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behorende bij her proet-schrift Administrative Response to Court Decisions.
The  impact  of court  decisions  on  the  asylum  procedure  in  the  Netherlands,
L.J.J. Wijkhuijs, 14 maart 2007.
1.   Rechterlijke uitspraken die de versnelde afdoening van asielverzoeken
dreigen te verstoren, resulteren binnen korte tijd in een aanpassing van
de asielprocedure.
2.    Dat eeti regel of rechterlijke uitspraak zowel naar 'de letter' als naar
'de geest' kan worden geinterpreteerd, betekent in de praktijk dat beleids-
medewerkers verschillend op rechterlijke uitspraken kunnen reageren.
3.  Aall de beleidsatiibtenaar is het de taak een balans te vinden tussen zijn
of haar commitment aan de politieke doelstellingen van het beleid en
de rechtmatigheid van de beleidsuitvoering.
4.   De Tweede Kamer en de At-deling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van
State hebben de beleidsmedewerkers van de IND gestimuleerd om instru-
metiteel op rechterlijke uitspraken te reageren.
5.   111 onderzoek naar de doorwerking van rechterlijke uitspraken dient
aandacht uit te gaan naar de juridische en politieke context waarin de
anibteluke organisatic geacht wordt te functioneren.
6.   Wie bij het plakken van een fietsband vergeet de buitenband op
glasscherven te controleren, kan na verloop van tijd weer opnieuw
beginnen.
7.   Politieke druk is geeti reden om lichtvaardig met regels om te gaan.
8.   In a society that is caught up iii newsflashes, highlights, and incidents,
it is unusual to study one specific subject for four years.
9.    Just like  sardines  try to find a way out from the  dolphins  chasing them
to the surthce of the sea and the seabirds awaiting them there, illegal
hnniigrants  seek  to  escape  tr-oni  abject  poverty  in  their  country of origin
.ind tight border controls at the EU (or US) frontiers.
10.   It  is  equally  important  to  preserve  the  capacity  to  observe  the  world
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Preface
This book is the result of an empirical study of the impact of court decisions.
The study focuses in particular on the response of policy officers of the Dutch
Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) to court decisions that address
the execution of the asylum procedure. The study started in 2002, but the
motive to undertake this project resulted from events that go back further in
time.  It was in  1987,  when,  at a Christmas gathering at high school, my physics
teacher held a speech about reftwees. Although Christmas is typically a period
when you think about other people's troubles instead of your own daily wor-
ries, the speech obviously made such .1 deep impression on me that I could still
recall that specific event eight years later when, in 1995, I had to choose a
subject for my Master's thesis. I decided to write my Master's thesis about the
admission of asylum seekers into the Netherlands. In the summer of 1995,
when the war in Bosnia resulted in the fall of Sebrenica, 1 worked for three
months as a trainee in an asylum seekers' reception center that accommodated
about 400 asylum seekers from the fortner Yugoslavia. In the following year, I
wrote my Master's thesis on the temporary residence permit that was intro-
duced especially for asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia, and described
its implications for the asyluni seekers' legal position and socio-psychological
well-being. After graduation, I worked as a researcher/consultant and did re-
search on subjects that were quite different from, although sometimes related
to, the subject of asylum. A few years later, however, in the spring of 2002,
Marc Hertogh invited me to come to Tilburg University to work on a PhD
thesis that focused on court decisions in asylum cases. Since the research pro-
posal addressed the policy field I had become familiar with, I was immediately
interested.
To conduct a socio-legal study, however, familiarity with the jargon used in
the specific field of study is required. Since I am not a legal scholar but had
been involved in other studies in the field of immigration and asylum law,  I  felt
more at ease with tliis field of law than, for example, labor law or tax law.  The
reason why the IND is the subject of this study is thus partly practical. More-
over, the earlier studies as well as the context in which the IND is operating
had aroused my interest in the manner in which the IND responds to court
decisions. This study is focused on the process of decision-making by with the
IND policy officers decided whether (or not) to respond to a court decision.
Furthermore, the study explores the factors that inUuence the impact of court
decisions. Getting access to the IND, however, was by no means easy. An
organization that is instructed to execute a restrictive immigration policy and
has been frequently criticized for the way it handles applications probably
instinctively tries to avoid becoming the subject of yet another investigation.
Nonetheless, after a difficult start, I received permission to interview the policy
officers.
Of course, this study could  not  have been completed without the  help  of oth-
ers. From the initial phase until the completion of the project, I received sup-
port from people inside as well as outside Tilburg University, and I would like
to acknowledge some of them in particular. First,  I  want to thank Marc Her-
togh for offering me the opportunity to conduct this research project and for
preventing me from jumping to conclusions. I also owe gratitude to Wibren
van der Burg, who preferred to fulfill a secondary role, but without whose
support I would not even have started this project. Furthermore, I want to
thank my colleagues at the Department of Legal History and Jurisprudence for
their comments on preliminary drafts and I particularly thank Roland Pierik,
who invited me to co-host the Department's weekly 'ERE lunches' which
gave me the opportunity to do something in return. I also want to thank both
Thijs Jansen, with whom I initially shared the rooin and could talk about pre-
liminary research findings, and Lonneke Poort for putting up with me during
the final year of the research project. Furthermore,  I  want to thank Annemarie
Graft for the energy she put into reminding us that asylum seekers and illegal
immigrants are humans, too. I especially thank Lies Pennings with whom 1
share the interest in social science and could discuss freely the progress of the
research project.
Furthermore, this project could not have been conducted without the readiness
and input of the respondents, the policy officers of the IND. Since 1 have
promised them anonymity, I can only thank them via Anita Heijkoop who
coordinated the interviews. Besides, I could not have undertaken the project
without the effort of the people working at Dutch Rail, thanks to whom I
could Commute between Rotter(lam and Tilburg, and The Hague. I am also
grateful to Ineke Sijtsma for the effort she has put in editing the manuscript and
thereby greatly contributing to the readability of this book.
Finally, I want to acknowledge my parents, who have always given me the
freedom to go my own way. I also want to thank Wendy and Iona Zwennis
for taking me out for dim sum or sushi, which was a welcome distraction from
the puzzles I was struggling with. And, last but not least, I thank Eugenie for
her patience and the joy she has given me. You are the only one excused from




The True Meaning  of Life
We are visitors on this planet.
We are here for ninety
I or one hundred years
at the very most.
During that period,
we must try to do something
good, something useful,
with our lives.
lf you contribute to other
people's happiness, you will
find the true goal,
the true meaning of life.
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1.1       INTRODUCTION
Since  the  mid  1980s, the Netherlands  has been confronted  with high in0uxes
of asylum seekers. As a party to the Geneva Convention and the European
Convention on Human Rights, it has dealt with the many difficulties related to
their admission: the processing of the asylum applications within a restricted
period of time, the reception of asylum seekers in large accommodations
located in small municipalities, and the deportation of rejected, and often un-
documented, asylum seekers. The problems surrounding the admission of asy-
lum seekers have led to many debates in the media as well as in Parliament and
had the attention ofinterest groups and monitoring institutions.
The number of people applying for asylum can fluctuate enormously.  In  1994,
for example, the Netherlands received 52,576 asylum seekers. In 1998, the
number had dropped to 22,857 but in the year 2000, the number rose to
43,895 and in 2004 the number dropped again to 9,782. The unpredictability
of the influx of asylum seekers can put severe pressure on the governmental
organizations responsible for the implementation of asylum policy, one of
which is the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND).
In the Netherlands, the IND comes under the Ministry ofJustice. The IND is
responsible for the hearing of asylum seekers coming from a variety of coun-
tries, with very different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. It has to assess the
legal grounds of the asylum applications while asylum legislation is in constant
flux. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that 'mistakes' do occur.
On the other hand, in cases of assigning a refugee status, or refusing one, these
mistakes can affect the core of people's existence. Fortunately, therefore, the
asylum procedure also provides the possibility of judicial appeal.   For  asylum
seekers, judicial appeal offers a last opportunity for a review of their asylum
application. Given that the IND rejects about 75% of the asylum applications in
first instance,1 the courts that decide in asylum cases have experienced a heavy
caseload in the last few years.
However, judicial review of asylum applications not only contributes to the
protection of asylum seekers' rights, it also enables the IND to improve the
quality of its decisions and, at least to some extent, its processing of applica-
tions. After all, 'by granting an application for judicial review a court is primar-
ily asserting ex post control over a single decision but, through the articulation
of the principles oflawfulness,  it may also perform an educative role by provid-
1 See Cohortanalyse  asielprocedure 1994-2003, published in  the  Parliamentary Papers of the
Lower House, TK 2004-2005 19 637 no. 911, p. 12. See also Doornbos 2003a, p. 70.
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ing guidelines to regulate future decision making:2 Judicial review of asylum
applications thus makes it possible for the IND to improve the legal quality of
its working practices. The question is, however: To what extent does the IND
learn from court decisions? More specific, this study addresses the following
question:
How do policy officers of the IND respond to court decisions that
address the asylum procedure, and what factors limit or enhance the
court decisions' impact?
1.2       THE  CONTEXT  OF  THIS  STUDY
Legal studies have shed light on judicial review from a variety of perspectives.
Most contributions, however, focus on constitutional or legislative review: the
invalidation of statutes, because they are in conflict with a superior law, typi-
cally a constitution or a treaty.3 Tliey specifically address the institutional role
and jurisdiction of the court and the differences in judicial review between
different countries. These studies have shown that the differences in judicial
review can, to a large extent, be explained by the historical, constitutional
features of the states in question: Therefore, studies ofjudicial review always
need to be conducted in a system-specific way.5
However, judicial review can be more broadly defined as 'scrutiny by the
judicial branch of government of decisions and actions of the executive branch
to police compliance with rules and principles of 'public law' (including, but
not  limited to, 'higher  law').'6  On the basis  of this definition,  only  some,
mainly socio-legal, researchers have looked more closely at judicial review of
administrative decisions. They are as such more concerned with the 'aftermath'
ofjudicial review, within a specific institutional system, and focus on the ques-
tion: What happens after a court has quashed an adniinistrative decision or
criticized administrative practices? With reference to this latter topiC of re-
search, this study focuses on the inipact of court decisions on the execution of
Dutch asylum procedure, although it will necessarily also address the constitu-
tional role and competence of the court within the Dutch democratic
rechtsstaat.
Furthermore, studies that have addressed the functioning of public administra-
tion  and, more specifically, the inipact of court decisions on policy implemen-
tation, have so far hardly paid attention to the role of policy officers who
operate at the middle management level of governmental organizations. Al-
though there is ati elaborate collection of studies on front-line officers or so-
2    Richardson & Sunkin 1996, p. 90.
3   Cane 2004, p. 16.
4    See, for example, Brewer-Carias 1989, and Tate 1992, pp. 4-5.
5   Cane 2004.
6   Cane 2004. p. 16.
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called street-level bureaucrats and, of course, the body of literature on upper
echelon public officials has grown in the last 2() years still, the role of policy
officers operating at niiddle management has hardly been explored. It seems as
if the functioning of the middle matiagenient level of governmental organiza-
tions is taken for granted, while policy officers operating at this level fulfill a
crucial role in the policy implementation process. They act as intermediaries
between the upper and lower levels of government,  they translate policy direc-
tives into operational measures and procedures, find solutions to practical prob-
lems affecting policy execution, and infortii their setiior-level officials about
policy results. Moreover, policy officers operatitig at niiddle tiianagenient, too,
have discretion in the Way they implenient policies, iii their allocations of pri-
orities and resources, and iii the methods and criteria used for evaluating pro-
grains.7 This study aims to provide a supplement to the literature currently
available and therefore focuses on  the role of policy officers in the government
agency's response to court decisions.
Iii sum, the present study offers a socio-legal perspective on the working of'the
law' within a government agency. The point of departure of this study is court
decisions that address the asylum procedure. The study examines the way these
decisions are addressed by the IND and focuses on the process by which the
policy officers of the IND decide whether (or not) to alter administrative pro-
cedures and workitig practices so as to bring the execution of the asylum pro-
cedure in accordance with the requirenients set out iii the court decision.
Furthemiore, this study aitiis to idetitify the litctors that in0uence the policy
officers' response and, in that way, the impact of court decisions. In the follow-
ing sections, I will further explain the theme of this study.
1.3   LEARNING FROM COURT DECISIONS
1.3.1 INTRODUCTION
As mentioned in the introduction  of this chapter, judicial review of administra-
tive decisions gives government agencies the opportunity to learn. Through its
judgments, the court provides a government agency with feedback on the legal
quality of its functioning. Court decisions can thus result in adjustments meant
to  improve the government agency's functioning.8  In  the body of literature on
public administration and organizational sociology, organizational learning has
been a prominent subject of research. Theoretical notions developed in the
1960s and 1970s by pioneers such as Cyert & March (1963), Deutsch (1966),
Wilensky (1967), March & Olson (1976), and Argyris & Schiin (1978) have
fonned a fertile basis for a large collection ofstudies into the capacity of organi-
zations to learn: The presupposition of theories on organizational learning is
7   Miller 1998, p. 38.
8    Daalder & De Groot 1993, p. 279.
9     For an overview, see, for example, Huysnian 1996, and Tsang 1997.
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that organizations, like individuals, are capable of learning. Learning is regarded
as a basic principle of the development of organizations. 10
Organizations do not have brains, but they have cognitive systems and
memories. As individuals develop their personalities, personal habits, and
beliefs over time, organizations develop worldviews and ideologies.
Whether and how organizations learn cannot be determined in advance and is,
therefore, a recurrent subject of study. Studies on organizational learning can
focus on both  the effect of learning and the learning process. The term 'organ-
izational learning', however, should not be confused with the 'Learning Or-
ganization', which has a (more) normative connotation and is mainly used ill
management studies. An organization is a Learning Organization only if it
manages to bring about a continuous learning process directed at innovation
and improvement.
11
Despite the elaborate  body of literature on organizational learning, however,
there is no uniform definition of the concept. 12 Definitions of organizational
learning usually emphasize the distinction between thinking and doing, be-
tween a cognitive dinlension and an action-oriented dimension of learning. 13
Learning is regarded as a process that is characterized by a growth of intelli-
gence directed at a systematic improvement of the organization's functioning. 14
in Dynamics of Organizational Learning, Huysman distinguishes four types of
organizational learning: internal learning, feedback learning, learning from
others, and creative learning:5 Internal learning is the basic process of organiza-
tional learning during which the organization learns from its members and the
members from the organization. Feedback learning occurs when the organiza-
tion learns from information that comes from the organization's environment.
Learning from others occurs when the organization learns from the experience
of other organizations. Creative learning, then, involves creating new knowl-
edge by means of innovative processes (such as experiments, exploration, and
creativity) that are initiated within the organization.
Since the purpose  of this study is to examine whether and how the IND learns
from court decisions, learning from feedback seems the most appropriate type
of learning to focus on. However,  to  give an impression  of how organizations
(can) learn from feedback information, I will first describe the elementary form
10   Hedberg 1981, p. 6. See also Templeton et al. 2004.
11 See Huysman & Van der Vlis 1998.
12   Templeton et al. offer some methodological atid thematic prescriptions for defining the
organizational learning concept (Templeton et al. 2004).
13   See, for example, March & Olson 1975, pp. 147-148.
14    't Hart et al.  1988, p. 86. See also Pressman & Wildavsky 1985, Etheredge  1985, p. 66,
and Sabatier 1986.
15 The four types of learning are mutually dependent since too much focus oti one type of
learning may produce negative consequences with regard  to the other types of learnitig
(Huysman 1996, p. 57).
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of organizational learning, that is, internal learning. Then a description will be
given of how organizations may learn from feedback.
1.3.2 INTERNAL LEARNING
Internal learning is the basic process of organizational learning and focuses on
the process by which knowledge and information is disseniinated throughout
the organization.  In fact, internal learning can be viewed as a process of institu-
tionalization.16 When social practices become generally accepted, they become
an institution, which, in turn, influences the behavior of individual members.
Institutionalization is thus a dual process. During an institutionalization (or
learning) process, individual knowledge becomes organizational knowledge,
whereas individual knowledge, through socialization, is infuenced by organiza-
tional knowledge. This institutionalization process takes place in three stages:
by extemalization, objectification, and internalization ofknowledge. 17
Externalization of knowledge is the stage in which individual knowledge is
shared with others. Individual knowledge of organizational members is ac-
quired during individual learning processes, and is influenced by both organiza-
tional knowledge and new information the individual receives from interaction
with the organization's external environment. Individual knowledge is usually
shared in formal settings, such as meetings or project group sessions, or in in-
formal ways.
Objectification of knowledge is the stage in which individual knowledge that is
shared with others is accepted by dominant coalitions in the organization, such
as the management, a critical mass, or charismatic figures. These dominant
coalitions can infliience the learning process positively or negatively. When
dominant coalitions confirm the externalized knowledge, it becomes part of
the 'objectified' organizational knowledge. Organizational knowledge com-
prises the rules, procedures, strategies, technologies, cultures, and other frames
of reference by which an organization operates.
Internalization of knowledge, the third stage of the institutionalization process,
entails the transmission of organizational knowledge to individual members of
the organization. Through internalization of organizational knowledge, indi-
viduals become and continue  to be members of an organization. Internalization
is promoted by systematic methods such as instructions and guidelines, and
through the exchange of particular working practices. Organizations can create
conditions that may significantly influence what individuals 'franie as a prob-
lem, design as a solution, and produce action to solve a problem'.18
16   Huysman & Van der Vlis 1998, p. 221. See also Huysman 1996, pp. 59-69, and Choo
1998.
17    Huysman & Van der vlis 1998, pp. 222-224. See also Berger & Luckman 1966.
18   Argyris 1992, p. 8
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The ideal situation is when there is 'mutual learning': A continuous interaction
between individual knowledge and organizational knowledge. Problems arise
when the emphasis on internalization is too strong, or too weak. In the first
situation, the individuals learn more from the organization than the organiza-
tion learns from the individuals, which reduces the possibility for new informa-
tion and ideas to be incorporated into the organization. In the reverse situation,
the individuals  do  not make  (full)  use of the organizational knowledge  that is
already available.
1.3.3 LEARNING FROM FEEDBACK
The type of organizational learning this study is concerned with is learning
from feedback. As one of the pioneers in the field of organizational learning,
Argyris & Schdn have specifically focused on the question of how organizations
learn from (negative) feedback.19 They distinguish three learning processes. The
first is 'single-loop learning', which rests on the organization's ability to detect
and correct errors in relation to a given set of operating norms. Single-loop
learning is appropriate for the repetitive issues. It is like a thennostat that learns
when it is too hot or too cold, and then turns the heat off or on. In a single
feedback loop, the detected outcomes of actions are connected to organiza-
tional strategies and assumptions, and then are followed by actions so aS to keep
organizational performance within the range set by organizational norms. The
norms themselves, for product quality, sales, or task performance, remain un-
changed.21' According to Morgan, many organizations have become proficient
at single-loop learning. The basic skill is often institutionalized in the forin of
information systems designed to keep the organization 'on course'.21
Another manner in which an organization can learn from feedback is by 'dou-
ble-loop learning'. Double-loop learning requires organizational members to
question the underlying normative assumptions to correct the detected error.
In double-loop learning, the error is not only connected to strategies and as-
sumptions for effective performance but to the very norms that define effective
performance.22 Double-loop learning thus depends on the organizational mem-
bers' ability to take a 'double look' at the situation by questioning the relevance
of operating norms.23 To do so, organizational members must be open to in-
consistencies in the organization's functioning.24 According to Bain, organiza-
tions that lack such a reflective space 'are "asleep" to their own behavior'.25
The organization may appear to be awake and responsive, but in fact is acting
in a  repetitive way without thought of reflection.
1"    Argyris &  Schdii 1978.
20    Argyris & Schun  1978, pp.  18-19.
21  Morgan 1997, p. 88
22    Argyris & Schon  1978, p. 22.
23  Morgan 1997. p. 87.
24  Morgan 1997, p. 94.
25  Bain 1998, p. 425.
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The third manner of learning that Argyris and Schdn distinguish is 'deutero-
learning', which means the organization is able to maintain a continuous cycle
of learning.26 Interventions are no longer attempts to solve problems but are
meant to bring about a Learning Organization.
1.3.4 CONCLUSION
This study examines to what extent the IND learns from court decisions. Since
court decisions form part of the feedback information the organization receives
from its environment, I have set out how organizations can learn from feed-
back as well as how the basic process of organizational learning takes place.  A
synthesis of these tWO types of organizational learning results in a more specific
distinction between single-loop and double-loop learning, which in this study,
serves to clarify the differences between modes of administrative response to
court decisions.
Single-loop learning requires organizational members to be able to detect de-
viations from predetermined nornis in feedback information, and to correct
these accordingly. In a single-loop learning process, however, feedback infor-
mation  does not result in an adjustment of the organizational norms that define
effective performance; These organizational norms determine what adjustments
to the organization's working practices are made. In some instances, a single-
loop learning process may be an adequate response, but it is less appropriate in
more complex situations where feedback information addresses the norms the
organization is supposed to meet. If, in that case, the organization shows a
single-loop learning process, it means that the information the individual
niembers received from feedback is not externalized, or is not objectified by
dominant coalitions in the organization. As a consequence, the organization
does not optimally learn from feedback information.
In double-loop learning, the feedback information does bring about an adjust-
ment of the organization's underlying norms and assumptions. The feedback
on the organization's performance not only results in a correction of the or-
ganization's working practices, but is also related to the norms that define efiec-
tive performance. This requires that individual menibers externalize their
knowledge and that the externalized individual knowledge is accepted by
dominant coalitions in the organization, So that it becomes part of the organi-
zation's memory. A double-loop learning process can eventually result in deu-
tero-learning that brings about a Learning Organization. lf there is optimal
interaction between individual knowledge and organizational knowledge, the
organization is able to maintain a continuous learning process.
The question to what extent a single-loop or double-loop learning process
actually takes place focuses attention on barriers and stimuli for organizational
learning. For example, the transition from single-loop to double-loop learning
26   March & Olson term this 'the complete cycle ofchoice' (March & Olson 1975).
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can be hindered by barriers such as high staff turnover or specialization.27 lin
Chapter 3, 1 will more fully elaborate on the factors that specifically influence
the impact of court decisions. First, in the following section, four modes of
administrative response to court decisions will be distinguished. The four
modes of administrative response differ  as to the extent to which a government
agency learns froin court decisions.
1.4    FOUR MODES OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE
As has been mentioned above, this study is about a government agency's re-
sponse to court decisions. The study focuses in particular  on  the  role of policy
officers who work at middle management of a government agency. In Regi,la-
tory justice, Kagan  distinguished  four  modes  o f rule  application  caseworkers  may
adopt when deciding iii individual cases.28 The four modes of rule application
(the judicial mode, legalism, unauthorized discretion and retreatism) differ as to
the extent to which caseworkers adhere to rules and procedures, and the extent
to which they are conimitted to the realization of organizational goals. Al-
though  a caseworker's manner of decision-making  might be classified as  one  of
the modes of rule application, Kagan assumes that most agencies incorporate a
mixture of modes of decision-niaking,  as organizational  and external conditions
change and as different kinds of cases and parties appear on the scene.
Analogous to Kagan's model, it is possible to define four modes of administra-
tive response policy officers inay adopt in response to court decisions. The
distinction between the four modes of response, however, is not based on a
differentiation between written rules and organizational ends but follows from
the distinction that is generally made between 'tile letter' and 'the spirit' of the
law.29 The letter of the law refers to the rules that define legal rights or obliga-
tions. When it specifically concerns court decisions in which the court has
criticized an administrative decision or action, the letter of the court decision
refers to the ultimate ruling: the breach of a specific rule. The spirit of the law,
on the other hand, refers to the overall purpose  of the law; the values and prin-
ciples that rules are supposed to guarantee. In deciding on a specific case, the
court not only concludes whether a rule has been violated, it also motivates the
weighing of ititerests that resulted in the final ruling. Therefore, the spirit of a
court decision entails a more general message concerning the values and princi-
ples the government agency is supposed to consider when executing its tasks.
The distinction between the letter and the spirit of court decisions results in
four  modes  of administrative response  Gee  Figure   1.1).  The four modes  of
administrative response differ as to the exteiit to which policy officers address
the spirit and the letter of court decisions. Although it is normally expected
tliat governinent agencies fully comply with court decisions, the question is:
27 See Morgan 1997, p. 88, and Dery 1982.
28    Kagan  1978.
29   See. for exatiiple, Halliday 2(1(14, p. 81), atid McBarnet & Whelan 1991.
8
INTRODUCTION
To what extent do policy officers, in response to court decisions, pay attention
to the letter  and the spirit  of the court decision?
Figure 1.1: Four modes ofadministrative response to court decisions.
Focus on the spirit of court decisions
+ -
I                                              II
+ Well-Considered Instruniental
Focus on the




-          Principle-Based Non-Response
Respoilse
The differentiation between the four modes of administrative response forms a
conceptual framework that serves analytical ends. In this study, the framework
is used to assess the IND policy officers' response to court decisions. Depend-
ing on the organizational context and external conditions, the policy officers
may apply a different mode of response. However,  in a specific context,  one  of
the modes of response niay turn out to be dominant. In this section, I will
describe  the four modes of administrative response  in more detail.
Well-Conside,ed Response
In a well-considered mode of response, the policy officers show a readiness to
bring administrative working practices into conformity with both the letter and
the spirit of the court decision. In response to a court decision, they do not
only examine to what extent the agency's working practices are in contraven-
tion with the court ruling, they also think through the possibility that the de-
tected non-conformity with the law is caused by an imbalance in the agency's
weighing of interests. They realize that besides an adjustment ofprocedures and
working practices, they also may have to evaluate the priorities the agency has
set in policy execution and, to that end, the policy officers examine the values
embedded in the court decision. The motto of policy officers applying a well-
considered response is: "How can we improve the agency's functioning?" If,
for instance, the court states in its judgment that the organization wastes en-
ergy, because it leaves the lights in the offices on for too long, the policy offi-
cers will not only adjust the time period the offices are lit but also examine
whether the organization can more generally reduce disproportionate energy
use. Or, in the opposite case: if the court states that the organization has gone
too far in striving to reduce energy use and makes its employees work in too
poorly lit rooms, which violates the employees' health and safety rights at
work, the court decision not only suggests adjusting the amount of light in  the
offices but also provides the policy officers with the impulse to examine
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whether the organization, due to its striving for efficiency and cost reduction,
compromises the working conditions of its employees in other ways as well.
This does not imply that the policy officers are not committed to the policy
goals their superiors have set. On the contrary, the policy ofBcers know that
public policy has to meet various though often conflicting interests. Therefore,
they reckon with the possibility that a one-sided account of interests has be-
come part of the agency's daily working processes and, in that way, has caused
the infringement of the law.
In  short, if policy officers apply a well-considered  mode of response,  the  gov-
ernment agency is capable of double-loop learning and, therefore, the impact
of court decisions is likely to be most profound. A well-considered mode of
response will usually result in both short-term and long-term corrective meas-
ures: besides adjustments that are meant to bring administrative working prac-
tices in accordance with the court ruling, the response to the court decision
also includes measures to secure that a similar mistake will not easily be made.
The well-considered mode of response thus may seem the most preferred ad-
ministrative response to court decisions. However, in some situations, this
mode of response may be less appropriate, or difficult to apply.
Instnimental Response
In an instrumental  mode of response, the policy officers primary focus on the
letter of the court decision. In response to a court decision, the policy officers
examine to what extent administrative procedures or working practices are in
contravention with the court ruling and search for measures to bridge the gap
between the letter of the court decision and policy execution. The motto of
policy officers applying an instrumental response is: "Rules are rules, and rules
are to be obeyed." However, in response to a court decision, the policy officers
pay little  or no attention  to the spirit of the court decision. The court's consid-
erations with regard to the values and principles that lie  at the basis  of the court
ruling are not used for a broader examination of the manner in which the
organization incorporates these interests in its working practices. Consequently,
the agency's underlying normative assumptions remain unchanged, although
the specific error in the agency's functioning is detected and corrected. The
court decision results in ad hoc adjustments of administrative procedures. The
effect of the court decision  does not include measures to uphold the legal qual-
ity of the agency's working practices.
An instrumental mode of response may result from a lack of legal knowledge.
It is possible that the policy officers are not aware of the thoughts and discus-
siotis that in former years resulted in the need to lay down specific rights or
obligations in formal legislation. However, it is also possible that the policy
officers do not fully use their legal knowledge because they do not take the
time, or do not find themselves in the position, to evaluate the agency's per-
formance in light of the values and principles set out iii a court decision.  Con-
sequently, the government agency shows a single-loop learning process and,
10
INTRODUCTION
therefore, the extent to which the agency learns from court decisions remains
limited.
Prindple-Based Response
A principle-based mode of response, on the other hand, is characterized by a
focus  on  the  spirit  of the court decision, while the letter of the court decision is
considered to be of secondary importance. Policy officers who apply a princi-
ple-based mode response are well capable of interpreting court decisions.
However, on the basis of the court's consideration, the policy officers come to
a different conclusion with regard to the implications of the court decision and,
therefore, do not comply with the court rulitig.
A principle-based mode of response offers scope for flexibly (or creatively)
dealing with coniplex situations in which legal noniis are not yet clearly speci-
fied. Policy officers may apply a principle-based mode of response when, for
instance, strict adherence to the court ruling would imply that a specific group
of clients is no longer entitled to the services the organization offers, while the
policy officers are of the opinion that under the law these services are aimed at
these clients. In response to the court decision, the policy officers therefore
refer to the law's general objective, or to the values and principles embedded iii
the court decision, but do not fully meet to the court ruling.
In a principle-based mode of response, the policy officers  thus  take "the princi-
ples"  or "the spirit of the law" as their primary point of reference. A principle-
based mode of response, however, can inhibit the legality of the government
agency's working practices. Since the policy officers do not fully nieet de court
ruling, two different kinds of realities may arise: One of rules (set out in the
court decision), and one of working practices. As a consequence, the effect of a
court decision can only be assessed after a (longer) period of time. If it turns
out that administrative working practices are brought into conforniity with the
court ruling, or official rules are adjusted in line with administrative working
practices, the court decision may have contributed to this development. How-
ever, if administrative working practices are not brought into confonnity with
the court ruling and official rules have not been adjusted, the inipact of the
court decision has eventually been minimal.
Non-Response
In case of a non-response, any reference to the court decision is lacking. This
mode of response can result from a lack of legal knowledge and information
about court decisions, or from resistance. As a consequence, the government
agency continues its manner of policy execution without knowing, or wishing
to  know,  that a court has challenged the legality of its working practices.  In  the
case of resistance, the policy officers almost automatically react to court deci-
sions by stating: "The court decision does not have consequences for the
agency's working processes." Moreover, the policy officers' non-response to a
court decision is apparently not criticized by controlling institutions, or is hid-
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den from their view. A non-response to court decisions thus also implies that
institutions, such as Parliament or the media, do not effectively observe the
legality of policy execution. Consequently, the government agency acts in
contravention with the law and does not learn from court decisions.
1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN
Case Stitdy
To gain insight into the impact of court decisions, the case study method was
used. A case study is a research method that can be very useful for research in
areas where the theory under consideration is still at an exploratory stage.30 it
requires an intensive inquiry into a relatively large number of variables to de-
scribe and explain the phenomenon that is studied:' Since a coherent theory
with regard to the impact of court decisions is lacking, exploratory hypotheses
derived from theoretical notions already available were used to gather and
analyze research data.32 From iinpact studies and  the body of literature on pol-
icy implementation, nine hypotheses were distilled witli regard to factors that
can linlit or enhance the impact  of a court decision.
In this study, five court decisions were examined in detail. The selection in-
cluded judgments from three different courts, though all five judgtnents specifi-
cally addressed the asylum procedure and, as such, required a reaction by the
IND. 31 The cases examined present a representative image of the impact of
court decisions on the Dutch asylum procedure. The cases show the problems
the  IND  had  to  deal  with when  it was confroiited with  this  type of court deci-
sion. Information about the agency's response to the court decisions was gath-
ered through interviews with policy officers of the IND.34 For each case, the
two policy officers who were directly involved in the agency's response to the
court decision were asked about the consequences of the court decision in
question. Each case provides insight into the way the policy officers interpreted
the court decision and weighted its implications for the IND organization. On
the basis of this infonnation, the policy officers'  mode of response  to the court
decisions was assessed.
In addition, the policy oRicers' dominant mode of response served as point of
reference for the study into the factors that influenced the impact of the court
decisions. The factors that could limit or enhance the inipact of court decisions
were grouped into three dotiiains. By means of desk research and (additional)
interviews with IND employees, inforniation was gathered about the charac-
teristics of the government ageticy, the field of law,  and the political context iii
30  Yin 1984, alid R.ingeling 1978.
31     Swatiborn  1996.
32    Swaiiborti 1996, and Ringeling 1978.
33   For the selection ofcases, see Section 4.6.
34   For a list of the respondents, see Appendix 2.
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which the government agency operates. On the basis of this information, the
hypotheses distilled from the literature were tested.
A Compariso,1 between the IND and Two other Government Agencies
This  study will show that besides characteristics of the government agency,  the
IND policy officers' response to court decisions was influenced by factors ema-
nating from the agency's legal and political context. Given that the IND oper-
ates in a specific context (which was briefly described in the introduction of
this  chapter  and  will be dealt with niore fully in Chapters  4  and  7), the manner
in which the IND policy officers responded to the court decisions may not be
representative for other government agencies.
To situate the findings from the case studies in the specific context in which
the IND is operating, the performance of the IND have been compared witll
the performance of two other government agencies: the Employee Insurance
Agency (l.Titvoen'ngsoreanisatie Werkgeversverzekeringen) and the Dutch Tax Au-
thority (Belastingdienst) However, the comparison did not address the decision-
making process in response to court decisions, since an iteration of an intensive
inquiry at these two other government agencies would be an enormous task
that would go beyond the scope of this study. Still, to  get an impression of the
differences and similarities between the three government agencies, the com-
parison addressed the legal context and, more specifically, the number ofjudi-
cial appeals against decisions of the three government agencies.35 The findings
of this comparison suggest that the policy officers of the Employee Insurance
Agency and the Dutch Tax Authority might apply a different mode of response
than did the policy oUicers ofthe IND.
1.6   OUTLINE OF THIS STUDY
This study starts with a description of the normative framework. For those who
are not familiar with the constitutional context of the Netherlands, Chapter 2
offers a description of the main features of the Dutch rechtsstaat. Furthermore,
Chapter 2 addresses two issues that, at present, dominate the debate about the
functioning of the Dutch rechtsstaat. The subjects of discussion  are the influence
of the courts on public policy implementation,  and the role of policy officers  in
relation to their elected political superiors. In short, Chapter 2 sketches the
perspectives of how the relationship between the three branches of government
is normatively seen by Dutch legal and public administration scholars.
Next, Chapter 3 Sets out the analytical framework of this study. The chapter
offers a definition of the term impact and a description of a research model that,
iii this study, is used to describe the policy officers' response to court decisions.
Furthermore, Chapter 3 contains nine hypotheses with regard to factors that
can  influence the iinpact of court decisions.
35 See Appendix 4.
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Chapters 4,5,6, and 7 form the empirical body of this study. First, Chapter 4
sets out the legal as well as the political and administrative context of Dutch
asylum policy. The chapter highlights the international treaties and national
regulations with regard to the admission of asylum seekers. Furthermore, the
chapter gives an overview of the legal proceedings that follow from the han-
dling of asylum applications and is concluded with an explanation of the selec-
don of cases that served to examine the IND policy officers' response to court
decisions. Next, the IND's response to five court decisions is described in detail
in Chapter 5.  On the basis of these findings,  the IND policy officers' dominant
mode of response  will be assessed in Chapter 6. In addition, Chapter 7 contains
an explanation of the impact of the court decisions. In this chapter, the hy-
potheses that were drafted in Chapter 3 will be tested against empirical data.
Finally, Chapter 8 contains a summary of the main findings of this study, and




2.1        INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets out the normative framework of this study. Firstly, for those
I who are not familiar with the constitutional features of the Dutch democratic
rechtsstaat», 1 will describe the institutional arrangement of the legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial powers and explain the tasks of the trias politica. The con-
stitutional arrangements described in the first sections form the starting point of
this study. Readers already familiar with the constitutional context of the
Netherlands are referred to section 2.5. In this section, I will elucidate the
arguments that, at present, form part of a debate about the actual working of
the Dutch rechtsstaat. This section focuses in particular on the assumed political
influence of the court on public policy implementation and on the role of
policy officers with regard to their political superiors. The chapter is concluded
with some final remarks concerning the present study into the impact of court
decisions.
2.2   THE FOUNDATIONS OP THE DUTCH RECHTSSTAAT
As an introduction to the constitutional features of the Dutch rechtsstaat, I start
with a metaphor that I borrowed from Witteveen. Witteveen describes the
history and distinctive characteristics of the Dutch rechtsstaat with the metaphor
of an old house.37 It is a house like the ones to be found in Amsterdam,  with a
foundation and three floors that have been added to the main building in the
course of the centuries. Picturing the reihisstaat as a house, the Dutch constitu-
T
tional state was established in 1814, when the first Constitution was drafted.
The foundations of the Dutch reditsstaat, however, are much older. They go
back to medieval times and consist of ideas and concepts derived from the
ancient legal tradition and the republican heritage that predates the modern
Dutch constitutional state. This medieval heritage forms the basis of the
rechtsstaat. Figure 2.1 depicts the three foors build on this heritage. The ground
floor contains four rooms decorated in a liberal style. Each room represents
concepts and practices  that were articulated during  the 188 century,  such  as:
liberal rights, the trias politica, judicial review, and legality. The first floor is
devoted to the 19'h century. It contains three period rooms in a democratic
style that present a collection of political rights and the Dutch parliamentary
system. Finally, the top floor, built during the 206 century, gives an impression
36 Rechtsstaat refers to the whole faniily of concepts of 'legality', 'rule of law'. and 'the
constitutional state' (Witteveen 2004).
37   Witteveen, 'Inhabiting Legality: How the Dutch keep reconstructing their Rechtsstaat'
in: Taekema (ed.) Understanding Dutch Law, 2004, pp.75-101.
15
CHAPTER 2
of the social face of the Dutch reditsstaat, as manifested  in  the addition  of social
rights and in a set of principles of good governance.
Figure 2.1: The edifice ofthe Dutch Rechtsstaat.38
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Although the edifice of the Dutch reditsstaat may now appear to be a well-
structured edifice, it has, nevertheless, a complex structure. Besides, the Dutch
continue to reconstruct their rechtsstaat to adapt it to new trends and to the
needs of its present-day inhabitants. In the following two sections, therefore, I
will elaborate on the characteristics of the parliamentary system, the doctrine of
the separation ofpolitics and adininistration, the principles ofgood governance,
the principles of judicial review, and the Dutch interpretation of the trias poli-
tica. 19 These 'rooms' contain the elements necessary to describe the relationship
between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government in the
Dutch reclitsstaat.
2.3 LEGISLATION, EXECUTION, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
2.3.1 LEGISLATION: PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT
111 the first  half of the 198 century, the first Constitution  (of 1814) was revised
several times.  In  1848, the Constitution introduced a parliamentary system and,
consequently, limited the power of the Dutch monarch. The parliamentary
system still provides the institutional infrastructure of the legislative process,
giving wide scope to the governinent to pursue its policies but placing 211 gov-
ernment activity under parliamentary scrutiny. Parliament and government set
38 Figure adapted from Witteveen 21)04, p. 76.
39 These sections are for a large part based on Witteveen 20(14, and Witteveen 200la.
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out the policy goals together. By Acts of Parliament, they define the legal con-
text within which public policy is supposed to be implemented.
Tlte Parliamentary System
Dutch Parliament has two houses. The Lower House, or the House of Repre-
sentatives, is directly elected and has the political primacy through its more
extensive legislative and inquiring powers. The Upper House, the Senate, is
indirectly elected through the menibers of the Provincial Council. A diverse set
of political parties are represented in the two Houses. Roughly speaking, the
parties are either liberal and left-wing (PvdA, SP, D66, Groenlinks), right-wing
il/VD,   LPF,   PvdV),or based on religious values (CDA, SGP, Christen Unie).
Otice every four years, after the election of the Lower House,  representatives
of the parties that (together) represent a majority of votes constitute a Cabinet
of Ministers, which is accountable to Parliament for all acts of government.
The Cabinet and the Queen form the Dutch government. The Queen, how-
ever, has little effective power nowadays and operates under full ministerial
responsibility. The Cabinet is presided by the Prime Minister.
Because of the Dutch multi-party system, the Cabinet is almost by definition a
coalition of two or more political parties. The political culture in the Nether-
lands, therefore, has a tendency to aim at political compromise, involving all
relevant interests. As a consequence, the policymaking as well as the legislative
process is receptive to influences of interest groups and (public and private)
organizations that, in one way or another, participate in policy implementation.
2.3.2 EXECUTION: GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
The actual implementation of public policy is entrusted to government agen-
cies.  In the Netherlands, the functioning of government agencies is defined by
(a) the legal doctrine of the separation of politics and administration, and (b)
the principles of good governance.
Separation of Politics and Administration
The doctrine of the separation of politics and administration finds its roots in
both American and European history. In America, it was Woodrow Wilson
(1856-1922) who, at the end of the 19'h century, criticized the then existing
spoils system, which afforded (and to sonic extent still affords) the elected
president the opportunity to replace the old administration by his own ap-
pointees. According to Wilson, the spoils system led to a too great involvement
of politics in administrative affairs and,  as a result,  in a dysfunctional and ineffi-
cient administration.4" In his view, the tasks assigned to the adrninistration
should be dealt with  in  a more business-like manner on the basis of administra-
tive expertise. Goodnow took up Wilson's ideas when he defined the differen-
40   Bovens et al. 2001, pp. 239-240.
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tiation between politics and administration in Politics and Administration (1900).
Political officials were supposed to express the popular will and determine the
41goals of public policy. Administration,  then, is responsible for its execution.
Political interference with policy execution would only be appropriate if the
administration looses sight of the political agenda and threatens to undermine
the goals and directives of its elected superiors.
On the European continent, Max Weber (1864-1920) came to a similar dis-
tinction, but his arguments differed. In the years between the tWO World Wars,
Weber noticed a  lack of political leadership  and,  due  to this absence, foresaw a
disproportionate influence of the administration. Moreover, Weber viewed
politics and administration as representing two different types of qualities or
expertise.42 The administration should be neutral and objective. Political offi-
cials should direct the administration by their vision; they must make the policy
choices for which they are held accountable by an elected Parliament.
The doctrine of the separation of politics and administration is thus meant to
secure political leadership and administrative expertise. Therefore, it implies a
differentiation between policy and execution. Policy is seen as the determina-
tion of goals and the finding of suitable means to attain them. Execution fol-
lows after policy goals are set.
In the Netherlands, the doctrine is explicated in two components. The first
component is the recognition of the    printacy    of politics, which means that the
administration must be directed from the political center, that is, the Cabinet.
This condition fits in with the principle of ministerial responsibility, which is
laid down in Article 42  of the Dutch Constitution  and has become one of the
pillars of Dutch democracy. The principle of ministerial responsibility implies
that the Minister is responsible  for acts  of government to Parliament.  If a  gov-
ernment agency does not perform well, and Parliament is not convinced of a
Minister's capacity to direct his or her administrators, Parliament can decide to
dismiss the Minister. The second component of the separation of politics and
administration is the principle of administrative neutrality, which means that the
administration may not interfere in the political process. Therefore, the ad-
ministration must be loyal to its political superiors, be neutral towards citizens
and organizations, and act in the common interest.
Principles of Good Governance
In order to deal with the contingencies of administration, the legislator has
granted government agencies discretionary powers. Moreover, regulations
41       In 77'e Afyth of the Dichotomy, Svara describes the historical development of the differen-
tiation between politics and adininistration and puts forward that the founding fathers
(Wilson and Goodnow) never advocated the narrowly defined dichotomy based on a
strict separation of politics and administration. According to Svara, it was Sayre who, in
1958, asserted that a strict dichotomy was 'the founding theory of public administration'
(Svara 2001).
42  Bovens et al. 2001, pp 241-242.
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actually binding upon citizens are described in more detail in legislation further
down the hierarchy.43 To secure legality, however, government agencies are
bound by principles of good governance.  In the Netherlands, these principles
were  developed  by the courts  in the second  half of the 20'h century.   In   1994,
the principles have been translated into statutory law and laid down in the
General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuitrsred,0.
Firstly, the principles of good governance comprise a set of formal principles
focusing on the qualities of both the process through which the government
agency has reached its decision and the way the decision is argued. Further-
more, administrative law prescribes substantive principles of good governance,
relating to the content of the decision taken. Taken together, the principles of
good governance have become a vast network of rule-of-law considerations,
applicable to all administrative deci,il,tls.  On the basis of the General Adminis-
trative Law Act, citizens can appeal with the administrative court against deci-
sions of government agencies. Besides, judicial review is not the only way
governinetit agencies are checked. Parliament and other institutions such as the
National Ombudsman also monitor the actions and decisions taken by gov-
ernment agencies.
2.3.3 JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE COURTS
As a liberal ideal, the protection of the laws afforded by the judiciary was al-
ready firmly established in the  constitutions of the 198 century.44 However,  the
judiciary was not promptly entrusted to adjudicate con0icts between citizens
and government agencies. These conflicts were dealt with by a separate system
of administrative review, under which it was possible  to file complaints culmi-
nating in an appeal to the Crown. In the 208 century, however, when gov-
ernment itself became more pervasive, shifting from a limited set of tasks to a
vast array of tasks associated with the welfare state, a comprehensive system of
judicial review of administrative acts emerged. An important influence in this
development was a decision of the European Court of Human Rights regard-
ing Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (dealing with the
judicial function).  In the Bent/tam case (1985), the European Court interpreted
Article 6  in such a  way as to greatly extend  the  role  of the judiciary in conflicts
regulated by administrative law. According to the European Court, the system
applied in the Netherlands, of administrative review through the Crown, was
in  contravention of Article  6.  As a result, this system of administrative review
was replaced by judicial review through the administrative court.
43     At the top of the hierarchy stand all  products of the legislative process in which the
Cabinet and  the two Houses of Parliament cooperate to make legislation:  Acts of Par-
liament. These formal statutes can delegate law-making powers to the Cabinet that can
publish general administrative orders by Royal Decree. Furthermore, all governmental
bodies can proclaim non-binding guidelines relating to their tasks and policies and, un-
der some conditions such as official publication, these are regarded as law as well and can
be applied by the Courts (Witteveen 2004, p. 87).
44  Witteveen 2004, p. 85 fE
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At present, judicial review in administrative law takes place in three stages.
Firstly, citizens can appeal with a District Court. Next, against decisions of a
District Court, both parties can lodge an appeal with an appeals court. The
appeals court re-examines the facts of the case and reaches its own conclusion.
Finally, one can appeal with the Dutch Supreme Court. At this stage, however,
the facts of the case as established by the lower court are no longer subject to
discussion. The Suprenie Court only examines whether the lower court ob-
served proper application of the  law in reaching its conclusion.
The Principles ofJudicial Review
The main principles ofjudicial review are laid down in the Constitution. In
the first place, the judiciary must be independent;45 it aims at impartial justice,
and applies and interprets the law but it cannot proclaim new law. Further-
more, trials are usually conducted in public and the court needs to specify the
grounds on which it's judgment is based.46 The courts are, however, not al-
lowed to review the constitutionality of formal legislation.47 The liberal rights
contained in the European Convention oti Human Rights, on the other hand,
can be invoked in court on the basis of Article 94 of the Constitution, holding
that '[s]tatutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable
if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties that are binding on
all persons or of resolutions by international institutions.'48 Furthermore, the
court can review the constitutionality of lower legislative instrunients.
Finally, one last characteristic ofjudicial review in the Netherlands needs to be
mentioned. When the judiciary started to develop the doctrine of good gov-
ernance (see section 2.3.2), it started out rather modestly with a theory of mar-
ginal judicial review. This theory, that still forms the basis for judicial review in
administrative law cases today, means that a conceptual distinction is made
between those aspects of a governmental decision that are dictated by consid-
erations of law, and those that are dictated by considerations of policy.  On  the
basis of the theory ofmarginal judicial review, the court does not enter into  the
policy considerations, since  it is not allowed to judge  oii the policy goals  or the
effectiveness of the nieasures the government agency has taken, but it has the                  4
right to judge on the legality of administrative decisions and the considerations
on which these are based. As a result, the court does not interfere with the core
of governmental activity but only  does a marginal check. This restricted role  of
the court is in line with the Dutch interpretation of the trias politica, which will
be dealt with in niore detail the following section.
2.4   THE DUTCH INTERPRETATION OF THE TRIAS POLITICA
In section 2.3, the institutional arrangement of the legislative, executive, and
judicial powers in the Dutch reclitsstaat was outlined. In this section, the
45    Article 117 of the Constitution.                                                                                                                        I46  Article 121 ofthe Constitution.
47  Article 120 ofthe Constitution.
48 <www.nzinbzk.ril>.
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boundaries of their tasks will be dealt with  in more detail.  The distinctive tasks
of the three state powers find their origin  in  the 18m century liberal ideals  of
the Trias Politica. The trias politica gives expression  to  a  normative point  of view
about the way the state powers should be organized to safeguard the freedom
of citizens in a democratic state.
In the Netherlands, the actual realization of the tnas politica took place in the
course  of the 19'h century  when the competences  of the legislative, the execu-
tive, and the judiciary were laid down in the Constitution. Before I  go into the
Dutch interpretation of the trias political, however, it is necessary to point out
that, under the heading of Trias Politica, there are, historically speaking, two
main schools of thought.49 One is the doctrine of the   separation   of  powers,   the
other is known as the   balance   of powers. Both doctrines can be found in Montes-
quieu's book 'I'he Spirit Of the 1-Au,s (1748). The doctrine of the separation of
powers, though,  has its origins in 178 century England where, after the civil
war (1690), Locke drafted a first concept of the doctrine that was meant to
avoid tyranny.   In 1787, Publius (a pseudonym of Alexander Hamilton, James
Madison, and John Jay)  took up Montesquieu's ideas, developing especially the
doctrine  of the balance of powers  through the notion of'checks and balances'
The point is that the Dutch  interpretation of the trias politica contains elements
from both doctrines. It could be said that the doctrine of the separation of
powers offers a set of minimum conditions, while the doctrine of the balance
of powers describes a set of optimal conditions.
50
The Separation of Powers
The doctrine of the separation of powers proclaims a strict separation of the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers. It conceives the three powers as
three consecutive stages  in the process of governing. First, there must be  laws,
accepted by the representatives of the people. Subsequently, the administration
must shape its policy on the basis of these laws.  The last stage is judicial review
of the legality of policy implementation by an independent and impartial judi-
ciary. Furthermore, the doctrine of the separation of powers not only requires
that these functions are separated, but also the organs fulfilling them and the
persons taking part in these functions. In the Netherlands, this latter require-
ment is not met, but the doctrine of the separation of powers has shaped the
contours of the Dutch reclitsstaat by a set of prohibitions. The main prohibitions
51
are.
-   The legislator makes general acts but must refrainfrom taking concrete decisions of
governance. To prevent tyranny and safeguard the freedom of citizens, the
legislator is allowed to set out general rules only.
49   Witteveen 21}04, pp. 83-85. See also Witteveen 200la, and Witteveen 1991.
50  Witteveen 2001, p. 279.
51   Witteveen 2004, p. 83, and Witteveen 2001a, pp 267-271.
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-     The legislator may not take decisions of a judicial nature. In theory, this rule is
generally accepted, although some laws with retroactive effect may have
the same effect as a court decision.
-    Government agendes may not make tlieir own ntles. Government agencies must
execute laws and they have discretionary powers to pursue the policy goals
the government has set. If government agencies were also in the position
to influence the law, this would forni a threat to the freedom of citizens.
Such a situation would be inconsistent with the doctrine of the separation
ofpolitics and administration.
-          The   courts   may   not   intefere   in    the   legislative   process.   If the courts made new
laws or interfered  with the content of statutory  law, they would violate  the
democratic principles of the Dutch rechtsstaat. The constitutional prohibi-
tion for Dutch courts to review the constitutionality of formal legislation
serves to ensure that this rule is met.
-    The judiciary is not allowed to interfere with activities assigned to the government.
Of course the courts judge the lawfulness of the policy implementation,
but, in the Netherlands, the courts must refrain from pronouncing policy
directives through their judgments. The theory of marginal jitdicial  review is
based on this thought.
The Balance of Powers
Besides the prohibitions resulting from the doctrine  of the separation of pow-
ers, notions from the doctrine of the balance of powers are part of the basis of
the Dutch rechtsstaat, too. The doctrine of the balance of powers takes the three
state functions as its starting point as well, but the temporal or normative suc-
cession of these functions are not its most salient features. The organs perform-
ing the three functions need not be separated so much. Instead of a sharp
demarcation of their respective domains, the organs must be made sufficiently
independent to be able to control each other. The underlying idea is that,
through the limitation of one power by the balancing influence of another,  the
freedom of citizens is safeguarded.
The prime example of a balance of powers is the American arrangement of
checks and balances between Congress and the President. Congress can make
laws, the President can Veto these laws and then a two-third majority in Con-
gress can override the Presidential veto. Similarly, the Dutch legislative process
of producing Acts of Parliament is an arrangement that is characterized by
checks and balances. Acts of Parliament must be made with the participation
and consent of both the government (which also has the executive power)  and
the two Houses of Parliament (which also have powers designed to control the
executive function). Moreover, the doctrine of the balance of powers has re-
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sulted in a set of normative guidelines for the functioning of the Dutch
rechtsstaat.51 These include:
-    Ascertain tliat tlze distribittion of tlze powers corresponds witli tlie working of social
and   political  forces   in society. This guideline entails that the institutional infra-
structure of the state is regularly checked. Adjustments  of the infrastructure
should be based on scientific social research.
-          Enable   government    to    operate    effectively,    and   make    it    transparent   and   subject    to
enqi,iry at the same time.  On the basis of this guideline, government depart-
ments and government agencies have the authority to draw up rules and
regulations. Obviously, these have to be in accordance with statutory laws.
Furthermore, from the requirement of transparency, it follows that a gov-
ernment agency always has to justify and motivate its actions. The General
Administrative Law Act is meant to guarantee this.
-     Give the judiciary, as the weakest of the three powers, a large measure offreedom in
tlie  interpretation  of  the  laws,   without   tempting   the  judiciary   to   dominate   the  politi-
cal process. From this guideline, it follows that the courts may not interfere
with activities assigned to the legislative or executive powers when this is
not necessary to protect a legally recognized interest of high importance.  In
deciding controversies, however, the courts inevitably need to interpret
the law, especially when the legislator has failed to clarifr the standards
stated in the statutory provision. This guideline aims at bringing the exist-
ing law (in an almost common law-like fashion) into harmony with new
developments in society. The courts apply the law and contribute to its
evolution.
Taken together, the prohibitions of 'the separation of powers' and the guide-
lines from 'the balance of powers' do not exclude nor fully correspond with
one another. Since both doctrines of the tnas politica can be found at work in
the Dutch reclitsstaat, it does not provide a conclusive framework of relations
between Parliament, government, and judiciary. For some, this may seem an
incomplete solution, but then again, the margins between the separation of
powers and the balance of powers give the Dutch the opportunity to find out
gradually what the role of the institutions actually should be. So, at times, rep-
resentatives of the government, legal scholars, and scholars in public admini-
stration get involved in  a debate about the functioning of the Dutch reclitsstaat.
In some of these controversies, the functioning of government agencies is sub-
ject of discussion. At other times, reference is made to the role of the courts.
The  arguments with regard  to the desired  role of government agencies  and  the
courts are further explicated in the following section.
42  See Witteveen 2(.)(14, p. 85, and Witteveen 20Ola, pp. 272-278.
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2.5   SUBJECTS OF DISCUSSION
2.5.1 INTRODUCTION
Although the functioning of the Dutch reditsstaat has been a recurrent subject
of discussion throughout the centuries, a starting poitit of a present debate
frequently referred to is a report published in 1997 entitled Administration under
control.53 In this report, representatives of the government expressed their con-
cern about the decreasing effectiveness of the administrative machinery due to
a growing number of administrative lawsuits.  By some, it was even argued that
appeal procedures, meant to protect citizens against illegitimate governmental
interference, had beconie part of a strategy used by citizens and interest groups
to  hold up government activities.54 Moreover, the growing number of admin-
istrative and judicial appeals had led to an increased workload for the adminis-
trative machinery as well as the judiciary.
This trend of'juridification' (i,tridisenng) was not only taking place in the Neth-
erlands. It is observed in other Western democracies as well:5 It is an almost
common feature of modern societies held together by a complex web of rules.
In the course of the 20'h century, the Dutch government, for example, has
gradually pernieated Dutch society. After the depression  o f the 1930s  and  the
devastations of the Second World War, it took on the responsibility to provide
a vast array of goods and services (such as transport, housing, education, and
health care). Later   on, the government started to develop activities in other
fields, like spatial planning and environment. To handle the growing responsi-
bilities of the welfare state, the legislator provided the adininistration with
general guidelines  that were  set  out  in  a vast number of adnunistrative rules  and
regulations. On the other hand, the legislator equipped citizens with legal pro-
tection to safeguard the legality of administrative decisions as well as the princi-
ples of democracy.
However, not only the number and complexity of national rules and regula-
tions expanded, in the second half of the 208 century, the number of interna-
tional and, in particular, European regulations also increased. Moreover, while
this  web of rules grew together, Dutch society and its citizens changed. Partly
due to inimigration, the Dutch population increased from 11.4 million inhabi-
tants in 1960 to 16.2 million in 2003.56 Moreover, since tlie 196Os, Dutch
citizens became more individualistic in their ways of life and assertive in de-
fending their rights.  They no longer unite in groups on the basis of religion but
on the basis of (personal) interests. As a consequence, administrative decision-
making has become a complex event of specialists whereas the decisions have
to comply with a diverse set of connictitig interests. Economic interests, for
53 Bestuur in geding, report of a study group under the direction of the Queen's Comniis-
sioner in the Province of North-Holland, Van Kemenade,  1997.
54  Rombouts 1997, p. 12
55     See, for example, Cooper  1995, and Cappelletti  1989.
56 Source: Statistics Netherlands.
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example, nuy collide with safety measures or environniental interests, while
the interests of an individual or group of citizens also have to be weighed
against the general interests of Dutch society as a  whole.
The growth in legal proceedings against administrative decisions, and the dis-
turbing effect of this development on policy implementation have led to a
discussion about the role of the administrative court and its assumed infuence
in political matters. The arguments of this debate are dealt with in section
2.5.2.  Furthermore, the growth of govertiment activity and the increased com-
plexity of its tasks have led to a widely held view that government agencies
form  a too prominetit  link  in the policy chain. Already  in 1969, Crince  Le
Roy stated that, because of its discretion and its influence in political inatters.
the administration should be regarded as a fourth power in the state.57 In the
years after (:rince Le lioy's publication, more studies on the discretion of ad-
ministrators followed, but the assumed political influence of the administration
was given only little attention until,  iii  the late  199()s, conHicts between Minis-
ters and their civil servants stirred a debate about the influence of bureaucrats in
political affairs. In section 2.5.3,  I will explain the arguments of this debate that
centers on  the role of policy officers with regard to their political superiors.
2.5.2 THE JUDICIARY AND THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY
The first subject of discussion concerns the influence of the administrative
courts in political matters.  11.epresentatives of the government in particular have-    '
the iinpression that the administrative machinery is being thwarted by the
judiciary. The vast number of appeal procedures against administrative deci-
sions would hinder an effective policy execution atid, therefore, harm the
credibility of the government. Moreover, in deciding conflicts, the courts
would pay insufficient attention to the general interest and, as a consequence,
interfere too much in the tasks assigned to the administration. The argument
goes that the courts underestimates the effort government agencies make in
preparing decisions, and passes over the fact that governnient agencies execute
laws that have parliatiientary approval.58 Therefore, the courts would meddle
too much in matters about which the legislator has already decided democrati-
cally.59
Others, however, mainly legal scholars, shed light on the problem from an-
other perspective. They consider the growth of the judicial role in the present
social welfare state as a necessary development to preserve a democratic system
of checks and balances. They indicate that the executive and the judiciary, in
fact, practice similar activities: both government agencies and the courts deter-
mine the position of interest and judge with reference to the law. Moreover,
they stress the constitutional impartiality and independency of the courts and
their function to safeguard the rights of minorities in society against a dispro-
57  Crince Le Roy 1969.
58     For a more elaborate description  of the arguments, see Wolthuis  2005.
59 See Nieuwenhuizen 1996.
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portionate power of majority rule.60 Furthermore, they point out that, since
govemnient activities have grown and have become more complex, Parliament
has become more dependent on the expertise of government agencies:' As a
result, the legislative and executive powers have blended and the constitutional
relations within the Dutch rechtsslaat transformed from a 'Trias Politica' into a
'Duas  Politica,62 or 'a duality of powers'.63 Therefore, the courts are considered
to counterbalance a too powerful bloc of Parliament and government. A more
active role of the judiciary is advocated; it is regarded as a 'compensatory
mechanism'64 meant to restore the institutional balance between the powers in
the state.
Tlie  Admi,tistrative Jicrisdiction  Department of tile  Colincil  of State
The discussion about the role of the courts touches in particular  upon  the posi-
tion of the Adini nistrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State,
which is one of the highest adininistrative courts in the Netherlands, which,
since the introduction of the Alietis Act 2()()(), has acted as an appeals court in
aliens law.  The Adniinistrative Jurisdiction 1)epartment  of the Council of State,
however, is not only criticized for thwarting the executive, but also for having
too close a relation with the government. The criticisni focuses on the dual
function the Council of State performs.
The Council of State is not only a court of appeal, it also advises the Dutch
government and Parliament on legislation, for example, on bills the Cabinet
puts before Parliament for approval. Although the Council of State makes a
clear distinction in its organization between the Legislation Department and
the Administrative Jurisdiction 1)epartment, the question is raised for how long
the Council of State will perform both the advisory and judicial functions,
especially since the European CZourt of Human Rights has criticized a similar
composition of the Luxembourg Council of State in the Procola case (1997).
Moreover, since the Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of
State decides in cases under the Aliens Act, it has been criticized for a too rig-
orous interpretation of the law, leaving little scope for aliens to defend their
cases and, therefore, taking a standpoint in favor of the executive.65 In this
study, 1 will go into this issue in more detail. First, however, there is one other
subject ofdiscussion that needs to be addressed.
2.5.3 THE ENTANGLEMENT OF POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION
The second subject of discussion focuses on the role of government agencies'
civil servants with regard to their political superiors. Since the first Kok Cabi-
net took office  in  1994,  it has tried to tighten  its  grip  on the administration  by
60   See, for example, Lindahl 20()1.
61   Tjee,ik Willitik 1999.
62   See, for example, Brenninknieijer 2(IC)1, and Stroink, 20()(J.
63   Vati Bijsterveld 2()(12.
64 Van Bijsterveld 2(1()2, p. 162.
65   Spijkerboer 21)(122.
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stressing 'the primacy of politics'. The Ministers expected absolute 10yalty frolll
their civil servants in executing the coalition agreement. 111 the years that fol-
lowed, however, reports about dysfunctional relations between Ministers and
their civil servants emerged.66 Some of these conflicts arose after publicly an-
nounced statements of highly placed policy officers in which they criticized the
Cabinet's policy or actions taken by their Minister.  In  February  1999,  for ex-
ainple, the Minister of Defense, Frank De Grave, was 'surprised' to read a
newspaper iii which one of his civil servatits argued that Parliament should
itivestigate the events that had resulted iti the fall ot-Sebrenica. Three days later,
the civil servant was replaced. Iii October   1999, the Minister of Econotiiic
Affairs, Anneniarie Jorritstiia, disniissed her Secretary General, after he had,
once again, publicly criticized the Cabinet's tax pOliCy. As these conflicts were
broadly dealt with in the media, a debate aniong legal and public adininistra-
lion scholars followed about the role of policy officers with regard to their
political superiors. Some strongly rejected the actions of tlie policy officers.
11.eferring to Weber, they stated  that,  on the basis  of the doctrine of tlie separa-
tion between politics and adtiiinistration, bureaucrats should always be loyal to
their political leaders, even if they personally disagree with the Minister's policy
choices. After all, the Minister is respoilsible and, therefore, the freedom of
speech of policy officers is, or should be, restricted.67
Others, however, neither approved nor disapproved the actions of the policy
officers, although they tried to relate the incidents that had happened to the
changes that had taken place in Dutcli society and within the state. In the past
15 years, for instance, the media had come to play a significant role in public
policy affairs. The media no longer covered the news only 'objectively'; it also
put forward policy issues, which drew the attention of members of Parliament
who, more often than not, put these issues on the political agenda.68 Moreover,
the argument is that a Weberian separation between politics and administration
has never been common practice, since a sharp differentiation between policy
and execution is practically impossible.  Execution of public policy iniplies that
decisions are to be taken and, in deciding on executive matters, policy officers
inevitably take political interests into account.69 Until 1965, the involvement of
bureaucrats iii political matters was perhaps not so apparent because of the
'pacifying politics' *acijicatiepolitiek) prevalent at the time.m At present, how-
ever, it is even expected from policy officers to have a sense of the political
state of affairs. Besides, since Weber drew up his idealistic and hierarchical
model of administration, government agencies have grown in size and have
66   See, for example, 't Hart & Wille 2(1(12, and Vrins 1999, pp. 8-10.
67   Cliteur 1999.
68  Rosenthal 1999.
69   See, for iristance, 't Hart & Wille (eds.) 20(12, Rosenthal et al. 2001, and Van Thun et al.
1998.
70    In the period between  19 17 and  1967, the political culture in the Netherlands was
characterized by 'pacifying politics' emphasizing the compromises between the three pil-
lars of Calvinism.  Catholicism, and secular hunianism (Lijphart  1968).  See also Andeweg
1985, and R.osenthal 1974.
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become a professional and specialized machinery. Political leaders, it is sug-
gested, should be able to deal with these development:s and appreciate their
civil servants for their expertise.71 Finally, it is stressed that the separation be-
tween politics and administration has its limits in a normative sense, too. The
principle of adininistrative neutrality, which implies administrative loyalty to
the  primacy of politics,  does not dismiss career civil servants from their respon-
sibility to test the feasibility, legality, or democratic content of a political order.
If political  decisions are inconsistent with these basic principles,  it is the policy
officer's task to inform the Minister, or to advice him or her to decide other-
wise so that the Minister can be held responsible for his or her decisions to
Parliament. In that way, the relation between politics and administration is in
accordance with the principle of ministerial responsibility, which is 'the life-
blood' of Dutch democracy.73 Therefore, the relation between political leaders
and policy officers should be based on mutual trust and mutual loyalty.73 In this
study, an impression will be given of the actual relation between the policy
officers of the IND and their political superiors as far as the impact of court
decisions is concerned.
2.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter set out the normative framework of this study. First, 1 described
the institutional setting of the legislative, the executive,  and the judicial powers
in the Dutch rechtsstaat and explained that the Dutch interpretation of the trias
politica combines the doctrine of the separation of powers with the doctrine of
the balance of powers. As a consequence,  the Dutch interpretation of the trias
politica offers scope for controversies. In that respect, this study addresses the
role of policy officers with regard to the doctrine of the separation of politics
and administration. From a normative point of view, they are supposed to
execute both the directives given by their political superiors and the law as
interpreted by the court. The question is what policy officers do if a court
decision and political directives do not coincide. This study will shed light on
this dilemma.
The primary task of the administrative courts is to judge the legality of the
actions and decisions taken by government agencies. However, the Dutch
interpretation of the trias politica restricts, to some extent,  the role of the Dutch
courts.  From the doctrine  of the separation of powers, it follows  that the courts
may not interfere with activities assigned to government and, therefore, InUSt
refrain from pronouncing policy directives through their judgments. That is
why, in the Netherlands, judicial review in administrative law is based on the
theory of marginal judicial review, which implies that the courts do not judge
the  effectiveness of government agencies' actions. Furthermore, the courts  may
not interfere in the legislative process. If the courts made new laws or inter-
71    See, for exaniple, 't Hart 1999.
72    Dikker 1999.
73 See Nieuwkanip 2001, Rosenthal et al. 2001, and Van Thijn et aj. 1998.
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fered with the content of statutory law, the judiciary would violate the democ-
ratic  principles of the Dutch reditsstaat. Therefore,  constitutional review of Acts
of Parliament by the courts is prohibited under the Dutch Constitution. How-
ever, with regard to the execution of asylum policy,  not only national statutes,
but also international treaties such as the Geneva Convention and the Euro-
pean Coiivention on Human Rights are in force. As a consequence, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights also conducts judicial review in asylum cases.
The selection of cases that will be examined in this study therefore also includes
a judgment ofthe European Court of Human Rights.
Furthermore, the Dutch interpretation of the trias politica restricts the role of
government agencies.  From the doctrine of the separation of powers, it follows
that government agencies may not make their own rules; they must execute
the law and refrain from influencing the law-making process. If government
agencies were also in the position to influence the law, this would be inconsis-
tent with the doctrine of the separation of politics and administration and,
consequently, form a threat to the freedom of citizens. The Minister, as the
political superior of the goveniment agency, is nevertheless, as a Member of
Cabinet, actively involved in the law-making process. However, since the
Dutch interpretation of the trias politica also includes guidelines from the doc-
trine of the balance of power, Cabinet cannot make laws without parliamentary
approval. Besides, the Minister can be held responsible by Parliament for acts of
government. This explanation of the nomiative basis of the Dutch rechtsstaat
suggests that Parliament closely observes the implementation of the asylum




A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
It is when we turn to consider judicial review's iliipact on ititernal proce-
dures atid decision-making that sonie of the niost difficult but also poten-
tially most interestitig research issues arise. Here we are getting very close to
tlie heart ofthe relatiotiship betweeti law aitd bureaucracy.
- Maurice Sunkin (2()04)
In:./tidicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact, p.  62.
3.1    INTRODUCTION
The aiin of this study is to enlarge the insight into the impact of court deci-
sions. Therefore, this study specifically focuses on the role ofpolicy officers iii a
goveninient  agency's  response to court decisions. In Chapter  1, the following
question was raised:
How do policy officers of the IND respond to court decisions that
address the asylum procedure, and wliat factors limit or enhance the
court decisiotis' itiipact?
This chapter sets out the analytical framework of this study. In their contribu-
dolls to Judicial    Review    and    Bureaucratic Impact, Sunkin as well as Richardson
point out the importance for researchers of precisely identifying the phenome-
non to be studied.74 The potential scope ofjudicial review and tlie anticipated
inipact of court decisions on administrative practice primarily depend on the
constitutional context. In Chapter 2, therefore, I have set out the constitutional
features of the Dutch rechtsstaat and addressed in particular the role of govern-
ment agencies and the courts. However, when studying the impact of court
decisions, some universal notions need to be considered, too. In defining 'im-
pact' it is necessary to specify the impact efwhat as well as the impact on what.
Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish impact as an c.{feet or product from
impact as a process. In section 3.2, I will address these matters and clarify what,
in the context of this study,  the term 'inipact' nleans. Next, section 3.3 presents
a research model that I have used to examine the response of the IND policy
officers towards court decisions. In addition, in section 3.4, three domains are
distinguished from which factors may arise that can limit or enhance the impact
of court decisions. This section results in a set of nine exploratory hypotheses
that, in this study, will serve as a checklist to explain the impact of court deci-
sions.
74  Sutikin 2(104; R.ichardson 2()()4. See also Richardson & Sunkin 1996.
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3.2 THE DEFINITION OF IMPACT
3.2.1 THE IMPACT OF WHAT?
There are various  ways of approaching the impact of judicial review.  Many
think ofjudicial review in terms of a court's final judgment. Other aspects of
the litigation process, however, may have equal if not greater impact. The most
significant effects, for example, might be felt not from the court decision itself
but from the publicity accompanying the entire procedure.75 Thus, in defining
impact,  one can focus  on the impact of the process ofjudicial review litigation,
including the threat of litigation, or on the impact of court decisions after a
court has published its judgment. Given the central question of this study, it is
specifically concerned with the aftermath of court decisions, although it will
also address factors that accompanied the judicial process.
Furthermore, when investigating the aftermath of court decisions, it is possible
to concentrate on the handling of individual cases and their eventual outcome
or on the 'consequences reaching into the future and beyond the particular
decision complained against'.76 An example of the former is a study by Bru-
insnia,77 who investigated the impact of a number of rulings by the Dutch
Supreme Court to find out what the implications had been for the participants
directly involved. On the basis of interviews with the individuals who took
part in the litigation process, he described the ultimate outcomes, and showed
that individuals who won the case were not, as a matter of course, satisfied
with the settlement suggested by the Court. Moreover, it turned out that some
of the Court's decisions never led to the suggested outcome at all. In a similar,
although more extensive study, Creyke & McMillan investigated the iinpact of
judgments of the Federal Court of Australia. Their study included all cases
brought before the Federal Court, over a ten-year period, in which the Court
set aside a government agency decision. They traced back both the legal repre-
sentatives of the individual applicants and the government agencies, and inven-
toried the ultimate outconie as well as the more indirect changes that Oowed
from the Court's decision.78 On the basis of their study, they came to a more
positive conclusion. Agencies generally did comply with the Court's decision
and reconsidered the matter. A common complaint of a number of applicants
was, nevertheless, that the agency took too long to reconsider the decision and,
in some instances, did so only after the applicant threatened further legal action.
In contrast to the two studies mentioned above, the present study focuses on
court decisions that, because of their content, imply an administrative response
that reaches further than the handling of an individual  case. This study is spe-
cifically concerned with court decisions that address the manner in which tlie
75  Richardson & Sunkin 1996, p. 88.
76 Hertogh 20Ola, p· 51·
77  Bruinsma 1999.
78   Creyke & McMillan 2004.
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asylum procedure is executed and, therefore, might necessitate the IND to
change its administrative procedures or working practice.
3.2.3 THE IMPACT ON WHATF
Now the type of cozirt decision has been more specifically defined, it is neces-
sary to consider where the impact is to be observed. For example, court deci-
sions can influence the parties directly affected by a particular court decision as
well as those whose cases are potentially subject to review. Richardson &
Sunkin term this the 'spread of the inipact'.79 The way in which government
agencies learn about developments in judicial review can be an important fac-
tor here.H Van Zoest, for example, studied the impact of court decisions on the
working practice of several local governments, which did not necessarily take
part iii the litigation process but were nevertheless subject to the court ruling.
On the basis of her studies with regard to street-vending licenses81 and the
assignnient of construction perniits,82 she concludes that, in tlieir daily practice,
local governinents do not find the time to take notice of court decisions.
Moreover, if they knew about a specific court decision, some weighed the
court ruling against (other) organization goals and admitiistrative practices. It
turned out that court decisions had only a limited impact oii the working prac-
tices of local governments.
The present study centers around one single agency, the IND, and, more spe-
cifically, on the agency's responsibility for the execution of the asylum proce-
dure.83 The IND is the principal although not the only governmental
organization involved in the execution of the asylum procedure. Other gov-
ernmental organizations the IND closely works with are: the Royal Military
Constabulary (Koninklijke   Marechaussee), the Alietis Police ( Vreenidelingenpolitie)
and the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (Centraal Orgaan
opvang Asietzoekers) Still, this study focuses on the IND's response to court
decisioris.
3.2.4 IMPACT AS AN EFFECT AND AS A PROCESS
Finally, one last element concertiing the impact ofjudicial review needs to be
addressed. It concerns the question  of how to assess the inipact. The nature of
an agency's reaction to court decisions can vary widely. In the context of
prison discipline, for example, there  are many examples of judicial decisions
79     Richardson &  Sunkin  1996, p.  94.  Richardson defines the spread ofthe impact  more
particularly as the direct and the indirect impact ofjudicial review (Richardson 2004, p
106). Hertogh, on the other hand, makes a distinction between 'single' and inultiple'
impact (Hertogh 1997b, p. 20)
811  Richardson & Sunkin 1996, p. 95.
81 Van Zoest 1989.
82 Van Zoest 1992.
83   Besides the handling ofasylum applications, the IND also decides on applications for
regular residence and naturalization. However, the working processes of these other
tasks are not included in this study.
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that led to changes in the rules relating to disciplinary procedures.84 Richardson
& Sunkin note that, 'in this context, judicial review seems thus to have pro-
vided the Prison Service with  a set of externally devised standards according to
which  they have shaped their guidance  and for the enforcement of which  they
can  look  to the courts.,85 Otliers, however, are more skeptical about  the  in-
strumental potential of judicial review. They point at the resistance of public
officials and put forward that any change occurs only when political leaders are
willing to give financial support.86 These differences in perspectives may result
from differences in the focus of the studies in question. In fact, impact can be
defined as both an dfect, or product, and as a process. Moreover, the two defini-
tions of impact are not mutually exclusive but can be used simultaneously.
However, if impact were solely defined aS the effect of a court decision, it
would generally require compliance research to investigate whether the agency
'obeys' the court decision.87 If, on the other hand, impact is defined as a proc-
ess, implementation research is required to investigate the way in which an
agency reacts towards court decisions.88 In this study, the focus is on the proc-
ess that follows after a court has published its judgment. The effect of the court
decision, however, will also be addressed.
When defining impact  as the effect of judicial review, a distinction  can  be
made between formal and i,dormal reactions.89 A formal reaction constitutes a
change in official agency policy, often characterized by a change in administra-
tive rules, such as an amendment to a statutory instrument, a standing order, or
a circular instruction. The most extreme formal reaction takes the form of
legislative intervention, but a single court judgment can also influence the
articulation of an agency's policy and the formal standards of that policy.90 In
general, these judicial standards are disseminated to front-line decision-makers
through what Sossin characterizes  as  'soft  law': a variety of informal guidelines,
circulars, operational memoranda, codes, and oral instructions.91 These rules are
used to further compliance with the agency's policy and raise the quality of
future decisions.
An informal effect, then, is defined as a behavioral change within a governnient
agency.92 In order to gauge this type of impact, it is necessary to look beyond
the formal reactions to the actual behavior of the agency's personnel.  It has
frequently been suggested that the behavior of administrative actors is more
strongly influenced by informal rules and customs than by formal legal princi-
84    See, for exampje, Boin & Resodihardjo 2000, Hammond  1998, and Feeley & Hanson
1990.
85  Richardson & Sunkin 1996, p. 94.
86   See, for example, Feeley 2004, and Boin & Resodihardjo 2000.
87    See, for instance, Canon  1991, p. 439, Mastop & Faludi  1993. and Bauni  1977, p.  129.
88 See Canoti  1991,  p. 439, and Mastop & Faludi  1993.
89  Richardson & Sunkin 1996, p. 93 and p. 96.
90     See,  for example, Hammond  1998.
91   Sossin 2()04a, p. 130. Baldwin speaks of'governmental rules' (Baldwin 1995, pp. 158-
159).
92  Richardson & Sunkin 1996, p. 96.
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ples.  Studies of decision-niaking in police and other rule applying organizations
frequently refer to the strong inUuence of organizational culture on actual rule
application.'3 Determining the informal impact of court decisions, Sossin states,
'requires due attention to the dynamics of administrative culture and institu-
tional relations as well as the predilections and convictions of individual deci-
sion-makers."4 To examine the informal impact of court decisions thus
requires a longitudinal inquiry of changes in administrative culture. Since this
study can only give a random indication of administrative practices, it is con-
fined to the formal effect of court decisions.  It may be presumed  that a change
in official agency policy is generally a first step, or a precondition, to bring
about a change in adniinistrative behavior.
In further classifying the effect ofjudicial review, Itichardson makes a distinc-
tion between 'positive' and 'negative' eff-ects. She states that Soille effects might
be regarded as positive in so far 'as they appear to be in furtherance of the spirit
of the court's decision', while others, iii contrast, are obviously negative, 'as iii
the case of a legislative reversal'.95 Although I agree that adjustments which
foster the spirit of court decisions can be classified as positive, I find it difficult
to define a legislative reversal as a negative effect since it is a majority in Par-
lianient that decides to amend statutory law. Therefore, 1 prefer a more 'neu-
tral'  definition of the effect of court decisions, following Halliday when  he says:
'the 'impact' ofjudicial review (. ..)  is not an 'either/or' matter, but is a ques-
tion of degree'.96
At this point, the distinction between impact as an effect and impact as a proc-
ess becomes apparent. So far,  I have dealt with the possible effects of a court
decision. However, it is equally possible to view impact as a process. Halliday,
for example, argues that 'the iinpact ofjudicial review should be recognized as
being dynamic, organic and changing. The question of what impact judicial
review has niay be better conceived as one of how the influence of experience
ofjudicial review interacts with other informing influences."7 In line with this
statement, Hertogh defined impact as 'the process by which the court decisions
are transmitted to the locus where the ultimate result occurs.'e In this study,
inipact as a process is defined as the way in which the government agency, on
the basis of case law, decides whether (or not) to alter its adniinistrative proce-
dures or working practices to meet the requirements embedded in the court
decision.  On the basis of this definition,  the response  of the IND policy officers
to court decisions will be examined.
93     See, for example, Kagan, 1978, Lipsky  198(b,  Van der Torre  1999,  and Halliday 2004.
94  Sossin 2()()4, p. 131
95  Richardson 2004, p. 109. See also Richardson & Sunkin 1996, p. 82
96   Halliday 2000, p. 122. See also Mastop & Faludi 1993, p. 80.
97    Halliday  1998, p. 196 cited iii: Sunkin 2()04, p. 69.




In this study, it will be examined how the IND responds to court decisions that
address the asylum procedure. The study focuses on the process of decision-
making by which policy officers of the IND decide whether (or not) to alter
administrative procedures or working practices so as to bring the execution of
the asylum procedure in accordance with the requirements set out in the court
decision. In determining the effect of the court decisions, this study is confined
to the formal, or procedural, effect of the court decisions: changes in official
agency policy, including legislative interventions and adjustments of the
agency's internal rules and regulations. This study does not go further into the
informal effect of court decisions, that is, the extent to which a change in ad-
nunistrative procedures has actually led behavioral change in the organization.
It  may be presumed  that a change of administrative procedures  is a first step,  or
precondition, to bring about a change in administrative behavior. However,
further research is required to determine whether such a change has ever oc-
curred.
The aim of this study is to deterndne how policy officers who function at the
middle management level  of a government agency respond to court decisions.
In  Chapter  1, four modes of administrative response to court decisions  were
distinguished: a well-considered response, an instrumental response, a princi-
ple-based response, and non-response. The four modes of administrative re-
sponse followed from the distinction that was made between 'the letter' and
'the spirit' of court decisions, and differ as to the extent to which the govern-
ment agency learns from court decisions. The question that was raised in
Chapter 1 was: To what extent do policy officers, in response to court deci-
sions, pay attention to the letter aiid the spirit of the court decision?
Now the focus of this study has been more clearly specified, the question re-
mains of how the policy officer's response to court decisions can be examined.
The following section, therefore, presents a research model that Hertogh de-
signed to examine the process of administrative decision-making in response  to
court decisions.99 In addition, section 3.4 inventories the factors that may inDu-
ence the policy officers' response and thereby the impact of court decisions.
3.3   IMPLEMENTATION OF COURT DECISIONS: A RESEARCH MODEL
In literature on public administration, a government agency is usually pictured
as a system that depends on input from its environment, which are processed or
put through into output. The process in which the input is transformed into
output is often conceived as a black box. Building on implementation studies,
Hertogh conceptualized this process of administrative decision-inaking in re-
sponse to court decisions as three consecutive steps or phases: the phase of
information, the phase of transformation,  and the phase of processing.'"'  Eacli
99   Hertogh 1997b.
100   Hertogh 20011, pp. 57-59; Hertogh  1997b, pp.  81-85.
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phase is concerned with a crucial question with regard to the implementation
of a court decision. This section describes the three phases of the research
model and concludes with some remarks with regard to its use in the present
study.
Tlte Pliase of hionnation
The first phase of the implementation model starts as soon as the government
agency takes notice of a court decision.  If a government agency itself took part
in the litigation process, it usually receives a transcript of the court decision, but
case law may also come to the notice of government agencies through special
journals  with an overview  of the most recent court decisions.'" An agency's
normal first step is then to interpret the court decision. During this phase the
question is: M/hat does the court decisi,. . say.7 The policy officers have to find out
what error the court has detected in the agency's decision or the manner in
which that decision was taken.
When the policy officers apply a well-considered mode of response, the expect:a-
tion is that they pay attention to both the precise ruling from a court decision and
the values and principles embedded in the court decision. When the policy offi-
cers apply an instrumental  mode of response,  they will mainly focus on the letter
of the court decision, while in a principle-based mode of response, the spirit of
the court decision is considered  to be  of primary importance.  Finally, a  possible
cause of the non-response mode can be that the policy officers were not aware of
the court decision.
Tlte Phase of Tra«onnation
When the policy officers have interpreted the court decision, they will find
themselves confronted with the question: M/hat (toes the  court  decision  mean for  the
organization? During this stage, the agency's policy is questioned in light of the
court's decision.102 The policy officers  will  have  to find answers to questions
such as: What adjustment can be made? Do these adjustment imply additional
costs for the organization? Can the adjustment be made within the term the
court has ordered? Because a rational calculation of utilities requires consider-
able time and information, this search process is like a rough 'cost-benefit
analysis'.
103
During the phase of transformation. the policy officers consider what measures are
necessary to comply with the court decision. The letter of the court decision
generally requires adjustments that are supposed to bring adntinistrative working
practices in conformity with the specific rule that, according to the court, was
violated. If the policy officers (also) address the spirit of the court decision. they
show a readiness to bring the agency's working practice in accordance with the
values and principles embedded in the court decision.
101 Hertogh 1997b, p. 84 and p. 107. See also Sossin 2004a, and Brouwer 1989.
102 Hertogh 1997b, p. 85 and p. 131. See also Canon 2(104, p. 96.
1(,3
Canon 2004, p. 88.
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The Phase of Processing
Finally,  in the third phase of the implementation process, the question follows:
What should be done ivith the cotirt decision? On the basis of the assessed implica-
tions of the court decision, the policy officers will have to Come to a decision
regarding the actions to be taken. When the policy officers believe a court
decision calls for an adjustment, the processing of the court decision might
include decisions as to whether any guidelines or instructions require revision
in light of a particular case and, if so, how to disseminate the information about
new procedures or working practices to employees and other relevant par-
ties.104 However, the policy officers can also decide not to comply with the
court decision. 105
When the policy officers apply a well-considered  mode of response, the phase  of
processing results in adjustments of administrative procedures and working prac-
tices that are meant to comply with both the letter and the spirit of the court
decision.  In ati  instruniental mode of response, the adjustments only address the
letter of tlie court decision, while in a principle-based mode of response, the
administrative reaction to the court decision stresses the spirit of the court deci-
sion. A lion-response to court decisions may result from resistance to alter admin-
istrative procedures or working practices.
Some Final Remarks
Hertogh realized that his model, like any conceptual model, is a simplification
of bureaucratic practice.  In  fact, the three phases  may  come  at  the  same  time  or
partially overlap. While interpreting a court decision, the policy officers106
might already decide about its implications or the manner in which the court
decision is disseminated into the organization. However, the conceptualization
of the decision-making process in three consecutive steps or phases serves ana-
lytical ends. The heuristic model was designed to detect factors that could
hinder the implementation of court decisions. Hertogh distilled the three per-
spectives from an extensive  list of implementation studies. By decomposing the
decision-making process into three phases, the implementation model offers a
helpful  tool for describing the de reaction of policy officers to court decisions
(see Figure 3.1).
In addition to the three phases, Hertogh distinguished three barriers that can
limit the impact of court decisions. In his study, however, Hertogh focused
exclusively on the role of the nionitoring institutions: the National Ombuds-
man and the courts. His aim was to detect possible differences in the impact of
court decisions and Ombudsman reports as a result of their style of control.  As
a consequence, he paid only limited attention to influences that were beyond
the monitoring institutions' control. Nonetheless, in the following section,
104  Hertogh 1997b, p. 85 and p. 157, See also Sossin 2004a, p. 158.
105 See Hertogh 20014 p. 59
106 Hertogh 1997b, p. 83
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which provides a list of factors that might influence the impact of court deci-
Sions, I will refer to the barriers Hertogh identified.










Iii./udktal Review and Compliance with Administrative Liw, Halliday examined to
what extent judicial review is capable of securing compliance with the re-
quirements of administrative law. His study was based on an empirical inquiry
at three local government departments that executed English homelessness law.
On the basis of his findings, Halliday concluded that informal rules and Customs
of the front-line officers inhibited the impact ofjudicial decisions. His research
thus affirms insights from other studies that questioned rule application by
street-level bureaucrats. However, the merit of Halliday's study is that he107
distinguishes three domains from which factors may arise that can limit or
enhance the impact of court decisions. The first domain consists of factors that
are located within the government agency. The second domain relates to the
field of law in which the government agency operates, and the third domain
comprises factors that stem from the government agency's political environ-
ment.  In this section  we  will  look more closely at these three domains.  How-
ever, since Halliday focused pnmarily on the role of front-line officers, while
the present study, by contrast, focuses on the role of middle management, I
have broadened the description of the three domains with findings from other
studies. The description of the three domains results in nine hypotheses, which
in this study, will serve as a checklist to explain the IND policy officers' re-      •
sponse to court decisions.
11'7   See, for example, Kagan 1978, Lipsky 198(), Aaiders 1987, and Van der Torre  1999.
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3.4.2 T E CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GOVERNMENT AGENCY
The first domain from which factors may arise that can limit or enhance the
impact of court decisions is the government agency. Halliday distinguishes
three factors in particular.
Legal Competence
The first factor that may influence the impact of court decisions is the agency's
legal competence. According to Halliday, legal competence encompasses the
agency's ability to understand law and its implications in the terms shared by
the courts as well as the application of legal knowledge to other relevant areas
of decision-making. 108 In response to a court decision, however, the govern-
merit agency may be faithful to the letter of the court decision, but miss, or
even violate, its spirit.'09 It can focus too much on bringing administrative
procedures in conformity with the court ruling, while not taking account of
the values and principles that the court expressed in its decision. For example,
in his study, Halliday found that, in one of the housing authorities, general
principles from administrative law were translated into detailed instructiotis,
which increased the workload of front-line officers, who subsequently imposed
a formalism on the interviews with applicants. As a result, the interviews lacked
the flexibility that administrative law requires for handling applications and,
thus, iii response to the court ruling, the agency missed the spirit of the court
decision. 110
In this study, in which the focus is on policy officers working at the middle
management level of a government agency, legal competence refers to the
policy officers' ability to interpret court decisions. The question is: Are they
able to find out what error the court has detected in the agency's working
practice? Policy oRicers who are legally competent have detailed knowledge of
both the law and the government agency's procedures and working practices
and are able to correct the detected error in a manner that is legally accept-
able."' The hypothesis is that the inipact of court decisions will be enhanced  if
the policy officers' legal competence is greater.
Hypothesis 1:
The impact of court decisions will be enhanced if the policy officers' legal compe-
tence is greater.
los  Halliday 2004, p. 73 and pp. 80-82.
11)9
Halliday 2004, p. 80.
110
Halliday 2004, pp. 72-8(1.
111 In this study, the policy officers' consideration to the values and principles ofa Court
decision falls under the definition of'legal conscientiousness', which will be dealt with at
the etid of this section.
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Dissemination of Legal Knowledge and Infonnation
The second factor Halliday distinguishes is the extent to which legal ktiowl-
edge is disseminated across the organization. Dissemination of legal knowledge
and information about court decisions is supposed to enable front-line officers
to comply with the regulations and is, therefore, a necessary condition to pro-
mote the impact of court decisions. Halliday suggests that the more legal
knowledge the front-line officers receive about what the law requires of them,
the greater the compliance with tlie court decision. In his empirical inquiry,
however, Halliday observed  that none of the three local authorities with whom
research was conducted kept a systematic record of court judgments, in spite of
the fact that they had been selected on the basis of their level of exposure to
judicial review litigation. By means of a description of the caseworkers' deci-
sion-making activities, he further ill„strated the difficult task of disseminating
information across the agency. Due to the complexity of even relatively sinall
organizations, legal knowledge was not disseminated throughout the govern-
ment agency. Halliday further noted that the appointment of a legal manager
1could enhance the agency s legal knowledge and expertise. The stronger the
relationship between front-line officers and their legal advisors, the greater
would be the level of legal knowledge within the agency. 112
The importance of disseminating legal knowledge and information has also
been  stressed by Oosting. 113 If court decisions are supposed  to  have any impact
on adrninistrative procedures and working practices, Oosting suggest, it is a
minimum requirement that the govertinient agency is sufficiently equipped
(with data-processing systems and personnel) to process the information that
follows from a judicial decision. Therefore, the hypothesis is that the impact of
court decisions will be enhanced when the policy officers make sure that in-
formation about court decisions is disseminated across the agency.
Hypothesis 2:
The impact of court decisions will be enhanced when the policy omcers make
sure that information about court decisions is disseminated across the agency.
Leal Conscientiousness
The third characteristic of the government agency that could influence the
inipact of court decisions is the policy officers' attitude to law. According to
Halliday, the regulatory capacity of a court decision will be enhanced when the
agency's employees are conscientious about applying their legal knowledge to
the full range of their decision-making tasks.'14 Employees who are legal con-
scientious care about acting lawfully: 'a commitment to legality must be part of
the decision-maker's professional orientation and value system.'115 Legal consci-
entiousness, however, should not be confused with the term 'legal conscious-
1 12   Halliday 2004, p.  50.
113 Oosting 1988.
114  Halliday 2004. p. 53.
115  Halliday 2004, p. 53.
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ness'. Although legal consciousness also refers to an individual's attitude to law,
it describes an individual's experience with the law and the outcome of legal
proceedings.116 Legal conscientiousness,  on the other hand, requires a willing-
ness to act lawfully. Legal conscientiousness is considered to be an important
factor for compliance with the spirit and not just the letter of the law and is,
therefore, a distinctive characteristic of policy officers who apply a well-
considered mode of response.
In practice, however, a thoughtful and skilled application of legal knowledge
may be overwhelmed  by the pursuit of administrative efficiency or by  fragmen-
tation within a large organization. 117 R.ather than looking to the law to guide
them about how to conduct the decision-making process, the decision-makers
often start with an intuitive sense of what the outcome should be and then
fashion the decision-making process around substantiating that objective. For
example, in her study on decision-making by immigration officers with regard
to the detention of asylum seekers at UK ports, Weber found that many immi-
gration officers reported being unaware of the detailed content of instruc-
tions. 118 Moreover,  they  said they relied on experience and common sense  to
guide their decisions, and considered their discretion to be constrained more by
peer review and the availability of detention space than by formal regulations.
Besides, knowledge of the law and the litigation process may be used creatively
to avoid legal control. 119
Legal conscientiousness, however, is not about masking or covering up mis-
takes. Legal conscientiousness calls for policy officers an adherence to legality,
which enables them to critically monitor the agency's priorities in policy exe-
cution, including the manner in which these are embedded in the implement:a-
tion process. In response to court decisions, therefore, the policy officers will
not only address the letter of the court decision but also its spirit. And when
they doubt whether the agency's priorities and norms are consistent with the
values and principles expressed in the court's judgment, it is expected they
make their doubts known. Otherwise, the government agency would not be
able to fully learn from court decisions. Or, as Morgan put it: To learn and
change, the policy officers must be prepared to challenge and change the basic
rules of the game at both strategic and operational level:20 The hypothesis is
that the impact of court decisions will be enhanced when policy officers ex-
press such a coinmitment to legality and apply their legal knowledge thought-
fully to  the full range of their decision-making and advisory tasks.
116   See, for ilistance, Merry  1990.
117  Halliday 2004, p. 81.
118   Weber 2003.
1 19   Halliday 2004, pp. 60-69. See also McBarnet & Whelan  1991.
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The impact of court decisions will be enhanced when policy omcers express a
commitment to legality and apply their legal knowledge thoughtfully to the full
range oftheir decision-making and advisory tasks.
3.4.3 THE LAW
The second doniain frotii which factors niay arise that niight influence the
inipact of court decisions is what Halliday calls 'the law'. The factors appertain-
ing to this doinain focus on the relation between the government agency and
the courts. Halliday distitiguishes one factor that might be of importance to
explaiti the iinpact of court decisions but there are in fact two factors to be
reckoned with. The first factor relates to the characteristics of the field of law.
The second factor is the clarity of court decisions.  In this section, I will clarify
both factors.
Characteristics ef tlie 1:ield of Ls,v
Iii his study, Halliday points out that adininistrative law has its own characteris-
tics, different froiti, for exainple, criminal law or private law. He makes it clear
that administrative law is structured around two parallel tensions. In the first
place, administrative law is meant to resolve disputes between a government
agency and an individual or group of citizens. Consequently, there is a tension
between the interests of the itidividual who is the subject of the administrative
process, and the goveniment agency. The second tension is between the
121
government ageticy and the courts. This tension relates to the basic constitu-
tional struggle between govertitiient agencies and the courts about who gets to
decide what, but the tension is also framed in terms of the relative expertise of
governnient agencies  and the courts. 122 Although his study is situated  in  a  Brit-
ish context, the point Halliday makes seems applicable to the Netherlands as
well. Chapter 2 provided a glimpse of the tensions that are inherent in the
relation between government agencies and the Dutch courts in the field of
administrative law. Every now and then, representatives of government accuse
the  courts  of judicial activism, while those who defend the position  of the
courts point at the too powerful influence of governnient agencies on public
policy. Halliday argues:
123
From a not-mative perspective, these competitions may be regarded as
what provide administrative law with its inherent and beneficial tlexibil-
ity. However, more practically, from an adnzinistrator's point of view,
they comprise the inherent contingency and uncertainty of administra-
tive law.





The point Halliday makes is that the tensions inherent to administrative law
permit the courts to develop competing models of administrative justice.
Firstly, the tension between the interests of the agency and the interests of the
individual brings forth two competing images of administrative justice  that  can
be placed at the opposite ends of a continuum. In the agency interest model,
bureaucratic efficiency is favored at the expense of the procedural protections
enjoyed by the individual citizen while, under the individual interest model, the
individual is the focus of the development of administrative practices at the
expense of bureaucratic efficiency. 124 Similarly, the tension between  the  gov-
ernment agency and the courts results in two other competing images. Under
the agency autonomy model, government agencies enjoy wide discretion in fash-
ioning their decision-making processes and the substance of their decision-
making outcome. They are free to follow their preferences, exercise their ex-
pertise, and trust their judgment.125 Under the judicial contwl model, on the
other hand, the courts show much greater willingness to exercise control and
to substitute their preferences for those  of the government agency. 126
By defining these images ofjustice, Halliday draws attention to factors that lie
out of reach of the government agency and, more specifically, follow from  the
legal context in which the government agency operates. However, Halliday
passes over the fact that, even within the field of administrative law, there Call
be differences between the characteristics of, for instance, tax law, social secu-
rity  law, and aliens  law that might be relevant to the impact of court decisions.
A study that examines the impact of court decisions should therefore address
the  characteristics  of the field of law with regard to the parties involved in  the
judicial process.
Like Halliday's study, also the present study is situated in the field of adminis-
trative law. Dutch aliens law, however, differs from other fields of administra-
tive law with regard to, for example, judicial appeal procedures and the
interests at stake in legal proceedings. For instance, in the Aliens Act 2000, the
legislator has shortened the term to lodge an appeal against a refusal to grant
asylum. This provision might be regarded as beneficial to the interests of the
IND. On the other hand, in the Netherlands, legal aid to asylum seekers is
subsidized which could favor the interests of asylum seekers. In Chapter 7,1
will further explicate the actual fields of tension between the applicants, the
IND, and the courts. With regard to the characteristics of the field of law,  the
hypothesis is that the more the 'agency interest' and the 'agency autonomy'
models dominate at the expense of the 'individual interest' and 'judicial con-
trol' models the less likely it is that court decisions will have an impact on
administrative procedures and working practices.
124  Halliday 2004, 9 157.
125  Halliday 20(,4, pp 157-158.




The impact of court decisions will be limited when the Sgency interest'  and the
'agency autonomy' models dominate at the expense of the 'individual interest'
and 'judicial control' models.
Clarity of Coun Decisions
In addition to the characteristics of the field of law, ambiguity in court deci-
sions may also influence the impact. In his study, Halliday clarifies the tension
inherent to administrative law by a legal analysis of case  law.  On the basis of his
analysis, he concludes that if compliance is to be secured, the courts should
give out consistent and clear messages to government agencies about what
administrative law requires.  I f the courts apply the law in an unclear and incon-
sistent fashion, the law is obviously confusing for those who conscientiously
seek to apply it. If, on the other hand, the courts apply administrative law
clearly and consistently, there is, or should be, no room for confusion.
127
Other researches have mentioned the role of the court in promoting compli-
ance as well. For exaniple, in her study on the impact of court decisions on the
working practice of local governments, Van Zoest observed that some of the
court rulings were ambiguous or self-contradictory, or dealt in too much detail
with the specific circumstances of the case in question.128 Her findings were
supported by a study of Neerhof, who conducted an extensive study into the
usefulness of case law with regard tO, among other things, spatial planning,
street-vending licenses, and unemployment benefits.  On the basis of an  analysis
of 235 court decisions, he concluded that 43% of the judgments lacked a clear
message about how to decide on similar cases; in only 28% of the judgments,
the court referred to an earlier court judgment.
129 Neerhof further noted that
court decisions become more useful when a higher court can overrule deci-
sions of lower courts, because judges of the higher court have to assess the
lower court's decision. Decisions of courts that have to decide in first and sin-
gle instance turned out to be more inconsistent. 130
In his study on the impact of court decisions and National Ombudsman re-
ports, Hertogh identified the lack of clarity of court decisions as a barrier for
the  impact of court decisions. He states that 'during the first phase  of the  deci-
sion-making process, it is especially important that officials feel that they are
confronted with clear and well-formulated rulings, which make it easy for
them to derive a general  rule from the great diversity of court decisions. ,131 The
difficulty of interpreting court decisions is mentioned by Sossin as well. In his
study on the impact of Baker on administrative decision-making in the Cana-
127  Halliday 2004, p. 166.
128 Van Zoest 1992.
129  Neerliof 1995, pp. 135-136
13"  Neerhof 1995, p. 214.
1.31   Hertogh 20(114 pp.  58-59. See also Hertogh 1997b.
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dian immigration service, he illustrates the di cult task of interpreting court
decisions with the following quote: 132
One of the difficulties arising from the [court] decision is what does
proper consideration of the children's interests mean. What does it
mean, in fact, to be alert, alive, and sensitive to the children's interest?
Because there is no easy answer to these questions, either on a factual
basis or on a principled basis, immigration officers and judges of this
Court have struggled whenever confronted with these questions.
These findings thus suggest that the clarity of a court decision influences the
court decision's effect. The hypothesis is that the impact of a court decision
will be enhanced if the court decision is clear and consistent. In this study,
however, this hypothesis will not be tested on the basis of a legal analysis of
case law as Halliday or Neerhof did. Instead, the hypothesis will be examined
from a policy officer's point of view. In interviews, IND policy officers were
asked whether they found court decisions to be clear and consistent.
Hypothesis 5:
The  impact o f a court decision  will be enhanced if the court decision is clear and
consistent.
3.4.4 THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT AGENCY
The third domain from which factors may arise that can influence the impact
of court decisions is the government agency's political environment. ln his
study, Halliday stresses that 'the law' is not the only normative system within
the decision-making environment: 'Government agencies do not operate in a
social, political or economic vacuum: 133 Consequently, administrative deci-
sion-making is,  to a certain extent, the product of its wider environment.  Hal-
liday does not describe the influences stemming from this domain in great
detail, but explored how front-line officers dealt with aspects like performance
audits, financial constraints, political pressure, and more remote social influ-
ences. The iniportance of including the broader (political) context when exam-
ining a decision-making or implementation process has been mentioned by
others as well. Barret & Fuge, for example, have stressed that, in implemetita-
tion studies, attention should be paid to the interaction between the subject
matter of policy and tlie organizational contexts in shaping the scope and limits
for action. 134 In addition, a series of socio-legal and public administration stud-
ies have shown that pressure from a government agency's political environment
can  have a profound  influence  on  administrative  behavior.135 With regard  to
the present study,  the following factors seeni of importance: the policy officers'
132 Quoted ill SOSSin 2004b, p. 1(15
133   Halliday 2(}04, p. 87. See also Hawkins  1992, p. 7.
134  Barret & Fuge 1981, p. 27. See also Bakker & Van Waarden, 2000.




comniitment to the Minister's policy goals, pressure from Parliament, influ-
ences froni the media, and the role of interest groups.
Tlie Policy Officers' Continit,ite,it to tlie Minister's Policy Goals
In his study on homelessness decision-making, Halliday observed that political
pressure limited the impact of judicial review. He noticed  that the political
climate iii Muirfield lead to a particularly harsh line in relation to homelessness
decision-making.  One of the  caseworkers stated:136
Homelessness is seen as the carbuncle on the bum of Muirfield, a bur-
den... The overriding factor  is   that the politicians   want  us   to  be   as
tough as possible. They want us to deter as many people as possible from
coilling to Muirfield. That's ati actual quote from a councilor.
Halliday argues that judicial review is rather litiiited in the extent to which it
can coutiterbalance such itifluetices. Judicial review hardly functions as a sane-
tion, although the cost of losing in court may provoke cautioii in adininistra-
tive decision-making. The political pressure can be felt at all levels of a137
governinetital organization. Nonetheless, policy officers working at the higher
levels of the hierarchy operate closer to the political arena and, therefore, in a
different field of tension than  do front-line officers. Policy officers operating at
middle management act as an intermediary between the Minister's staff and  the
caseworkers working at the lower level of the organization. They are supposed
to be loyal to the Mi,iister and carry out the Minister's orders and, at the same
time, inform the Minister about (operational) problems in policy execution. In
Chapter 2, I explained that both Parliainent and the Cabinet determine the
legal and financial conditions of public policy. Furthermore, the Minister di-
rects the policy implementation for which he or she can be held responsible to
Parliament. To keep Parliament up to date, the Minister relies on the informa-
tion that is gathered by policy officers operating at the middle management
level of governmental organizations. They inform the Minister's staff about
matters such as workload, backlog, and financial affairs. Furthermore, when
Members of Parliament have questions with regard to policy developments or a
specific incident, the policy officers brief the (staff of the) Minister on the rele-
vant information.
Because of their role in articulating tlie Minister's position in both Parliament
and the court, policy officers operating at the middle management level of a
governinent agency may demonstrate a strong commitment to the policy pref-
erence of their political superior. Canon, for exaniple, expects that policy offi-
cers who decide about an agency's official response to a court decision will
consider how a policy change will affect its relationship with outside groups,
including the positions of political bodies or offices that fund or govern it. 138
136 Quoted in Halliday 2004. p. 97.
137 See Halliday 2004. pp. 1()3-1,)5.
138 See Canon 2004.
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With reference to Canon, Hertogh has also drawn attention to the policy tension
that might occur between the court's message and the policy the agency is
supposed to implement: 'When an organization is strongly committed to the
policy goals that are at odds with a court decision, policy tension occurs within
the organization.,139 Hertogh assumes that 'the greater the change required by
the court as perceived by the agency, the less likely the agency is to immedi-
ately adopt the court decision.'14  Iii this study, the hypothesis is that the more
committed the policy officers are to the Minister's policy goals, the more lim-
ited will be the impact ofcourt decisions.
Hypothesis 6:
The more committed the policy ofIcers are to the Minister's policy goals, the
more limited will be the impact ofcourt decisions.
Pressure from  Parliametit
With regard to the political pressure from the government agency's environ-
ment, however, there is another factor worth examining, which addresses the
role of Parliament. In Chapter 2, I explained that the Dutch Lower House can
question a Minister about policy results. Moreover, the Lower House can
decide to withdraw its confidence in the Minister's capability to direct policy
implementation, which normally means that the Minister has to resign. Politi-
cal pressure from Parliament can thus put the Minister to the test. This mecha-
nism of 'checks and balances', that lay at the basis of the Dutch democratic
rechtsstaat, does not only apply to the implementation of policy measures; It
may also stimulate the impact of court decisions. Oosting, for example, expects
that parliamentary attention to messages of monitoring institutions will enhance
the  impact of feedback. 141 Therefore, the hypothesis  is  that the impact of court
decisions will be enhanced if (Members of) Parliament put questions to the
Minister about the manner in which court decisions are implemented.
Hypothesis 7:
The impact of court decisions will be enhanced if (Members of) Parliament put
questions to the Minister about the manner in which court decisions are iniple-
mented.
The Media
Another factor from the agency environment that might influence the impact
of court decisions is the media. In Chapter 2,1 briefly mentioned that the
media have come to play an important role in reporting on thorny issues,
which then come to doniinate the political agenda. Sonie have even pictured
the media as ati additional fifth power in tlie state.142 Government agencies,
139  Canon 1991, p. 443, cited in Hertogh 1997b, p. 91.
140 Johnson 1979, p. 38, cited in Hertogh 1997b. p. 91.
141 Oosting 1988.
142  Bovens et al. 2001, p. 110.
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then, cannot expect to be immune from public scrutiny and criticism.143 For
some time now, asylum policy has been a subject that frequently receives me-
dia attention. Problems surrounding the admission or deportation of asylum
seekers are broadly dealt with in the media and, in addition, discussed in Par-
liament. Media attention to court decisions niay thus stimulate the Minister, or
the government agency,  to  comply  with the court decision:44 The hypothesis
is that the impact of court decisions will be enhanced if the media reports on
the outcome of court decisions.
Hypothesis 8:
The  impact of court decisions will be enhanced  if the media reports  on  the  out-
come of court decisions.
Interest Groups
Finally, also interest groups might fulfill a role in influencing the impact of
court decisions. Interest groups are generally defined as (private, non-profit, or
subsidized) organizations that have some autonomy from government and
political parties,  and  try to infuence a specific field of public policy.145 Because
of their specialized and detailed knowledge, interest groups can be very useful
in the policy process. Government agencies as well as Members of Parliament
often make grateful use of their expertise. Furthermore, interest groups fulfill
an important role for individuals who hope that, in their case, the law is prop-
erly  applied.146 With regard  to the execution of Dutch asylum policy there  are
several organizations that act on behalf of, or advocate, the asylum seekers'
interests, such as the Dutch Refugee Council ( vi/N), the Asylum Seekers
Legal Advice Center (SRA), tlie Association of Attorneys for Asylum Seekers
( FAJN)   and the Dutch section of the International Commission of jurists
(N/c ).  Because  most of these interest groups are involved  in the execution  of
Dutch asylum policy,  they have expert knowledge  o f the problems  surrounding
the asylum procedure. However, the question is whether interest groups are
capable of influencing the impact of court decisions. Because of their involve-
ment in the policy execution, they might be able to enhance the impact of
court decisions. The hypothesis is therefore that the impact of court decisions
will be enhanced if interest groups are actively involved in the policy execu-
tion.
Hypothesis 9:
The impact of court decisions will be enhanced if interest groups are actively
involved in the policy execution.
143  Barret & Fuge 1981, p. 3
144 Canon 2004; Oosting 1988.
145    Wilson  1990.




This chapter set out the conceptual framework of this study. Firstly, impact has
been defined as both an effect and a process. Impact as a process refers to the
process of administrative decision-making by which the policy officers decide
whether to alter administrative procedures or working practices in response to
a court decision. This process will be examined by means of Hertogh's imple-
mentation model in which three phases are distinguished. Each phase centers
on a specific question. The phase of information (1+liat does the court decisiou
say.2) and the phase of transformation  ( Mliat does the court decision imply?) provide
insight in the policy officers' consideration with regard to a specific court deci-
sion, while the phase of processing (What sliorild be do,ze with the court decision?)
shed light on the (possible) effect of tlle court decision. The decision-making
process may eventually result in an adjustment of administrative procedures or
working practices. If a court decision results in adjustments, it is possible to
determine its effect.
111 the inquiry itito the policy officers' response to court decisions, however,
the emphasis is on the assessment of the policy officers' dominant mode of
response. By means of the distinction between 'the letter' and 'the spirit' of
court decisions, four modes of adininistrative response were defined. The un-
derlying assumption of the present study is that the four modes of adininistra-
tive response, defined in Chapter   1,   differ   as   to the extent to which   a
government agency learns from court decisions. By examining the impact of
court decisions and, more specifically, the process of administrative decision-
making in response to court decisions and the court decisions' eventual effect,
it is possible to assess how and what a government agency learns from court
decisions. On the basis of empirical findings, it will be assessed what mode of
response the IND policy officers use most.
Furthermore, nine hypotheses have been raised with regard to factors that may
infuence the policy officers' response and, in that way, limit or enhance the
impact of court decisions. Following Halliday's study, the factors are grouped
into three domains: the characteristics of the government agency, the law, and
the government agency's political environment. In this study, the hypotheses
will be tested against empirical data.
The empirical findings  of this study will be presented  in the following chapters.
By way of introduction  to the specific field of study, a description  of the legal
as well as the political and administrative context of Dutch asylum policy will
be  provided in Chapter 4.  Next, in Chapter 5, the response  of the  IND  to  five
court decisions will be described in detail. On the basis of these findings, the
policy  officers'   dominant  mode   of response  will  be assessed (Chapter  6).   The
research findings with regard to the factors that have influenced the impact of
court decisions will be presented in Chapter 7.
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THE ADMISSION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS INTO THE
NETHERLANDS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets out the legal as well as the political and adniinistrative con-
texts of Dutch asylum policy. First,  the main  provisions of international treaties
with regard to the admission of asylum seekers are highlighted iii section 4.2.
Next, section 4.3 provides a historical overview of the policy measures the
1,utch goveninient has taken since 1985 to handle asyluin applications. This
section  also  offers  a  description  of the asylum procedure. Iii addition,  the  IND
organizatioii structure as well as the poliCy goals the IND is expected to
achieve will be described in section 4.4. An overview of the legal proceedings
tliat follow from decisions iii asylum applications is provided iii section 4.5.
The chapter concludes with an explanation of- the selection of court decisions
that will be examined iii Chapter 5.
4.2 INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
77,e Ettropean Convention on Hm,ian RQ/its a,id the Geneva Convention
The primary rights of asylum seekers are laid down in the European Conven-
tion for the protection of Human R.ights and Fundamental Freed0171s (ECHR)
aiid the Geneva Convetition relatitig to the Status of lt.efugees (Geneva Con-
vention). Both Conventions were drafted  ill  the  wake  of the Second World
War. It was a time when victinis of the nazi regime, and other fascist regitnes,
were not able or not willing to return to tlieir country of origin and, therefore,
sought refuge in other states. Moreover, in these years, a new world order
emerged. The assumption of power by socialist regimes iii Eastern European
countries meant the beginning of the Cold War and led to an additional refu-
gee now to Western democracies. In the ECHIZ, which was signed in 1950,
the contracting states agreed to offer protection to those who sought refuge. In
Article   14  of the ECHR, the Council  of Europe declared that 'everyone  has
the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution.' Furthermore, Article 3 of
the ECHR prohibits the contracting states to expel a person to a country
where he  or she faces a  real  risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment,  or
puti ishment. In addition, Article  1  of the Getieva Cotivention, which was
147
signed  by the United Nations  in 1951, provides  a more specific definition  of a
'refugee'. Article  1  of the Convention defines a refugee as 'any person who is
outside his country of origin and is unable or unwilling to return to it because
147   Article 3 ofthe Convention Against Torture  ((:AT) and Article 7 of the  Inteniational
Convention on Civil and Political Rights afford protection agaitist refoulenient as well,
though their reach is less extelisive.
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of a well- founded  fear of being persecuted for reasons  of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.'148 Further-
more, the Geneva Convention provides minimum standards for the treatment
of refugees. Article 33 of the Geneva Convention defines a norm of 'non-
refoulement', which states that 'no contracting state shall expel or return a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life
or freedom would be threatened. ,149
EU Regulations
The ECHIL and the Geneva Convention still form the basis of present-day
international asylum law:50 In addition to these treaties, EU member states
have agreed on some practical matters to handle asylum applications. Because
of the removal of internal border checks on persons in  1995, the EU member
states felt compelled to counter possible side effects of the freedom of move-
ment within EU territory. They foresaw irregular movement of asylum seekers
and illegal immigrants. Therefore, on June 15, 1990, the EU member states
signed the Dublin Convention, which regulates the attribution of responsibility
between European countries for deciding asylum applications. The Dublin
Convention is meant to prevent an asylum seeker asks for asylum to no avail
(refugee in orbit) as well as to stop 'asylum shopping' to countries with a tolerant
asylum regime. The Dublin Convention came into force in 1997. In 2003, it
was replaced by the 'Dublin II' Regulation, which fleshes out the details of a
Europe-wide cooperation for determining the member state responsible for
examining an asylum application. 151  Furthermore, as a result of the Treaty of
Amsterdam  (1997), the harmonization  of EU member states' asylum policy  has
more recently taken shape in Council Directives on the minimum standards for
the qualification of refugees,152 the procedures for granting and withdrawing a
refugee status, 153 and the minimum standards for reception.154
148  In 1979, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHOR) published
the  Handbook on  Procedures  and  Criteriafor  Determining  Refugee  Status to which the receiv-
ing states ascribe authority although it has no legally binding status.
149   A similar protection  is laid down in Article 3 of the ECHR.
150 Originally, the Geneva Convention mentioned a time liniit: the Convention was aimed
at people who sought refuge due to situations that had taken place before 1951. How-
ever, with the Protocol of New York (1967), the Convention became applicable to later
situations as well.
151 Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003, OJ L 30/1, 25.02.2003.
152 Council Directive 20(}4/83/EC of April 29,2004 (OJ L 304 3(j/()9/2004, p. 12-13).
153 Council Directive 20(15/85/EC of Deceinber 1,2005 (OJ L 326 13.12.20(6, p. 13-14).
154 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of anuary 27, 2003 (OJ L 31, 06.02.2(103)
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4.3 DUTCH AsYLUM POLICY
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the ECHit. and the Geneva Convention, national states have committed
themselves to offer relief to people who have a well-founded fear of being
persecuted because of their race, religion, or political beliefs. Although these
treaties  are  over 50 years old, the commitment inade is still of great importance
for those who flee from civil wars, ethnic conflicts, or authoritarian regimes. 155
At the time these treaties were drafted, however, the national states that are
party to these treaties did not foresee that economic under-development would
become another main reason for people to seek refuge. Moreover, for the
countries of origin, which generally experience economic recession or under-
development, emigration means an opportunity to reduce demographic pres-
sures and unemployment, while Western states see immigration now much
niore as a threat than as a potential gain.156 The point is that economic instabil-
ity and arnied conflicts often go hand iii hand. People applying for asylum may
therefore have clear but often interwoven reasons for leaving their country of
origin. They f]ee from violence, from poverty, or to be reunited with their
family. From a humanitarian point of view, all these reasons  may be accepted as
legitimate but,  from a legal point of view,  not all the applications offer legiti-
mate grounds for a residence permit. It is the sovereign states that decide who
is given permission to stay, and who is not.
In the following sections, I will describe the main elements of Dutch asylum
policy. First, section 4.3.2 deals with the political context of- the asylum policy
and provides an overview of the number of asylum applications submitted in
the Netherlands. Next. section 4.3.3 contains an overview of the policy meas-
ures the Dutch government took in the period 1985-2000 to handle the asy-
lum applications. Finally, I will address the legal context: Section 4.3.4 provides
a description of the main provisions of the Aliens Act 2000 and, in section
4.3.5, the asylum procedure will be described.
4.3.2 THE NuMBER OF ASYLUM SEEKERS
Since the ECHR and the Geneva Convention were drafted, the political cli-
mate in the Netherlands with regard to the admission of asylum seekers has
somewhat changed. The present attitude towards asylum seekers did not sud-
denly emerge, but grew gradually out of developments that took place in the
last decades of the 20'h century. During the 19604 for instance, the Netherlands
received large numbers of immigrant workers from countries such as Morocco,
Turkey, and Spain. After 1970, however, the capacity to shelter immigrants  is
thought to have reached its maximum:57 Since then, the Netherlands has been
155   At the end of 2004, the global refugee population was estimated at 9,237,()00
(UNHOR, Refugees  by Numbers, 2005 edition <www.unhcr.org>).
156  't Hart & Wukhuijs 1999.
157  See, for example, the Parliamentary Papers ofthe Lower House, TK 1973-1974 12 600
VI no. 13, and TK 1984-1985 18 600 VI no. 2.
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regarded as a densely populated country, which encounters difficulties with
regard to the housing, education, and employment of its citizens. These con-
straints, it was suggested, would hinder the integration of new immigrants.
Therefore, the Dutch government adopted a restrictive immigration policy,
although it still made an exception with regard to the admission of asyluni
seekers. However,  as  from  1985,  the  number of asylum applications increased
dramatically (see Table 4.1) Moreover, people applying for asylum no longer
only came from countries with an authoritarian regime but also from countries
that were experiencing political and economic instability. Lacking any other
legal basis for entry, for the economic migrants, the asylum procedure had
become the only means to be admitted to the Netherlands:58 As a conse-
quence, the majority of the asylum seekers  (85%-90%)  did not meet the defini-
tion of'refugee' as stated in the Geneva Convention. 159
Furthermore,  in the beginning o f the 199Os, it became clear that asylum seekers
depend on travel agents who ask large sums of money to supply travel docu-
ments and transportation to European countries.160 This placed the Nether-
lands,  as the receiving state,  in a dilemma.  If it adopted a liberal asylum policy,
the Netherlands might receive even more asylum seekers. It would 'open the
foodgates' and overload the governmental organizations involved in the exe-
cution  of the asylum procedure. 16'  At that time,  the IND already experienced a
large backlog of applications and, because many asylum seekers filed an appeal
against a refusal to grant asylum, the courts were faced with a heavy caseload.
Besides, the Central Agency for the  Reception  of Asylum Seekers could hardly
find accommodation for the asylum seekers, partly because groups of citizens
agitated against the building of asylum seekers' reception center in their mu-
nicipalities.
158  See. for example. TK 1978-1979 15 649 no. 1-2. p. 22, and TK 1984-1985 18 600 VI
110.2, p. 66.
159   Between  1980 atid  1991, the percentage of asylum seekers receiving an A status was
even below 1()%. Between  ]991  and 2(1(11, this percentage rose slightly to  12%- 15%,
with an exception of34% in 1993. See, for example, two brochures from the Ministry
of Justice  Vreemdelingen,  een statistisdi  overzicht  1994  and  Het vreemdelingenbeleid  kent  z'n
gren:en. See also Doonibos 20032, p. 66.
16 1 TK 1995-1996 19 637 no. 188, p. 14. See also Doornhein & Dijkhoff 1995, pp. 54-55,
and Doombos 2003a.
161  TK 199()-1991 21 998 no. 2, pp. 34-36.
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Table 4.1: Asylum applications submitted  in  the  EU  and the Netherlands, 1985-2005.
Applications Applications Percentage  (of EU
Year submitted in the submitted in the total) submitted in
EIJ162 Netherlands the Netherlands163
1985 157,717 5,644 3.58
1986 189,938 5,865 3.()9
1987 162,613 13,460 8.28
1988 2()9,114 7,486 4.60
1989 285,741 13,898 4.86
1990 4()0,315 21,208 5.27
1991 509,493 21,615 4.24
1992 675,455 20,346 3.01
1993 516,398 35,399 6.85
1994 309,722 52,576 16.98
1995 274,951 29,258 1().64
1996 233,560 22,857 9.79
1997 251,762 34,443 13.68
1998 311,408 45,217 14.52
1999 396,737 39,299 9.91
2000 391,275 43,895 11.22
2001 388,372 32,579 8.39
2002 423,853 18,667 4.40
20()3 373,022 13,402 3.59
2004 289,420 9,782 3.38
2005                         --                             12,347                             --
4.3.3 POLICY MEASURES 1985 - 2000
The increase in asylum applications necessitated the Dutch government to
more efficiently regulate the admission of asylum seekers. The problems the
Dutch government was confronted with had to do with both the admission
and deportation of (rejected) asylum seekers. By the mid 198Os, it had already
became clear that asylum seekers whose asylum application was rejected did not
leave the country voluntarily but stayed iii the Netherlands illegally. Therefore,
in October 1986, the then Deputy Minister ofJustice opened a detention cen-
ter at Schiphol to prevent rejected asylum seekers from entering Dutch terri-
tory illegally. Nonetheless, the actual deportation of the rejected asylum164
162  Figures for the years 1985-2001 adapted from UNHCR statistical yearbook, 2001.
Figures for the years 2002-2004 adapted from TK 2005-2006 19 637 no. 1025, Appen-
dix p. 36.
163   Figures for the years 1985-2005 adapted from-/aarrapportages  Freemdelingenketen.
164  See TK 1986-1987 19 700 VI no. 2, p. 44, and TK 1987-1988 20 200 VI no. 2, p. 40.
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seekers faltered because many rejected asylum seekers were undocumented and,
as a consequence, could not be easily deported to their country of origin.
In addition to these asylum seekers that were difficult to deport for 'technical'
reasons, there was an even larger group of asylum seekers who could not be
deported for so-called 'policy' reasons. It concerned asylum seekers from coun-
tries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia, whose asylum application was
rejected, but who could not be deported, because deportation to the country
of origin would be a contravention of Article  3  of the ECHR  due  to the over-
all  situation  in the country of origin. Therefore,  by  the  end of 1991, the Dutch
government introduced a temporary residence permit for these so-called 'toler-
ated persons' Gedoogden).
A  few years later,  in  1994,  when  the war iii Bosnia caused a mass refugee  dis-
placement throughout Europe, the influx ofasylum seekers reached its peak. hi
that same year, the Dutch government introduced a thoroughly revised Aliens
Act  and, in October   1994,  the AC procedure, which  is an accelerated proce-
dure for the handling of manifestly unfounded and abusive asylum requests. 165
Since then, the initial interview with asylum seekers takes place at an Applica-
tion Center.
Furthermore, in 1995, the Dutch government added two concepts to its asy-
lum policy to regulate the adinission of asylum seekers more efficiently.  Firstly,
the concept of safe collntry of origin was added to the Aliens Act. This concept
means that an asylum application can be rejected, or found inadmissible, if the
asylum seeker originates from a country of origin that has signed the Geneva
Convention and consistently observes the basic standards laid down in interna-
tional treaties:66 The second concept was the concept of safe   third  countries,
which means  that an application  of an asylum seeker who stayed in another  safe
country before he arrived in the Netherlands can be rejected, or found inad-
missible, because the asylum seeker could have applied for asylum in the coun-
try where he first resided.167 This latter concept is siinilar to the agreement laid
down in the Dublin Convention, but it includes non-EU member states as
well.
Besides these policy measures, technological devices have been introduced to
handle asylum applications inore efficiently and effectively. For example, to
verify that an asylum seeker does originate from the country or region he de-
clares to come from, the IND can conduct a language analysis'68 and, to estab-
tish the age of an asylum seeker or, more specifically, his minority, the IND
165  See TK 1994-1995 23 9(10 VI no. 2, p. 44, and TK 1993-1994 19 637 no. 104.
166   Article  15  (c) Aliens Act  1994, currently Article 30 and 31 (g) Aliens Act 2000. See TK
1993-1994 23 588 nos. 1-2.
167   Article  15 (b) Aliens Act 1994, currently Article 30 and 31  (i)  Aliens Act 2000. See TK
1993-1994 23 807 nos. 1-2.
1 68 TK 1998-1999 26 000 VI no. 2, p. 174.
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can conduct an age test.  One of the cases described in Chapter 5 deals with the
manner the age test is conducted.
Finally, one of the most recent changes in Dutch asyluni policy has been the
coming into force of the Aliens Act 2000, which will be dealt with in the
following section.
4.3.4 THE ALIENS ACT 2000
The coming into force of the Aliens Act 2000 marked a significant change in
Dutch asylum policy. The motive to introduce this new Aliens Act followed
from the coalition agreenient of the second Kok Cabinet.  In  1998, the coali-
tion parties (PvdA, D66, atid FFD) agreed to thorouglily revise the Aliens Act
of 1994. The coalition parties found that the asyluni procedure offered too
much scope for legal proceedings and, consequently, it took too much time
before a final decision on an asylum application was taken.169 The lengthy
procedure, which could take about three years, not only imposed a burden on
the governniental organizations involved in the execution of the asylum proce-
dure, it was also regarded as an intolerable situation for the asylum seekers who
had to cope with uncertainty about the eventual outcome of their application.
Moreover, the lengthy procedure could attract asylum seekers who might
expect that their chances of receiving a residence permit would be enhanced  by
the lengthy procedure. Hence, the primary aim of the Aliens Act 2000 was to
speed up the asylum procedure. To that end, the Aliens Act 2000 incorporated
four significant changes.
In the first place, the Aliens Act 2000 provides only one residence pemiit for
asylum seekers, instead of three. The former Aliens Act of 1994 distinguished
two permanent residence permits and one temporary residence permit. A per-
manent residence permit was granted to asylum seekers who met the definition
of the Geneva Convention (A status) or to asylum seekers who had been ad-
mitted on humanitarian grounds (C status). The difference between these  two
perinanent residence permits was that an asylum seeker who was granted a C
status gradually became entitled to the rights that were associated with the A
status. The temporary residence permit was meant for asylum seekers who did
not meet the criteria to get a permanent residence pennit but who could not
be  deported  due  to the overall situation in their country of origin (D status).
This temporary residence peI'niit was valid for maximally three years and could
be withdrawn at any time if the situation in the country of origin improved.
Because of the differentiation between these three residence permits, it had
become common practice that asylum seekers who were granted a C or D
status, lodged an apped with the court in order to obtain an A (or C) status.
Consequently, the large number of legal proceedings put a burden on the
Aliens Divisions of the District Courts and lengthened the asylum procedure.
169 TK 1997-1998 26 024 no. 9.
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At present, asylum seekers who  meet the definition of the Geneva Convention
as well as asylum seekers who will be admitted on humanitarian ground, or
because of the overall situation in their country of origin can apply for only
one temporary residence permit, which is valid for five years17ci and can be
withdrawn earlier. After the five-year period, the asylum seeker can apply for a
permanent residence permit. 171 In this way, the asylum seekers who are granted
a residence permit, no longer have grounds to lodge an appeal.172
A second remarkable adjustment made in the Aliens Act 2000 is that a decision
on an asylum application incorporates a number of implications with regard to
the asylum seeker's entitlements. The decision to reject an asylum application
not only means the asylum seeker is not entitled to a residence permit, it also
implies that the asylum seeker is no longer entitled to accommodation and has
to leave the country within 28 days:73 Furthermore, the asylum seeker can be
evicted from the asylum seekers' reception center and, in anticipation of his
deportation, held in detention. Under tlle former Aliens Act, these implications
were dealt with in different decisions and an asylum seeker could lodge an
appeal against each of these decisions separately. Under the Aliens Act 2000,
however, an asylum seeker can only appeal against the decision to reject his
application.
Thirdly, the Aliens Act 2000 excludes the possibility for asylum seekers to file a
notice of objection against a decision on their asylum application.174 Instead,
they can directly lodge an appeal with the Aliens Division of the Hague Dis-
trict Court.175 The rationale behind this measure was that it would contribute
to the quality of decisions iii asylum applications if the caseworkers of the IND
were more aware that the Court directly judged their decisions.176 In contrast
to the guidelines of the General Administrative Law Act, the time limit to
lodge an appeal with the Aliens Division of the Hague District Court is set at
four weeks (instead of six weeks).177 By shortening this tenn, the legislator
hoped to reduce the cost of the accommodation of asylum seekers.
Finally, the Aliens Act 2000 provides the possibility to lodge an appeal with the
Administrative Jurisdiction Department of- the Council of State. During the
former adjustment of the Aliens Act, in  1994, the legislator had abrogated the
possibility to appeal with an appeals court. Since then, the Aliens Divisions of
170  Article 28 Aliens Act 2000. See also WBV 2004/54, published in the Staatscourant
INetherlands Government Gazettel of September 6,  2004  no.  170, p.  8.
171  Article 33 Aliens Act 2000.
172 See judgments ofthe Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State,
March 28,2002 UV 20()2/153)  and May  1,2002 (1V 2002/203).
173  Article 45 and Article 62 Aliens Act 200().
174  Article 80 Aliens Act 2()0(}. This rneasure is meant to speed up the asylum procedure.
See TK 1999-20()() 26 732 no. 7, p. 55.
175  Article 71 Aliens Act 200(1. The Aliens Division of the Hague District Court distributes
the cases among the Alieiis Divisions ofother District Courts.
176  Hoogvlier 2001.
177   Article 69 (1) Aliens Act 2000 (formerly Article 30 (3) Aliens Act  1965)
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the District Courts provided a Rechtseenlieidskanter, which was an ad hoc divi-
Sion, a panel composed of three judges from the Aliens Divisions of the District
Courts. The Rechtseenheidskamer decided in specific asylum seekers' cases that
required a judgment on a matter of principle and, therefore, could be of iln-
portance for other asylum seekers' cases as well. These cases were put forward
for consideration by the Aliens Divisions of the District  Courts,  not by repre-
sentatives  of the asylum seekers  or  the INI). Although the judgments  of the
Reclitseenheidskamer were generally accepted,178 they did not formally bind the
courts to decide accordingly in similar asylum seekers' cases. To benefit the
unity and development of law, the legislator restored the possibility to appeal
against a judgment of a District C:ourt.179 On the basis of Article 95 of the
Aliens Act 2000, the Administrative Jurisdiction I)epartment of the Council of
State was designated as the appeals court in aliens law cases. 180
4.3.5 THE AsYLUM PROCEDURE
In the Dutch asylum procedure, the handling ofasylum applications takes place
iii two stages. The examination of asylu m applications starts with an initial
interview that is meant to determine the asylum seeker's identity, nationality,
and travel route. If necessary, an age test and language analysis is conducted.'81
However, the initial interview does not include the asylum seeker's motives to
seek refuge. These are subject of an in-depth interview, which takes place at a
later date. After the initial interview, the IND first examines whether (on the
basis of the available information) the asylum application can be rejected with-
out a thorough investigation. A distinction is made between applications that
can be decided within 48 process hours, and applications that require addi-
tional, and more time-consuming, investigation. If the IND expects to settle
the application within 48 hours, also the in-depth interview will take place at
the Application Center. These applications are dealt with in the accelerated AC
procedure and will most probably be rejected. However, since December
2004, it has also been possible to grant an asylum application in the AC proce-
dure.182 Asylum seekers whose motives require further investigation are trans-
ferred to a Reception and Investigation Center. Their applications are dealt
with in the normal asylu111 procedure, which, in theory, takes about six
months.
178 See Terlouw 2003b, and Thieme et al., 1999.
179 TK 1999-2000 26 732 no. 3, p. 1()-11.
181) For the legislator's intentions to ititroduce the Adnzinistrative Jurisdiction Department of
the Council of State as an appeals court iii asyluni cases, see TK 1997-1998 25 829 no.
5, p. 5.
181  See TK 2001-2()02 26 732 no. 96.
182 TK 20()4-2(105 19 637 110.911, Appendix, p. 15.
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Figure 4.1: The Dutch asylum procedure.
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With the coming into force of the Aliens Act 2000, the AC procedure is based
on Article 37 of the Aliens Act 2000. This article provides the competence to
create guidelines with regard to the manner in which asylum applications are
handled. Furthermore, Article C3/12.2.1 of the Aliens Act Implementation
Guidelines states that applications that can be rejected on the basis of Articles
30  or  31  of the Aliens  Act  2000,  or  on the basis of Article  4:6 of General  Ad-
ministrative Law Act, are eligible for an accelerated handling in the AC proce-
dure. Article 30 of the Aliens Act 2000 defines four situations in which it is
possible to reject an asylum application.  One of these is the intention  to mark
the asylum application as a Dublin claim because another EU member state is
responsible  for the handling  of the application:83 The other three possibilities
are:
-    The asylum seeker already has a (temporary) residence permit;
-   The asylum seeker has already filed an application which has
not yet been decided upon;
183  Article 30 (a) Aliens Act 2000.
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-   The asylum seeker can be transferred to a country of earlier
residence on the basis of a bilateral agreeinent.
In addition, Article 31  of the Aliens Act 2000 states eleven motives to reject an
asylutii application. These include the fact that the asylum seeker cannot sub-
stantiate his claim with valid documents, and the fact that the asylum seeker
originates from a safe country of origin, or stayed in a safe third country before
he arrived in the Netherlands. Finally, Article 4:6 of the General Administra-
tive Law Act specifies the handling of renewed applications  due  to new facts  or
circumstances.
Dgerences Between the AC Procedure and the Normal Asylum Procedure
The most important differences between the AC procedure and the normal
asylum procedure are the legal conditions under which the handling of asylum
applications takes place. During the handling of the application, asylum seekers
can get legal assistance. In the normal asylum procedure, the asylum seeker's
attorney has two weeks to provide additional information and make corrections
to the report of the in-depth interview, and four weeks to write an additional
view in response to the IND's intention to reject the application. In the AC
procedure, the asylum seeker's attorney has seven hours in total to prepare the
asylum seeker for his in-depth interview, provide additional information, and
write an additional view in response to the intended rejection of the asylum
seeker's application.
184
Furthermore, if the asylum application is rejected, an asylum seeker can lodge
an  appeal with the Aliens Division of the Hague District Court.  In the normal
asylum procedure, the deadline for appeal is four weeks. In the AC procedure,
this period is one week.'85 In addition, both the asylum seeker and the Minister
of Immigration and Integration can lodge an appeal with the Administrative
Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State.  In the normal asylum proce-
dure as well as in the AC procedure, the period for lodging an appeal with the
Administrative Jurisdiction Department is one week. However, pending his
appeal, an asylum seeker whose application is rejected iii the AC procedure is
not entitled to accommodation. He must leave the country immediately. 186
Asylum seekers whose asylum application is handled in the normal asylum
procedure are permitted to stay in an asylum seekers' reception center until the
decision on their appeal is final.
184 The additional  view in response  to the intended rejection of the asylum application  must
be presented withiri three process hours (Article 3.117 (2) of the Aliens Decree 2()00).
184  Article 69 (1) and (2) Aliens Act 2000.
Ix"   Article 62 (4) Aliens Act 2(IC)0.  If the asylum seeker wants to stay iii the Netherlands
pending his appeal, he can submit a request for a provisional ruling to the President of
the Aliens Division of the Hague District Court.
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4.4 THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
Until 1994, the execution of the asylum procedure was in the hands of the
Department of Aliens Affairs  of the Ministry ofJustice. However,  in  1994,  the
wish for a clearer distinction between policy and executive tasks was felt, so the
IND became a government agency that reports to the Department of Aliens
Affairs of the Ministry ofJustice.187 Formerly, this department was headed by a
Deputy Minister ofJustice. As from August 2002, when the first Balkenende
Cabinet took office, this task was assigned to the Minister of Immigration and
Integration  (I&1).188 On  behalf- of the Minister of 1&I (and formerly the Deputy
Minister ofJustice), the IND handles asylum applications.
Policy Goals
Although, in the past, an exact demarcation between policy and executive tasks
proved difficult to implement, the IND does not set out the policy goals of189
asylum policy. This is up to the Cabinet and the Minister of I&I (who is as-
sisted in this by public officials of the Departinent of Aliens Affairs). In the
coalition agreement of May 2003, the coalition parties of the second Bal-
kenende Cabinet (CDA, Fl/D, D66) agreed to the following policy goal with
regard  to the admission of asylum seekers: 190
The  Netherlands is still Willing to offer relief to refugees. Therefore,  asy-
lum applications should be strictly handled, in a tiniely niatiner, which is
just, and done carefully.
Besides,  once  a year,  on the third Tuesday of September, Cabinet informs both
Houses of Parliament about its policy goals and the national budget for the
coming parliamentary year. In the years 2002 to 2004, the political goal of
immigration and asylum policy was: 191
To take care of a regulated admission of aliens,  in a manner that  is so-
cially acceptable and includes the interest of aliens who want to stay in
the Netherlands permanently or temporarily.
In 2005, the policy goal was adjusted to 'a regulated and controlled admission,
residence, and repatriation, which is, nationally and internationally, socially
187 TK 1998-1999 26 200 VI no. 2, p. 172, and TK 1997-1998 25 600 VI no. 2, p. 40.
188  Article 1 0) Aliens Act 20()0. See also TBV 2()02/33, and TK 2(}()2-2003 28 600 VI no.
2, p. 4.
189 TK 1997-1998 25 600 VI no. 2, 41. See also Alink et al. 1998.
190 Coalition Agreement Cabinet Balkene,ide 11, May 16,2003, p. 11 (niy translation)
191  See TK 20f13-2004 29 20() VI no. 2, p. 162, TK 2002-2003 28 600 VI no. 2, p. 153,
and TK 2001-2002 28 000 VI no. 2, p. 110.
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acceptable.,192 However, the operational goal remained the same and has stated
since 2002:193
Applications for a residence permit are dealt with within the legally re-
stricted period oftime.
Organization Structure
194From 1994 to 2001, the IND organization grew from 850 employees to
3,700 eniployees.195 The main reason for this strong growth iii personnel was
the large infux of asylum seekers during the 1990s. In recent years, the number
of asylum applications has dropped, and the number of employees working at
the IND has decreased to about 3,000 employees in 2005.196
Because the IND has always had a high turnover of personnel, the agency has
put great effort to train new personnel.197 The mission ofthe IND states: 198
The IND is an open, professional, and reliable organization, and has the
aim of rendering careful, timely decisions. To this end, we recruit ex-
pert,  motivated, and concerned staff members, who are indispensable to
the quality of our work.
In 2004, the IND was reorganized to a so-called 'process organization'. This
means the agency is organized on the basis of five working processes or divi-
sions: Asylum, Regular, Naturalization, Repatriation, and Litigation. Besides
the handling of asylum applications, the IND also decides on applications for
regular residence and naturalization. Furthermore, the IND is involved in the
repatriation of rejected asylum seekers,  and the Litigation Division takes  care of
the  handling of legal proceedings.
The divisions of the  IND each consist of several Units that are directed by unit
managers, who report to a Division director. The five Division directors, in
turn, report to the managing director of the IND. The managing director is
supported by three staff units. One of these units is the Policy Execution staff
unit, which is closely involved in the agency's response to court decisions. The
192  See TK 2004-2005 29 800 VI no. 2, p. 91. See also TK 2005-2006 30 3000 VI no. 2, p
93.
193  See TK 2005-2006 30 3000 VI no. 2, p. 94; TK 2004-2005 29 800 VI no. 2, p. 93; TK
2003-2()04 29 200 VI no. 2, p. 163, and TK 2002-2()03 28 600 VI no. 2, p. 154.
194 TK 1994-1995 19 637 no. 135.
195 See OR-informatie 2001, no. 3, pp. 20-23, md jaarverslag IND 2002, p. 46.
196  De IND belicht, jaarresultaten 2005. Women make up more than half (55%) of IND
personnel. The average age of the IND employees is 36 Uaarverstag IND 2002, p. 46).
197  See, for instance, TK 1998-1999 19 637 no. 445, pp. 21-22, and TK 1996-1997 19 637
no. 254, p. 1. See also 'Conflict bij IND wegens uitbreiding' in: NRC Handetsblad, Fe-
bruary 23, 1999.
198 4The IND executor of the policy in respect ofaliens', brochure published by the Minis-
try ofJustice/IND, November 2001, p. 2
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task of the Policy Execution staff unit is, among other things, to inform the
managing director and the Division directors about the consequences of court
decisions. The managing director of the IND finally reports to the Secretary
General of the Department of Aliens Affairs that is headed by the Minister of
I&1.
The Litigation Division
The Litigation Division is one ofthe youngest divisions of the IND. it was added
to the IND in 1995, when the number oflegal proceedings exceeded the number
the State Advocate could handle. The then Deputy Minister ofjustice decided to
set up a special unit for the handling of legal proceedings.m The unit started with
60 employees, but grew to a division of about 300 employees in 2005. The
Litigation staff unit, which comprises 20 employees,  has an advisory and coordi-
nating task with regard to the handling ofcourt decisions.
4.5 JUDICIAL REVIEW
Given its tasks, the IND is often involved in legal proceedings. judicial review
of asylum cases is primarily conducted by the Aliens Division of the Hague
District Court and the Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council
of State but, now and then, the IND also has to deal with civil proceedings,
and with judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. This section
gives an impression of the number of court decisions the IND is confronted
with.
4.5.1 THE ALIENS DIVISION OF THE HAGUE DISTRICT COURT
As I mentioned in section 4.3.5, asylum applications are handled in either the
AC procedure or the normal asylum procedure. The two procedures differ as
to the legal conditions under which the handling  of an asylum application takes
place. However, on the basis of Article 71  of the Aliens Act 2000 all asylum
seekers can lodge an appeal with the Aliens Division of the Hague District
Court against a refusal to grant asylum.
Judicial Appeals against Decisions Taken in the AC Procedure
Table 4.2 shows the number ofjudicial appeals against a decision to reject the
asylum application in the AC procedure. Because the number of judicial ap-
peals includes requests for a provisional ruling, the number ofjudicial appeals
can exceed the total number of decisions taken  in  the AC procedure.
199 See TK 1994-1995 19 637 no. 124, and TK 1994-1995 19 637 no. 135, p. 2.
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2(10Table 4.2: Judicial appeals against decisions taken in the AC procedure, 2002-2005.
2002 2003 2004 2005
AC decisions (rejection of 7,665 4,701 3,245 3,151the asylum application)
Nuniber ofjudicial appeals
lodged by the asylum 6,977 4,714 4,5()7 4,621
seeker
The Aliens Divisioti of the Haglie 1)istrict Court distributes the appeal cases
aitiong the Aliens Divisions of other District C:ourts.  In 2002 and 2003, the
Aliens 1)ivisions of the District Courts dismissed about 8()% of the appeals
against decisions taken iii the AC procedure; 20% of the appeals were upheld
(see Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Judgliients of the Aliens Divisions of the District Courts with regard to AC
decisiotis, 2(*)2 and 2(}()3.3,1
2002 2003
Number ofjudgments 6,992 4,885
1,tad,nissible 350 195
Disniissed 5,384 (81%) 3,761 (80%)
Uplield 1,258 (19%) 928 (20%)
judicial Appeals agai,ist Decisions laken in the Nonnal Asyltim Procedure
Table 4.4 shows the number of judicial appeals against decisions taken iii the
normal asylum procedure. The numbers shown include judicial appeals against
decisiotis taken on the basis of the former Aliens Act. Asylum seekers whose
application is handled on the basis of the former Aliens Act have the right to
lodge an appeal against a decision to grant a temporary residence permit. Asy-
lum seekers whose applications are dealt with on the basis of the Aliens Act
20()() can only lodge an appeal against a rejection of their asylum application.
Since the backlog of old asylum applications is shrinking, the number ofjudi-
cial appeals lodged on the basis of the former Aliens Act lias dropped from
14,784 in 2002 to 574 in 2005. The nunibers ofjudicial appeals lodged on the
basis of the Aliens Act 2000 are respectively: 19,589 in 2002, 9,460 in 2003,
5,324 in 2004, and 6,212 iii 2005.
20(   Figures distilled frolli TK 2()()5-2(106 19 637 no. 1025, Appendix, p. 37.
201     Figures  distilled  frotil./aarverslag   Frecindelingenkanters,  2()(12  and 20()3. Figures from later
date are not available.
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Table 4.4: Judicial appeals against decisions taken in the normal asylum procedure,
2002-2005.202
2002 2003 2004 2005
Decisions in normal proce-
dure  (Aliens Act  1994 and 35,299 28,250 21,802 32,221
2000)
Number ofjudicial appeals,
lodged by the asylum 34,373 12,852 6,212 6,786
seeker
In  the last few years, the Aliens Divisions of the District Courts  have made an
effort to diminish the backlog of pending cases. Table 4.5 shows the outcome
of the District Courts' judgments for the years 2002 and 2003, with regard to
decisions taken in the normal asylum procedure.
Table 4.5: Judgnients of the Aliens Divisions of the District Courts with regard
to decisions taken in the normal asylum procedure, 2002 and 2003.203
2002 2003
Number ofjudgnients 16,568 27,259
Inadmissible 3,479 4,361
Dismissed 9,775 (75%) 18,536 (81%)
Upheld 3,314 (25%) 4,361 (19%)
Percentage of Appeals Upheld  by the Court
Since  the mid 199()s, the percentage of well-founded appeals  has been subject  of
parliamentary discussion. By the end of 1997, when it became clear that the court
had upheld about 27% of the judicial appeals, Member of Parliament Dittrich
(D66) asked the then Deputy Minister ofJustice what measures she was planning
to take in order to lower this percentage. The then Deputy Minister replied that
she would see to the quality of decisions on asylum applications and she expected
that the percentage would drop as a result. ears later, however, the204 A few y
percentage of appeals that were upheld by the court had not diminished. Despite
the fact that the then Deputy Minister ofJustice aimed at a percentage of 20,205 in
2001, the court upheld 39% of the judicial appeals.206
202 Figures distilled from TK 2005-2006 19 637 no. 1025, Appendix, p. 37 and p. 40.
203  Figures distilled from Jaarverstag Vreemdelingenkamers, 2002 and 2003. Figures from later
date are not available.
204 TK 1997-1998 19 637 no. 307, p. 6.
205
TK 20(K)-2(101 27 400 Vi no. 2, p. 87.
206  Aa,itia,igsel van de Handelingen [Appendix to Parliamentary Proceedings] TK 2001-2002
no. 1432. See also 'Meer foutell bij de IND' in: Trouw, May 27,20()2.
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As the percentages in Table  4.3  and Table 4.5  show,  the percentage  of appeals
that were upheld by the court has in recent years in fact dropped to about 20%. A
lower percentage is considered to be unrealistic, because at the tinie the court
decides on the appeal, the court may have to consider new facts and circtini-
stances that were not known at the time the IND decided on the asylum applica-
tion.207
4.5.2 THE ADMINISTRATIVEJURISDICTION DEPARTMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF
STATE
A primary task of the Litigation staff unit is to select cases that necessitate lodg-
ing an appeal with the Administrative jurisdiction Department. However, it is
the agency's policy to only lodge an appeal when the case serves the unity or
the  development of law.  Therefore.  the  IND does not challenge all court deci-
sions in which, according to the Litigation staff unit, the District Court has
decided wrongly. Or, as a policy officer of the Litigation staff unit remarked:
"Some asylum seekers get more than they actually deserve.',208 The Litigation
staff unit makes a selection of the most important judgments. In selecting the
court decisions that will be challenged, the Litigation staff unit takes into ac-
count whether: 209
a)  The court decision implies consequences for the priorities set
with regard to the handling of asylum applications, and;
b)  The court decision implies financial consequences for the re-
ception of asylum seekers.
Table 4.6 sliows the total number ofjudicial appeals lodged with the Adminis-
trative Jurisdiction Department for the years 2002 to 2005, with regard to both
decisions taken in the AC procedure and decisions taken in the normal asylum
procedure. About 10% of the cases were lodged by the IND, 90% by the asy-
lum seeker.
Table 4.6: Judicial appeals in asylum cases lodged with the Administrative
jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, 2002-2005.210
2002 2003 2004 2005
With regard to AC decisions 644 470 560 635
With regard to decisions taken
in the normal asylum proce- 533 2,107 2,668 2,045
dure (Aliens Act 2000)
Total 1,198 2,981 4,242 2,680
207 6
Cohen: een vijfde van besluiten IND fout' in: NRC Handelsblad, October 24,2000.
208 policy officer no. 2.
209   From an interview with a policy officer of the Litigation staff unit.
210 TK 2005-2005 19 637 no. 1025, Appendix, p. 37 and p. 41.
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In addition, Table 4.7 shows the decisions taken  by the Administrative Jurisdic-
tion Department in the years 2002 to 2005. A majority of the cases (about
90%) is decided without a hearing in court.211 On the basis of the Aliens Act
2000, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department can decide without a hearingif the appeal case in question does not raise complicated matters that might be
of importance for the unity or development of law. 212
Table 4.7: Judgments of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the
Council of State, 2002-2005.213
2002 2003 2004 2005
With regard to AC decisions 652 532 579 588
With regard to decisions taken
in the normal asyluni proce- 451 1,819 2,577 2,357
dure (Aliens Act 2000)
Total 1,103 2,451 3,156 2,945
The Administrative jurisdiction Department does not publish quantitative data
on the outcome of its decisions. From an analysis of the IND, however, it
follows   that   10%   of the appeals   that were lodged   by an asylum seeker  have
been upheld.214 This does not imply the asylum application is granted. The
Administrative Jurisdiction Department can just correct the District Court's
judgment, while leaving the implications of the IND decision on the asylum
applications intact.
4.5.3 THE COURTS OF APPEAL
Besides judgments of the court in aliens law, the IND can also be confronted
with civil law proceedings. Although the legislator intended to appoint the
Aliens Division of the Hague District Court as the principal court to decide in
aliens law cases,215 interest groups have successfully claimed that, in some in-
stances, the court in civil law can provide additional legal protection in con-
flicts that address generally binding regulations.216 The appeals court iii civil law
cases is a Court of Appeal. A Court of Appeal re-examines the facts  of the  case
and reaches its own conclusions. In addition, it is possible to contest a decision
of a Court of Appeal by appealing in cassation to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court examines whether the lower court applied the law properly in
reaching its decision. At this stage, the facts of the case as established by the
Court of Appeal are no longer subject to discussion. Appeal in cassation pri-
marily serves to proniote the unity of the law.
211  See, for example, Jaarverslag Raad van State 2004, p. 178.
212  See Article 91 Aliens Act 2000. See also Memone van Toelighting [Explanatory Memor:in-
duni to the Aliens Bill], TK 1998-1999 26 732 no. 3.
213 TK 2005-2005 19 637 no. 1025, Appendix, p. 37 and p. 41.
214  Cohortanalyse asielprocedure 1994-2003, TK 201)4-2005 19 637 no. 911, p. 12.
215 See Article 71 ofthe Aliens Act 2000.
216 Dutch Supreme Court, September 3,2004 (IV 2004/4(10).
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4.5.4 THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Finally,  the  IND  can be affected by decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights (European Court). An asylum seeker can lodge an appeal   with   the
European Court when he claims that his human rights, as stated iii the ECHR,
are violated by a decision or action taken by a national state that is party to the
ECHR. In immigration and asylum cases, appeals to the European Court pri-
marily deal with Article 3 (non-refoulement), Article 5 (detention), and Article
8 (family life) of the ECHR. On the basis of Article 46 of the ECHR, the
national state that is addressed by the European Court is obliged to Comply
with the court decision. Furthermore, judgments of the European Court that
do not directly address the Netherlands might be of importance, too, since the
European Court not only decides in a specific case but, at the same time, also
elucidates, safeguards, and develops the miles instituted by the ECHR. 217
The Court's judgment in fact serves not only to decide those cases
brought before the Court but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard,
and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contribut-
ing to the observance by the States of the engagements undertaken by
them as Contracting Parties.
Besides final judgments, the European Court can also decide to take an interim
measure in an asylum application, which is a request to the national state not to
deport the asylum seeker to the country of origin until the Court has consid-
ered the asylum seeker's claim. In one of the cases exaniined in Chapter 5,
interim measures of the European Court with regard to Somali asylum seekers
are subject of discussion.
4.6   A SELECTION OF COURT DECISIONS
In Chapter 5, the IND's response to five court decisions will be described. The
selection of cases includes judgments of three different courts:  one  of the Euro-
pean Court, one of the Hague Court of Appeal, and three judgments of the
Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State. By including
judgments of different courts, differences may be detected in the agency's re-
sponse that relate to the court that has decided.
The five cases selected are not a random selection of court decisions. This study
is specifically concerned with court decisions criticizing the manner in which
the IND executed the asylum procedure and, therefore, requiring an adminis-
trative response of the  IND.  It was thus necessary to select court decisions  that
would ask for an administrative response. The judgments selected are of rela-
tively recent date so that the policy officers who were directly involved in the
agency's response could be interviewed about the actions taken in response to
the court decisions.
217 Judgment ofthe European Court ofHuman Rights, January 18,1978, cited in Steen-
bergen et al. 1999, p. 191.
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First, a judgment of the Hague Court of Appeal was selected which served  as  a
pilot study to see whether the interviews would yield enough relevant informa-
tion.  In the years  2001  to  2005, the Dutch Courts of Appeal decided in eleven
cases  that  had  to do with asylum  in some way. The judgments  of the Courts of
Appeal, however, often specifically dealt with an individual case. Only a judg-
ment of the Hague Court of Appeal particularly addressed the asylum proce-
dure and, more specifically, the conditions of residence in the Application
Center. This court decision was therefore selected as a case to be examined. In
addition, three judgments  of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department  of the
Council of State and a judginent of the European Court of Human Rights
were selected.
As to the judgments of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department, the selec-
tion of cases was complicated by the fact that, as I already mentioned, not all
judgments of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department are published.  In the
monthly case law journal Jurisprudentie   Vreenidetingenreclit (jV), only those court
decisions are published which serve as an example or are considered to be of
importance for judges and lawyers working in the field ofaliens law. However,
since the aim was to select specific or extreme cases, the judgments published
in JV could be used as a starting point. A preliminary survey of court decisions
published in JV in the years 2001 to 2004 showed, however, that there was
only a relatively small number of court decisions that specifically addressed  the
asylum procedure and could be defined as an 'extreme' cases. For instance, in
many cases in which the Administrative Jurisdiction Department decided in
favor of the asylum seeker, it ordered either the District Court or the IND to
reconsider the asylum seeker's case. Because these judgments did not directly
compel the IND to adjust its working practices, only a sniall number of cases
were left that could serve as cases to be examined. From the approximately
twenty cases that would be worth examining, three cases were selected that
each addressed a specific aspect of the asylum procedure: the intake of asylum
seekers, the age test of unaccompanied underage asylum seekers, and the de-
portation of rejected asylum seekers. Other judgments of the Adininistrative
Jurisdiction Department related to these subjects are included in the description
of the context and the aftermath of the selected cases, which further clarifies
the exceptional character of the cases selected.
With regard to the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, it was
even more difficult to select an interesting case of recent date. Of course, the
European Court has decided in some landmark cases218 but the more recent
European Court's decisions mostly dealt with family life or concerned such a
specific case that would not necessarily require an administrative response by
the INI). Eventually, a judgment dating from 2(100 was selected which dealt
with the transfer of Dublin clainiants and, iii Dutch literature on aliens case
law, was described as a remarkable case.
218  See. for example, Chahal  vs.  United Kingdom (November 15, 1996), Bahaddar vs. The
Netherlands  (February  19,1998),  and  Ramachandraiyer  Fenkadajalasanna vs.  Tlie Nether-
lands (luly 11,  2002).
70
THE ADMISSION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS INTO THE NETHERLANDS
Overall, the cases described in Chapter 5 present a representative image of the
impact of court decisions on the Dutch asylum procedure. They show the
problems the IND had to deal with when it has to respond to court decisions.
In addition, the IND policy officers' dominant mode of response will be as-
sessed in Chapter 6. The factors that influenced the impact of the court deci-




One picture of a caterpillar does not tell you it is going to transform into a
butterfly, and it takes many frames of the cinema to inform you that the
butterfly can fly, and many thousands of franies to permit a possible replica-
tive  engineering discovery  of how  it  can  fly.
- R. Buckniinster Fuller (1977)
In: Tetrascroll. Goldilocks and the Three Bears, p. 25.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the response of the IND to five court decisions is described in
detail. The five court decisions addressed the asylum procedure and, conse-
quently, might necessitate the IND to adjust its administrative procedure or
working practice.  In each of the following sections, one judgment is presented.
The first judgment is from the European Court of Human Rights and deals
with the transfer of asylum seekers to another EU member state on the basis of
the Dublin Convention. The second judgment is from the Hague Court of
Appeal and addresses the conditions of residence in an Application Center.
Then follow three judgments of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department of
the Council of State. In the first of these judgments, the Administrative Juris-
diction Department decided in a matter regarding the the ititake of asylum
seekers  and, more specifically, the comparison of asylum seekers' fingerprints  in
the EU database called Eurodac. The second judgment of the Administrative
Jurisdiction Department deals with the age test of unaccompanied minors.  The
final judgment is about the deportation of rejected Somali asylum seekers to
northern Somalia. Because each judgment addresses a specific aspect of the
asylum procedure, each section starts with a description of the policy context
related to the court decision in question. Then follow the facts of the case in
which the court has decided, and a description of the response to the court
decision. Finally, each section concludes with some final remarks about what
happened afterwards.
The description of the IND's response to the court decisions is based on inter-
views with policy officers of the IND. Generally, in responding to a court
decision that addresses the manner in which the asylum procedure is executed,
two policy officers are directly involved: one of the Litigation staff unit and
one of the Policy Execution staff unit.  For each  case examined,  the two poliCy
officers directly involved ill the IND's response were interviewed individu-
ally.219 The interviews took place in 2004, and each interview took about one
219 The policy officer who on behalf of the Policy Execution staff unit was involved in the
IND response to the Dublin case did no longer work at the IND. Instead, an interview
has taken place with his successor who, at the time the European Court published its
judgment, worked as a lawyer at the Litigation Division.
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and a halfhours. The policy officers were asked about the manner in which the
court decision was interpreted, translated into practical actions, and incorpo-
rated in the agency's working practices.220 The description of the IND's re-
sponse thus reflects the policy of cers' view of the situation. lf I quote one of
them, I will refer in a footnote to the policy officer in question, although the
quote  is of course my translation.
5.2 THE DUBLIN CASE
5.2.1 THE CONTEXT
The Dublin Co„vention
As  mentioned in Chapter  4, tlie Dublin Convention  of June  15,   1990,  regu-
lates the attribution of responsibility between European countries for deciding
asylum applications. In the Dublin Convention, the EU member states agreed
that the first EU member state where an application for asylum is lodged is
responsible for examining that asylum application.221 The Dublin Convention
came into force on  September  1,  1997,  and was translated into Article  15(b)  of
the Dutch Aliens Act, currently Article 30(a) of the Aliens Act 2000. On the
basis of Article 30(a) of the Aliens Act 2000, an asylum application can be
found inadmissible and marked as a Dublin claim, if, on the basis of the Dublin
Convention, another EU member state can be held responsible for examining
the asylum application. During the asylum procedure, as soon as evidence is
found that another EU member state is responsible for handling the asylum
application, the immigration service will start a procedure to subniit a Dublin
claim, which is a request to transfer the asylum seeker to the other EU member
state.
Artide 3 of the  European Convention on Human Rights
Article 3 of the ECHR states that no person may be subjected to torture, in-
hunian or degrading treatment, or punishment. In effect, Article 3 of the
ECHR imposes an obligation on contracting states not to deport an asylum
seeker to a country where he or she faces a real risk of such inhuman treat-
ment. The prohibition implies that an asylum seeker cannot be deported to a
country that violates Article 3 of the ECHR nor to a country from which it
can be expected that it will transfer the asyluni seeker to a country that violates
Article 3 of-the ECHR.
22   The interviews centered 011 the three questions set out in Section 3.3. Iii addition,
questions were asked about the factors that influenced the policy officers' response,
which will be dealt with in Chapter 7. (For the interview checklist. see Appendix 3).
221  In 2003. the Dublin Convention was replaced by the '1)ublin II' Regulation (Regula-
tion (EC) No. 343/2003, OJ L 30/1, 25.02.2003).
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5.2.2 THE JUDGMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
On March 7, 2000, the European Court of Human Rights decided in a case
concerning a planned transfer of an asylum seeker from the United Kingdom
to Germany.222 The asylum seeker, a Tamil from Sri Lanka, had first submitted
an asylum application in Germany, but Germany had refused to grant him
asylum. The asylum seeker subsequently went to the United Kingdom and,
once again, applied for asylum. During the handling of his case by the British
imniigration service, the asylum seeker handed over medical reports to prove
lie had been tortured in Sri Lanka. The British immigration service, however,
decided that, on the basis of the Dublin Convention, Germany was responsible
for handling his asylum claim so it started the procedure for submitting a Dub-
lin claim. Because the asyluni seeker feared being transferred to Germany and
being subsequently deported to Sri Lanka, he filed a complaint with the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights.
Although Gennany has signed the Geneva Convention as well as the ECHIZ,
the German Supreme Court has developed case law that partly differs from case
law in other European countries, most notably with regard to the concept of
'persecution' as defined in the Geneva Convention. According to Gernian223
case law, this concept only includes persecution by the authorities of a state; it
does not include violations of human rights that result from rivalry between
ethnic groups, which was the state of affairs in Sri Lanka at  that time.  In a simi-
lar way, the German Supreme Court has interpreted Article 3 of the ECHR:
Deportation  of an alien  can  only  be a violation of Article  3  of the  ECHR. if the
alien fears inhuman  treatment by the authorities of the state.
In its judgment, the European Court dealt with the matter elaborately and
decided in favor of the asylum seeker, but only to the extent that he had
claimed that the United Kingdom could not automatically transfer him to
Germany. The Court expected from the United Kingdom to investigate the
likelihood that the asylum seeker's transfer to GerI'liany could imply violation
ofArticle 3 ofthe ECHR..224
The Court finds that the indirect removal in this case to an intermediary
country, which is also a Contracting State, does not affect the responsi-
bility of the United Kingdom to ensure that the applicant is not,  as a re-
the Convention. Nor can the United Kingdom rely automatically in
suk of its decision to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3  of
that context on the arrangements made in the Dublin Convention con-
cerning the attribution of responsibility between European countries for
deciding asylum claims (...). It would be incompatible with the purpose
and object of the Conventioii if Contracting States were hereby ab-
222 Application no. 43844/98, T. I. vs. the United  Kingdom  (R.V  100 no.  11; R.V 1974-2003
no. 4).
223 Explanation distilled from Vermeulen in: RV 100 no. 11, and from Boeles 2000.




solved from their responsibility under the Convention in relation to the
field ofactivity covered by such attribution.
The Court further stated that, in this case, the apparent gap in protection was
obviated by the guarantee of the German authorities to handle the asylum
seeker's case on the basis of Article 53 of the Gemian Auslandergesetz (Aliens
Act), which provided the possibility to refrain from deportation if the asylum
seeker would be deported to a country where he might fear for life, limb, or
freedom.225
[Tlhe Court notes that the apparent gap in protection resulting from the
Gennan approach to non-State agent risk is Inet, to at least sotne extent,
by the application by the Gennan authorities of section  53(6). It appears
that this provision has been applied to give protection to persons facing
risk to life and limb from non-State agents, including groups acting in
opposition to the Government (...). It has also been applied to a number
of Taiizils,  including a young male  Tamil at  risk of ill-treatment froni se-
curity forces due to the presence of scars on  his body.
Finally, the European Court concluded that, despite Germany's divergent
interpretation of Article 3 of the ECHIZ, a real risk tllat Germany would de-
port the asylum seeker to Sri Lanka in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR could
not be established. Therefore, the Court declared the asylum seeker's claim ill-
founded.226
5.2.3 THE RESPONSE TO THE COURT DECISION
Tlie Reaction in Parliament
On April  17,  20(1(),  Halsema, Member of Parliament and representing a liberal
party (GroenLinks), asked the then 1)eputy Minister oflustice what he thought
the consequences of the European Court's judginent would be. She stated that
the Court's judginent would necessitate a more exhaustive investigation of the
reasonableness of an asylum seeker's transfer to another EU member state if an
asylum application is niarked as a Dublin Claim. One month later, however, on
May  12, 2()()(), the Deputy Minister ofJustice answered that the judgment of
the European Court did not oblige the Netherlands to adjust working practices
with regard  to the transfer of Dublin claimants.  He  stated: 227
The European Court has accepted the United Kingdom's procedure for
handling asylum requests with regard  to the Dublin  C:onvention,  a  pro-
cedure that is comparable to the Dutch procedure. Therefore, the Neth-
125 Ibid.
226  One year later. on March 6. 20()1, the European Court decided iii a similar case (appli-
cation 110. 45276/99). which concerned an illtended transfer of an asylum seeker from
the United Kingdom to Tanza,iia (11-V 2001 no. 1).
117  Aanhangsel van de Handelingen [Appendix to the Parliatiientary Proceedingsl  TK  1999-
20()(} no. 1245 (iny traiislation)
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erlands meets the requirements meant to prevent a violation of Article 3
of the ECHR if an asylum seeker is transferred to another EU nieinber
state, as stated in the European Court's decision.
In his answer, the then Deputy Minister made it clear that, since all EU meni-
ber states had signed the Dublin Convention, the Netherlands could presume
that EU nieniber states would comply with the requirements of both the Ge-
neva Convention and the EC'.Hll, unless there were clear indications that the
state to which the asyluni seeker would be deported did not uphold these prin-
ciples. If an asylum seeker would to be transferred to another EU member
state,  it was up  to  the asylum seeker to provide proof of a possible violation  of
Article 3 of the ECHIL. 228
The  Response  ef the  IND
According to the policy officer of the Litigation staff unit who was involved in
the agency's response to this court decision, the judgment of the European
Court was consistent with the case law the European Court had already devel-
oped on Article 3 of the ECHR.239 Despite the Deputy Minister's explanation
of the European Court's judgment, however, the IND had to respond to the
judgment because, in several appeals lodged with the Aliens Division of the
Hague District Court, the attorneys of asylum seekers referred  to  the judgment
of the European Court. The discussions in court focused in particular on the
question of whether the asylum seeker,  or the Deputy Minister of Justice,
should substantiate the claini  of a possible violation of Article 3 of the ECHR,
if the asylum seeker would be transferred to another EU member state.
On behalf of the Deputy Minister ofJustice, the representatives of the  IND put
forward in their speech to the Aliens Divisions of the District Courts that the
European Court had decided in a very specific case. Therefore, the European
Court's decision did not imply consequences for other asylum applications.
The case in which the European Court had decided concerned an asylum
seeker whose asylum claim was refused in first instance. However, the asylum
seeker had not inentioned the medical reports to the Gernian authorities. Only
later, after he had submitted an asylum claim in the United Kingdom, had he
handed these reports to the British immigration service. Therefore, the Gemian
authorities had not been able to take these medical reports into account in their
decision.
Besides, the European Court had declared the complaint of the asylum seeker
ill-founded. Although the Court had nientioned the requirement that, in the
case of a transfer, the itilmigration service had to make sure the other EU
niember state would not violate Article 3 of the ECHR, the European Court
218 Ibid.
229 Interview policy officer no.  1. See, for exaniple, European Court of Human Rights,
March 2(1, 1991 Ortiz Varas (IZV 1991 no. 18; RV 1()() 110.70); European Court of
Human R.ights, October 311, 1991 Vilvarajah (RV 1991 no. 19; R.V 1974-2003 no. 1).
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had not criticized tlie UK's procedure. Moreover, they stated that 'the Nether-
lands was not in the position to judge whether other EU member states comply
with the requirements of international conventions,230 and, therefore, the
Netherlands should be able to rely on the premise that other EU member states
comply with the requirement stated in international conventions. Thus, all the
IND lawyer could do was to explicate in their speech to the court how the
asylum procedures in other EU member states prevented a violation of Article
3 of the ECHR. They based their information on the available literature and
contacts with liaison officers or authorities of other EU member states.
The Aliens Divisions of the District Courts, however, interpreted the European
Court's judgment very differently.231  On the one hand, the Aliens Divisions of
the District Courts concluded that Germany offered adequate legal protection
in light of Article 3 of the ECHR.232 On the other hand, they found that the
argument of 'interstate trust' fell short of complying with Article 3 of the
ECHR.233 Because of the large number of appeal cases in which an asylum
seeker filed an appeal against a decision to mark his asylum application as a
Dublin claim, the IND policy officers discussed the matter during one of their
so-called Dublin meetings.
Since 1996, policy officers of the staff units Litigation, Policy Execution,  and
Asylum,  and an official  of the Department of Aliens Affairs have gathered  on  a
regularly basis to discuss matters concerning the implementation of the Dublin
Convention. In one of these meetings, soine months after the European
Court's judgment, they discussed the divergent views of the Aliens Divisions of
the District Courts and decided to incorporate the official interpretation in the
Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines. In January 2001, the Aliens Act Im-
plementation Guidelines were adjusted accordingly. Since then, the guidelines
concerning the implementation of the Dublin Convention have stated that in
the case of a transfer to another EU member state, the Netherlands relies on
the principle of inter state trust. Therefore, an asylum seeker will have to sub-
stantiate his claim  of a possible violation of Article 3  of the ECHR by the EU
member state he is going to be transferred to. 234
5.2.4 WHAT HAPPENED AFTERWARDS
On October 25, 2001, some months after the Aliens Act Implementation
Guidelines had been adjusted, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department
230  Interview policy officer no. 6.
231  Terlouw 2001, p. 168.
232 Aliens Division of the Zwolle District Court, August 16, 2000 (NAV 2000/185), and
Aliens Division of the Zwolle District Court, September 2000 (AB 20()0/439).
233 Aliens Division of the Zwolle District Court, July 5, 2000 (NAV 2000 no. 8, p. 568),
Aliens Division of the Zwolle District Court, December 1,2000 (NAV 2001  no. 2, p
110), and Aliens Division of the Zwolle District Court, December 13, 2000 (NAV 2001
no 2, p. 106).
234 IND Instruction no. 239, published in the Staatscourant [Netherlands Government Ga-
zette] oflanuary 29,2(101, no. 20, p. 9
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confirmed the official interpretation of the European Court's judgment as laid
down in the guidelines. In its decision, the Administrative Jurisdiction Depart-
ment stated:235
The basis of the Deputy Minister's asylum policy is that the Netherlands
relies on the premise that states which have signed the Dublin Conven-
tion will comply with the requirements of both the Geneva Convention
and the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, the
policy implies that the asylum seeker will have to substantiate his claim
that, in his particular case, the EU member state to which he will be
transferred violates these provisions. There is no argument to support
the claim that, in light of the European Court's judgnient of March 7,
2000, tlie Deputy Minister's policy is unjust or unlawful.
However, despite this judgment of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department,
the matter continued to give rise to appeals with the Aliens Division of the
Hague District Court in subsequent years.
5.3   THE AC CASE
5.3.1 THE CONTEXT
The AC procedure
Since 2000, the number of people applying for asylum  in the Netherlands  has
dropped sharply. Before that time, however, the influx of asylum seekers was
huge at times (see Table 4.1). To handle the enormous numbers of asylum
seekers, the AC procedure, which is an accelerated procedure for examining
asylum applications, was introduced in October 1994. Initially,  the AC proce-
dure aimed at young tourists froni former Eastern European countries who
tried to get around the obligation to get a visa and, instead, applied for asylum
to make use of the facilities in the reception center.236 The AC procedure was
meant to handle paper-thin asylum applications that could be declared inadmis-
sible or ill-founded without thorough investigation.237 These asylum seekers
could then be barred from the crowded reception centers.
Since the introduction  of the AC procedure, all asylum seekers must register at
an Application Center. When asylum seekers arrive at the Application Center,
their body, clothes, and luggage is thoroughly searched for documents and
identity cards, and fingerprints and photos are taken. These actions, which the
officers of the Aliens Police are allowed to execute on the basis of the Aliens
Act, are meant to identify the asylum seeker and to find out whether he or she
is registered in a criminal investigation database. Next, an appointment is made
235 Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, October  25,2001  (R.V
2001 no.  15; JV 2001/328) (my translation).
236 See Doornbos 2003a, p. 56.
237 TK 1993-1994 19 637 no. 104, p. 2.
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for an initial interview with an IND employee.238 After the initial interview, a
distinction is made between applications that can be decided within 48 process
hours, and applications that require additional, and more time-consuming,
investigation (see section 4.3.5). If the IND expects to settle the application
within 48 process hours, the application will be dealt with in the accelerated
AC procedure. In these cases, also the in-depth interview will take place at the
Application Center.
Tlze Conditions of Residence in tlie Application Center
In  1994,  the time limit  of the AC procedure was initially  set  at 24 process
hours.  Five years after its introduction,  in June 1999,239 the duration of the AC
procedure was lengthened to 48 process hours.29 The AC procedure officially
starts when the investigation into the credibility of the asylum application be-
girls. However, the hours between 22:00 and 08:00 are not counted as hours
available for the procedure. Consequently, asylum seekers may have to spend
up to five days at an Application Center.24' During the asylum seekers' stay in
an Application Center, some restrictions are imposed upon them that are
meant to expedite the investigation of their asyluni application. During the
day, the asylum seekers must stay in waiting rooms or in a closed courtyard,
and they are obliged to be in the dormitory at 22:00 hours. In 1999 and 2000,
the National Ombudsman received a number of complaints about the condi-
tions of residence in the Application Center, which led the National Om-
budsman to decide to conduct an inquiry into the cleanliness of the
accommodation and the privacy of the asylum seekers.  On the basis of its in-
quiry, the National Ombudsnian concluded that the conditions of residence in
the Application Center resembled detention. 242
7lte Number of Rejected Asylum Applications in the AC procedure
At  the  time  the AC procedure was introduced,  it was expected that about  10%
of the asylum applications would be dealt with in the accelerated procedure:
"Only really weak cases (about 10%) will be decided within this restricted
period of tinie.-243 Until the introduction  of the 48-hours procedure,  in  1999,                        i
the percentage of asylum applications dealt with in the AC procedure was
actually  9% to 14%.244  In the years thereafter, however, the percentage  of asy-
238 Until the initial interview begins, the asylum seeker stays in a Temporary Facility.
239   On June  15,  1999, the 48-hours procedure was introduced at AC Zevenaar and AC
Rijsbergen (TBV 1999/12). In October 1999, AC Schiphol followed (TBV 1999/21),
and a few months later a fourth Application Cetiter was opened in Ter Apel  (TK  1999-
2000 19637 no. 484, p. 7 and p. 16).
241'   Currently, this provision is laid down in Article  1.1  (f) Aliens Decree 2()0(1.
241 TK 2000-2001 19 637 no. 579, p. 3.
242 Report ofthe National Onibudsrnan no. 2001/0081 (March 28,2001). For the Deputy
Mitiister's reaction, see TK 20(1()-2001 19 637 no. 579.
243 TK 1993-1994 19 637 no. 104, p. 3
244 TK 1997-1998 19 637 no. 330, p. 20. See also Lodder 2()032, p. 16.
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lum applications that was rejected in the AC procedure increased (see Table
5.1)
Table 5.1: Number and percentage of asylum applications rejected in the AC
procedure.
245
Number of Percentage of
Intake of Asylum Asylum
Year Asylurn Applications Applications
Seekers Rejected in the Rejected in the
AC procedure AC procedure
20()0 41,082 6,573                               16
2001 30,913 6,801                               22
2()<)2 17,033 7,665                               45
2(X }3 11,753 4,701                               40
2004 7 327 3,245                               42
2005 8,518 3,151                               37
The increase  of the percentage of asylum applications that were rejected in the
AC procedure was partly the result of policy changes with regard to Some
(primary) countries of origin. Since the second half of 2001, asylum seekers
coming from R.wanda and Somalia were no longer automatically granted a
residence permit.246 In 2002, a similar policy measure was taken with regard to
asyluni seekers coming from Afghanistan and Sierra Leone.247 Like other asy-
lum applications, their applications have been dealt with individually since
then. The decrease of the percentage of rejected asylum applications in 2003 is
attributed to a decision of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department (which
will be dealt with in Section 5.4). 248
5.3.2 THEJUDGMENT OF THE HAGUE COURT OF APPEAL
On October 31, 2002, the Hague Court of Appeal decided iii a case that was
brought before the court by two interest groups (the VAJN and the NJCM)249
both representing the interests of asylum seekers:50 By means of this appeal,
they tried to challenge the lengthening of the AC procedure from 24 to 48
hours. They stated, aniong other things, that:
245  Figures 2()00: TK 2000-20()1 19 637 no. 559, p. 3. Figures 2001: TK 2001-2002 19 637
and 27557 no. 652, p. 11). Figures 24)02: TK 2002-20()3 19 637 no. 731, p. 11. Figures
20()3-2(1()5: TK 2005-2006 19 637 no. 1025, Appendix p. 35.
246 TK 20()1-2002 19 637 and 27557 no. 652, pp. 12-15.
247 TK 2()(12-2003 19 637 no. 731, pp. 12-14.
248 TK 2003-20(14 19 637 no. 805, p. 7
249 The Association of Attorneys for Asylum Seekers (141/N) and the Dutch section of the
International Commission ofJurists (NICAl).
2511 In December 1999, the Civil Division of the Hague District Court had declared the case




a)  The AC procedure violates the guidelines of the Executive Com-
mittee of the UNHCR (ExCom Conclusion no. 30),251 because the
AC procedure lacks an unambiguous criterion for handling asylum
applications.
b)   The criterion that does form the basis of the 48-hours procedure re-
sults in arbitrariness.
c)  The AC procedure offers no adequate opportunity to offer legal aid
or to produce evidence for the asylum seeker's case.
d) The AC procedure does not provide in a six-day rest period, which
is contrary to the guidelines ofthe Geneva Convention.
The VAJN and the NjCM claimed that, because of these inadequacies, decid-
ing in asylum cases during the AC procedure was careless. As a consequence,
the AC procedure would result in a rejection of asylum applications which
should have been granted. Therefore, the Netherlands would violate Article 33
ofthe Geneva Convention that prohibits the deportation of asylum seekers to a
country where they face a real risk ofpersecution.
Iii its interlocutory ruling, the Hague Court of Appeal declared that the Aliens
Act 200() did, in fact, offer an adequate legal basis for the AC procedure as an
accelerated procedure for the handling of asylum applications. However, the
question that remained to be answered was whether the AC procedure was in
contradiction with international conventions. In its final judgment, the Hague
Court of Appeal declared all of the above-mentioned arguments unfounded.
However, the Court took notice of the argument put forward by the VAJN
and NJCM that the conditions of residence in the Application Center could be
described as an unlawful deprivation of liberty. The Court concluded that,
taken together, the conditions of residence in the Application Center indeed
constituted a deprivation of freedom (as described in Article 5 of the ECHR)
for which there was no legal basis.252 The Court considered in particular the
limited freedom of movenient  in the Application Center as well as the restric-
tion for asylum seekers to leave the Application Center because otherwise their
asylum application would be rejected.
During the handling of the case in court, the State Advocate had replied that
Article  55  of the Aliens Act 2000 provided a legal basis for detention of asylum
seekers in the Application Center. In its final judgment, however, the Court
found that Article 55 of the Aliens Act did not provide a legal basis for deten-
tion, because it only obligates asylum seekers 'to be available' and does not
require them to stay in a closed reception center. Therefore, the Court de-
clared the AC procedure unlawful, and ordered the Dutch State to revoke the
lengthening of the AC procedure (from 24 to 48 hours) within 30 days after
251 ExCom Conclusion no. 30 is a non-binding conclusion ofthe Executive Committee of
the UNHCR and contains guidelines and recommendations for an accelerated handlitig
of manifestly unfounded or abusive asylum applications. See Kok 2003, pp. 191-2()4.
252 The Hague Court ofAppeal, October 31, 2002, no. KG 99/1281 and KG 99/1251
(RV 2002 no. 22. JV 2(102/467).
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the Court had published its judgment. The 48-hours procedure could only
resume as soon as the unlawful aspects had been dealt with.253
In its judgment, the Hague Court of Appeal referred to case law of both the
European Court of Human 11.ights and the Dutch Supreme Court and there-
tore offered the Dutch State only a restricted period of time to comply with its
judgnient.  In its decision, the Hague Court of Appeal explains: 254
The Court will offer the State respite to comply with this judgment.
However, this respite cannot take long considering, on the one hand,
the asylum seekers' interests that are at stake and, on the other hand, the
fact that this judgmetit, in light of case law of both the European Court
of Human  Rights and the Suprenie Court, cannot conie as a surprise.
The Judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court (December 9,  1988)
On December 9, 1988, the Dutch Supreme Court decided in three cases that
addressed the accommodation for rejected asylum seekers in the detention center
at Schiphol Airport. In these cases, a similar question was raised. The Supreme
Court held that the physical freedom of asylum seekers under the then present
circumstances was subject to such fundamental, spatial as well as social, restrictions
that the total of restrictions resembled the situation of a detainee and should,
therefore, be regarded as detention for which there was no legal basis.255 In re-
sponse to this court decision, the legislator adjusted the Aliens Act by adding
Article 7(a), currently Article 6 ofthe Aliens Act 2000.256
The Judgment of the European Court on Human Rights Gune 25, 1996)
on J ne 25,  1996, the European Court of Human Rights expressed a similar
point of view in Amuur v. France. The European Court found:
257
Holding aliens in the international zone does indeed involve a restriction
upon liberty  (...). Such holding should  not be prolonged excessively,  oth-
envise there would be a risk of it turning a mere restriction on liberty  (...)
into a deprivation of liberty.  In that connection, account should be taken
of the fact that the measure is applicable not to those who have committed
criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled
from their own country. The mere fact that it is possible for asylum-
seekers to leave voluntarily (...) cannot exclude a restriction on liberty
(...).
153 The judgment of the Hague Court of Appeal was only applicable to Application Centers
situated on Dutch territory. Detention of asylum seekers at AC Schiphol is cotisidered to
be legitimate on the basis of Article 6 of the Aliens Act 20CIO.
254 The Hague Court ofAppeal, October 31,  2002, nos. KG 99/1281  and 99/1251  (RV
2002 no. 22; JV 2002/467).
255  RV 1988 no. 14; RV 100 no. 73. See also Dutch Supreme Court, May 25,1982 (RV
1982 no. 74).
256 TK 1989-1990 21 300 no. 2, p.5(J.




The European Court concluded that holding the applicants in the transit zone of
Paris Airport  was,  in view  of the restnctions suffered, equivalent to deprivation of
liberty. The French legal rules in force at the time did not sufficiently guarantee
the applicant's right to liberty and, consequently,  were in violation of Article  5  of
the ECHR.
5.3.3 THE RESPONSE TO THE COURT DECISION
The decision of the Hague Court of Appeal received some attention from the
press. On November 2, 2002, the national newspaper NRC Handelsblad re-
ported on the outcome of the court decision.258 It mentioned that the accom-
modation of asylum seekers in the Application Center was in contravention of
the ECHR..
7'he Response of the IND
The Interpretation of the Court Decision
The IND policy officers who were involved in the interpretation of the court
decision  were  of the opinion  that the Hague Court of Appeal had clearly stated
its judgnient: The Court had decided that the 48-hours procedure could only
continue if the unlawful detention was abolished.  If the IND wanted to carry
on with  the AC procedure, the length  of the procedure should be shortened  to
24 hours. Besides, the Court had set a strict term (of 30 days) in which the
adjustment of the AC procedure should be dealt with.
The Hague Court of Appeal had inentioned a total of seven reasons why the
AC procedure constituted detention. According to the policy officers, the main
reasons were the limited freedom of movement in the Application Center and
the fact that,  if an asylum seeker wanted to leave the Application Center,  this
would result in a rejection of his asyluni applicatioti. Furthermore, the Court
had mentioned the taking of the asylum seekers' mobile phones as well as the
restriction to use their own toiletries. On the other hand, the Court had de-
clared all the otlier claims ill-founded, so if the unlawful aspects of the AC
procedure was abolished, there would be no reason to doubt the lawfulness of
the procedure.
The Transformation of the Court Decision
Although the policy officers found the court decision clear, they were not
prepared for the ultimate outcome.  In that sense, the consequences  of the court
decision did come as a 'surprise'. Therefore, the day after the Court had de-
cided, the policy officers of the Litigation staff unit and the Policy Execution
staff unit gathered with the State Advocate who, on behalf of the Minister of
1&I, had defended the case in court, to talk through some possible measures in
response to the court decision.
258  'Asielproce(lure in strild met me,ise,irechten', in: NRC Handelsblad, November 2,2(1(12.
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A first measure would be to lodge an appeal against the judgment of the Hague
Court of Appeal with the Dutch Supreme Court. The importance of this legal
action was to find out how the Supreme Court would judge oii whether 'third
parties', such as interest groups, have the right to challenge the conditions of
residence in an Application Center by means of civil law proceedings. It was
expected that the Aliens Act provides asylum seekers with enough opportutii-
ties to bring such matters before the Aliens Division of the Hague District
Court. It would take some time, however, before the Supreine Court would
be able to consider the niatter and, Sitice lodging an appeal would not dismiss
the IND from its obligation to comply with the Hague Court of Appeal's
judgment, other measures had to be considered, too.
Consequently, the policy officers and the State Advocate thought over the
possibility to create a legal basis for detention in the Application Center. How-
ever, adjusting the Aliens Act takes time, because it requires parliamentary
approval. Moreover, Article 5 of the ECHR. restricts the possibility of lawful
detention to situations iii which it is meant to prevent illegal entry or to ensure
deportation. Since the asylum seekers' residence in the Application Center did
not  meet  any of these criteria, adjustment  of the Aliens Act seemed no realistic
option. It turned out that the only possibility to comply with the court deci-
sion was to adjust the regime in the Application Center so that it no longer
constituted detention. It would imply the impossibility to reject an asylum
application simply because the asylum seeker wanted to leave the Application
Center during the handling of his application.
Next, policy officers of the Policy Execution staff unit had to consider how to
adjust the regime in the Application Center. On the one hand, asylum seekers
were to be given the opportunity to leave the Application Center but, on the
other hand, their presence at the Application Center should be guaranteed too,
so that the handling of asylum applications would not be held up. The policy
officers thought of introducing a strict appointment and report systeni since
'just opening the gates of the Application Center could result in unintended
consequences.,259 This option should, of course, be discussed with  the employ-
ees at the Application Center, including the Aliens Police and the attorneys of
the asylum seekers. The IND also may have to inform local government au-
thorities because, if asylum seekers were permitted to leave the Application
Center, they might start wandering around in the municipalities. Furthermore,
the policy officers took into account the possibility to temporarily shut the
Application Center if the solution  they had in  mind was not ready in time.
Iii a following meeting with employees at the Application Center, however,
the proposal of a strict appointment and report system was not welcomed.
&4 Investigating asylum applications and the hearing of asylum seekers require
flexibility!" Was their reaction and the AC employees therefore found a strict
259 Interview policy officer no. 7. Asylum seekers might leave the Application Center and
riot return, while the IND has not yet decided on their application. In that case, the asy-
lum seeker's stay in the country is illegal.
85
CHAPTER 5
appointment system impracticable.260 Besides, the AC employees were 'slightly
irritated' by the fact that the policy officers had not anticipated the court deci-
sion, but, for the policy officers, this was undeserved criticism. Finally, a less
rigorous method to permit asylum seekers to leave the Application Center was
opted for. The policy officers of the Policy Execution staff unit advised the
Minister of 1&I to offer asylum seekers the possibility to stay outside the Appli-
cation Center during the hours between 22:00 and 07:30.
The Processing of the Court Decision
The adjustments of the Application Center regime were laid down in an in-
terim report of the Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines, which was pub-
lished in the Government Gazette.26' In that way, the AC employees and their
colleagues of the Aliens Police could take notice  of the adjustments in working
practice, since the staff of the Application Center usually discusses policy
changes in their weekly meeting. During these meetings, guidelines and proce-
dures are further explicated. Furthermore, the Minister's Department gave out
a press release with the official interpretation of the court decision and the
Minister's response. In the IND annual report, a policy official of the Policy
Execution staff unit explained afterwards: 262
There were numerous matters, practical as well as legal, we had to expli-
cate to ensure that the adjustment of the AC procedure combined with
our policy goal to handle asylum applications carefully within 48 hours.
After we had decided on these matters with respect to content, our col-
leagues of the Litigation staff unit checked the legal aspects of the ad-
justments. At the same time, instructions for AC employees were
written.  We just barely managed to get the adjustments ready before the
deadline the Court had set. The adjustments have been operational since
December 5,2002.
The adjustments to the AC regime thus catiie into force on December 5,2002.
After the Minister of I&I had informed Parliament about the content of the
court decision, one day after the Hague Court of Appeal had published its
judgment,263 Parliament was brought up to date by the Minister on December
19, 2002. In his letter, the Minister of INI explained that he held to his posi-
tion that asylum seekers must be available for the investigation into the credi-
bility of their asylum application 'since the AC procedure is a complicated
logistic process.,264 For asylum seekers, however, the opportunity was created
to stay elsewhere, outside the Application Center, between 22:00 and 07:30
260 Interview policy officer no. 7.
261 Staatscourant, December 3,2()00 no. 233 (TBV 2002/52).
162 jaarverslag IND 20(12, p. 17 (my translation)
263 TK 20()2-20()3  19 637  no. 687 (Letter of the Minister of Inimigration and Integration
addressed to the Lower House, November  1,  2002)
264 TK 2(-)02-2()03 19 637 no. 708.
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hours.265 Besides, an asylum seeker was allowed to leave the Application Center
before 22:00 hours if, according to the IND, his presence is not necessary for
the rest of that day.  If an asylum seeker wants to leave the Application Center,
he is expected to return at 07:30, so that he can be searched before entering,
and the handling of the asylum applications can start at 08:00 hours. 266
Furthermore, the possibility for asylum seekers to have access to their luggage
was extended, and they were allowed to keep their toiletries and mobile
phones after the Aliens Police had read the SIM card.267 A few months later,
the Minister of I&1 lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against the
judgment of the flague Court of Appeal to find out whether the Supreme
Court considered it admissible that interest parties use civil law procedures to
raise questions that address the admission and residence ofasylum seekers.
5.3.4 WHAT HAPPENED AFTERWARDS
During the meeting with employees at the Application Center, the AC elli-
ployees had asked for an evaluation of the new regime. One year after the
adjustments were implemented, the new regime appeared to work to 'every-
one's' satisfaction: Asylum seekers seldom make use of the possibility to stay
outside the Application Center during the evening and, moreover, the number
of asylum seekers that leave without returning (and are registered as 'destina-
tion unknown') showed no significant change. 268
The Hague Court of Appeal's judgment, however, was not the end of this
remarkable process. In the months after the Court had decided, the AC proce-
dure continued to be a subject of discussion. International as well as national
organizations criticized the short time during which the asylum applications are
to be examined.26' The pace of the handling of asylum applications would have
a bad effect on the thoroughness of the decision-making.  The arguments ad-
dressed the short time available for asylum seekers to tell about their flight, the
limited tillie for attorneys to assist in an asylum seeker's case, the restricted
options to submit new facts or circumstances, and the marginal judicial review
of IND decisions. Because the criticism persisted, the Aliens Affairs Advisory
Commission advised the Minister to lengthen the duration of the AC proce-
dure.270 Nonetheless, in her letter to Parliament, the Minister of I&I refuted
265 The doors of the Application Center are closed from  22:00 to 07:30. Asylum seekers
who have chosen not to spend the night at the Application Center but return before
07:30 can stay at the emergency accommodation  of the security guards (TK 2002-2003
19 637 no. 708 p. 3)
266 The time period between 07:30 and 08:00 is not counted as time available for the inves-
tigation  into the credibility  of the asylum application, because  it  is  used for actions  to
check the identity of the asylum seeker (TBV 2002/52. published  in the Staatscourant of
December 3, 2(*)2, no. 233, p. 12).
3'·7  TK 2(11)2-2(M)3 19 637 no. 7()8 pp. 2-3.
268 Interview policy officer no. 7.
269 Human Right Watch, 2003; UNHCR, 2003; NJCM, 2003, Terlouw, 2003a.
270  Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, 2004.
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the claim that the AC procedure resulted in careless decision-making.27' Ac-
cording to the Minister, the AC procedure offered the asylum seeker sufficient
time, rest, and opportunity to prepare his case. The Minister referred to the
decision of the Hague Court of Appeal of October 31, 2002, in which the
court had decided that, although the time available for the asylum seekers'
attorneys was limited, the AC procedure is not too short for a careful handling
of asylum applications within 48 hours.272 Furthermore, the Minister referred
to the coalition agreement in which the coalition parties had agreed to maxi-
mize the number of asylum applications handled during the AC procedure,  and
stated that "la]sylum applicatiotis that can be judged with care within 48-
process hours are supposed to be handled iii the AC procedure. „273
Nonetheless, the Minister said to be willing to investigate the possibility to
'optimize' the AC procedure. Possibly, also the time asylum seekers spent in a
Temporary Facility (where they stay before being transferred to an Application
Center) could be utilized for the investigation of the asylum seeker's identity,
nationality, travel route, and motives for flight. This period could be used both
to get the necessary documents from tlie authorities of the country of origin,
and to give asylum seekers legal assistance and information about the asylum
procedure. Finally, the Minister would consider the possibility to not only
reject, but also to grant an asylum application in the AC procedure. This op-
tion has been available under the AC procedure since December 2004.274
Eventually, on September 3, 2004, the Dutch Supreme Court decided in the
case that was brought before the court by the Minister of I&1 concerning the
judginent of the Hague Court of Appeal of October 31, 2002.275 However,  the
Dutch Supreme Court did not consider the facts of the case as established by
the  Court of Appeal, but examined whether the Court of Appeal had properly
observed the application of the law in reaching its conclusion.  In its judgment,
the Supreme Court rejected the claim of the Minister of I&I that interest
groups cannot use civil law procedures to raise issues that address the admission
or residence of asylum seekers.  The fact that an asylum seeker could challenge
administrative guidelines in an appeal with the Aliens Division of the Hague
District Court did not, according to the Supreme Court, suffice to constitute
an adequate legal procedure for interest groups. However, if interest groups  are
to be regarded as legally involved parties, their legal case must relate to their
organizational goals as set out in their bylaws. Since this precondition was met
in the case the Hague Court of Appeal had decided, the Supreme Court con-
cluded  that the Hague Court of Appeal had judged rightfully
271 TK 2003-2004 19 637 no. 826.
272
TK 2003-2004 19 637 no. 826, p. 6.
273 TK 2003-2004 19 637 rio. 826, p. 4
274
See TK 2004-2005 19 637 no. 911, Appendix p. 15.
275 Dutch Supreme Court, September 3,2004, no. C03/0118HR- (JV 2004/400)
88
FIVE CASES
5.4 THE EURODAC CASE
5.4.1 THE CONTEXT
In the preceding section, 1 described the INI)'s response to a decision of the
Hague Court of Appeal, which had judged  iii a conflict  that,  iii 1999, started
off as a protest ofasylurn attorneys against the lengthening of the AC procedure
from 24 to 48 hours, but that soon became a judicial process between interest
groups and representatives  of the Dutch State. Eventually, Oil October  31,
2002, the Hague Court of Appeal decided that the conditiotis of residence in
the Application Center were unlawful and, in the following month, the IND
adjusted the regime in the Application Center. Since the introduction of the
Aliens Act 2000 (as of April 2001), also the Administrative jurisdiction De-
partment has decided on some cases that concerned the AC procedure. The
issues included, among others things, the definition  of the criterion that justifies
the accelerated handling of asylum applications  in  the AC procedure   (the  A C
·
416                              processcntenon) and the time available for handling an asylum application
hotirs).
277 Court decisions with regard to these definitions form the context of
the present case, in which the Administrative Jurisdiction Department was
asked to judge whether the 48-hours procedure starts when the fingerprints of
an asylum seeker are compared in the Eurodac database. To explain the Ad-
ministrative Jurisdiction Departnient's judgment on this case,  I will first elabo-
rate on the case law regarding the two concepts that are central in the AC
procedure: the AC criterion and the process hours. In this section, I will also
briefly outline the genesis of the Eurodac database.
Case Liw with Regard to t|ze AC proceditre
In one of the first cases brought before the Administrative Jurisdiction Depart-
ment after the coming into force of the Aliens Act 20()0, the Appeals Court
was asked to consider what type of asylum applications could be handled dur-
ing the AC procedure.278 In its decision on this matter, the Administrative
Jurisdiction Department referred to an explanation of the Deputy Minister of
justice iii which he stated: "With regard to the question of whether an asylum
request can be handled in the AC procedure, the decisive factor is whether a
careful investigation into the credibility of an asylum request is possible within
the restricted period of time."279 On the basis of this explanation, the Adminis-
trative Jurisdiction Department concluded that the legislator had deliberately
failed to define an AC criterion, so the AC procedure was not only meant for
manifestly unfounded or abusive asylum applications. According to the Admin-
istrative Jurisdiction Department, the claim that some types of asylum applica-
tions could not be handled in the AC procedure could therefore not be
276  See RV 2001 no. 19.
277  See R.V 2(101 no. 20.
278 Adnlinistrative Jurisdiction 1)epartment of the (Zouticil of State. August 7, 2001  (JV
2001/259), and Administrative Jurisdiction 1)epartment of the Council of State, August
27,20(11 (RV 2()01 no. 19).
279  Parliamentary Papers of the Upper Housel EK 2000-2001 26 975 no. 5d. p. 6.
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upheld. Whether an asylum application could be rejected in the AC procedure
depended on the question of whether such a decision could be carefully taken
within 48 process hours:280
From both the legislative process with regard to the Aliens Act 2000 and
the explanation given in the Aliens Decree 2000, it follows that the leg-
islator has chosen to prescribe a time limit to decide whether an asylum
application can be rejected in the AC procedure. The underlying
thought was that this criterion guarantees that, in the AC procedure,
only those asylum applications are handled which do not require a tillie-
consuming investigation.
A decision to reject an asylum application in the AC procedure can thus be
reviewed by the court on the basis of the carefulness of the investigation and
the time period in which the decision was taken.
With regard to the time available for the investigation into the credibility of
asylum applications that are handled in the AC procedure, the Administrative
Jurisdiction Department decided that all hours that elapse between the registra-
tion of an asylum seeker and the handing over of the decision on his asylum
application (with the exception of the hours between 22:00 and 08:00) can be
marked as process hours.281 An exception could be made only when, due to
specific circumstance or facts, some hours could not be used for the investiga-
tion into the asylum application. Such an exception is legitimate, for example,
in the event of delay because a interpreter must be found.282 On the other
hand, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department refused to accept as an ex-
ception the situation in which an asylum seeker's attorney needed more time
(than the three hours available) to prepare the asyluni seeker for his in-depth
interview and to write an additional view in response to that interview:83 If
such a situatioti arises, the Adininistrative jurisdiction Department holds the
Minister of I&1 responsible to decide whether the asylum application can be
rejected in the AC procedure: 284
280 Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, December 20,2001  (jV
2002/44).
281 Administrative jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, Deceniber 20,2001  OV
2002/44), and Administrative Jurisdiction Department ofthe Council of State, February
25, 2002 OV 2002/123). In Article 1.1 (f) ofthe Aliens Decree 2000, process hours are
defined as 'the hours available for the investigation  of an  application for a temporary
residence pernlit as referred to in Article 28 of the Aliens Act 2000, whereby the hours
between 22:(K) and 08:00 are not counted.'
282   Administrative Jurisdiction Departinent of the Council of State, June 29,2001  (JV
2001/208).
283  It had become common practice in these situations to stop the clock. This arrangement
was even laid down in the Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines (See Lodder 2003a, p
127).




The fact that no investigation takes place or extra titiie is spent on cer-
tain aspects of the investigation forms no grounds to conclude that this
time was not available for the investigation. After all, otherwise - by
'stopping the clock' - also relatively time-consuming cases could be
handled in the AC procedure, and that would devaluate the meaning of
the criterion defined in Article  1.1  of the Aliens 1)ecree 2()()0.
Furthennore, the Adniinistrative jurisdiction Departillent more than once
emphasized that the Minister (i.e., the INI)) should comply with the measure
of 48 process hours: 285
With regard to the legal consequences attached by law to the handling
of asylum applications within 48 hours (and in the ititerests oflegal secu-
rity), this time limit must strictly complied with.
From judgments of the Administrative Jurisdiction I)epartment, it can further
be concluded that the 48-hours procedure starts when the investigation of an
asylum claim begins. The Adniinistrative Jurisdiction Ilepartment made it clear
that,  in the absence  of a clear definition,  but on the basis of Article  1.1 (f)  of the
Aliens Decree 2000, the start of the 48-hours procedure depends on the begin-
izitig of the investigation into the credibility of tlie asylutii application. 286
Stibmitting a Dublin claim
As mentioned in section 5.2.1, an asylum application can be found inadmissible
and marked as a Dublin claim if, on the basis of the Dublin Convention, an-
other EU member state can be held responsible for exaniining the asylum ap
plication. The procedure to submit a Dublin claim consists of three steps. 287
First, the IND investigates the possibility to submit a Dublin claim, then the
Dublin claim is put before the other EU member state and, finally, the other
EU member state accepts or rejects the Dublin claim.
A Dublin claim must be put before the other EU member state within three
months after the asylum seeker has submitted his asylum application. When an
asylum application is marked as a Dublin claim during the AC procedure, the
in-depth interview with the asylum seeker about his reasons to seek refuge is
285 Ad,iziriistrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, December 20.2001  (IV
2002/44). See also Administrative Jurisdiction Department ofthe Council of State, Feb-
ruary 25,2002 UV 2002/123); Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of
State, February 26,  20(12, case no. 2(*)1(16177/1; Administrative Jurisdiction Department
of the Council of State. May  17,20()2. case no. 20()201653/ 1.
286 Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, May 22.2002 (V
2002/225).  Some of the above mentioned judgments of the Administrative Jurisdiction
Department with regard to the AC procedure have led to adjustnients ofthe Aliens Act
Implementation Guidelines. See TBV 24)02/44, published in the Staatscourant ofOctober
18,2002, no. 201, p. 9.




cancelled. Iii most cases, however, the possibility to submit a Dublin claim
follows froni evidence found during that interview. Next, the other EU mem-
her state, to which the Dublin claim is addressed, is obliged to respond within
two months. When the other EU member state accepts the Dublin claim, or
does not respond within tWO nionths, it is (automatically) held responsible for
handling the asylum application. In that case, the asylum seeker will be trans-
ferred to tile other EU meniber state.  I f the EU member state rejects the Dub-
lin claim, the IND will exainine the asylum claim after all.
Eurodac
Although, in theory, the Dublin Convention offers a clear concept, the regula-
tion turned out difficult to implement. To submit a Dublin claim, for example,
evidence is needed to support any suspicion that the asylum seeker was in
another EU nieniber state. Because iiiany of tile asylum seekers enter the
Netherlands undocumented, the IND has difficulty in finding formal evidence
(such as docunients) or circumstantial evidence (such as bus tickets or hotel
bills) that could prove another EU member state is responsible for handling the
asylum application. At present, the checking of fingerprints in the Eurodac
database is supposed to provide decisive proof 288
Eurodac is a fingerprint database designed to identify immigrants who have
entered EU territory illegally, or who have applied for asylum in one of the
EU member states. Eurodac is meant as an effective application of the 1)ublin
Convention and is based on the Eurodac Regulation that was approved by the
EU  Council on December  11,   2000,  and  came into force on January   15,
2003.289 Iii the Eurodac Regulation, the EU member states agreed to promptly
take  fingerprints from every person   (over  the  age   of  14) who applies  for  asy-
lum. The fingerprints are sent to the Eurodac database where they are com-
pared with other, already stored, fingerprint data.29„ The Eurodac database
makes it possible to check whether an asylum seeker has been iii another EU
member state before he entered the Netherlands.291  lf an asylum seeker stayed
in another EU member state, the Netherlands can mark his asylum application
as a Dublin claim.
5.4.2 THEJUDGMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION DEPARTMENT
On October 28,2003, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department decided in a
case that was brought before the court by an asylum seeker who had lodged an
appeal against a judglnent of the Aliens Division of the District Court of 's
288  From an evaluation of Eurodac data, it followed that, in 2(*)4, 31.307 asylum seekers
had applied for asylum in niore than one EU country. ('Aantal asielhoppers afgelopen
jaar verdubbeld' iii: Elsevier. June 21, 21)(15).
289  Regulation (ECZ) No. 2725/2()(31) (OJ L 316, 15.12.20(*)).
290 The Eurodac database falls under the responsibility ofthe European Commission.
291  Currently, all EU metriber states (except Denmark) take part in this scheme, plus two




Hertogenbosch. During the handling of his case in court, the question was
raised what activities should be considered as the start of the investigation into
the  credibility of the asylum application.
The asylum seeker had registered at the Application Center in R.ijsbergen on
June 3, 2003. On that occasion, the police officers of the Aliens Police took
fingerprints, which were immediately, or shortly thereafter, checked in the
Eurodac database. The police officers had also asked the asylum seeker if he had
applied for asylum in another EU member state, or had had the opportunity to
do so. In addition, an appointment was made for his first interview with an
employee of the IND, whicli would take place in about ten days. Until then,
the asylum seeker stayed in a Temporary Facility. When his interview with the
IND eniployee began, the asylum seeker officially signed his application.
on June   14,  2003, the asylum  application was rejected. However, the asylum
seeker lodged an appeal with the Aliens Division  of the 's Hertogenbosch Dis-
trict Court against the refusal to grant asylum but, on July 3, 2003, the District
Court dismissed his appeal. The asylum seeker therefore lodged an appeal with
the Administrative Jurisdiction Department. His attorney argued that the Dis-
trict Court had not rightfully considered the fact that the actions taken on June
3, 2003, by the Aliens Police were significant for the decision to reject the
asylum application in the accelerated procedure so the IND had exceeded the
48-hours term for handling asylum applications in the AC procedure.
The Administrative Jurisdiction Department heard the case on October 7,
2003, and came to a decision on October 28, 2003.292 In its judgment, the
Appeals Court referred  to its previous judgments with regard  to the start  of the
48-hoitrs procedure.293 According to the Administrative Jurisdiction Depart-
ment, the beginning of the investigation into the credibility of the asylum
application marked the start of the 48-hours procedure. Furthermore, the Ap-
peals Court explained  that,  on the basis of Article C.3/12.1.3  of the Aliens Act
Implementation Guidelines, the 48-hours procedure at the Application Center
in Rijsbergen started when police officers of the Aliens Police began with the
investigation of the identity, nationality, and travel route of the asylum seeker.
Searching asylum seekers for documents and identity cards, however, does not
start  the  term  of 48 hours, since these actions take place  on the basis of Article
55(2) of the Aliens Act 200(). Furthermore, the activities laid down in Article
3.109 of the Aliens Decree, which provides that photos and fingerprints of
applicants are to be taken, do not start the AC procedure either. On the basis
of the Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines, these actions are necessary for
administrative and logistical reasons and are therefore not related with the ex-
292 Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, October 28,2003  (lv
2()(13/559).
39'  Ad,11itii,trative Jurisdictioti I)epartment of the Council of State, February 25,2002 (V
2(,1 12/ 123), Administrative Jurisdiction Departmerit of the Council of State, May 22.
2(1( )2 (IV 2002/225). a,id Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of
State, August 7,2002 (IV 2(1()2/323).
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amination of an asylum application.294 However, the Administrative Jurisdic-
tion Department concluded that comparing fingerprints (and asking an asylum
seeker about his stay in other EU member states) could not be considered as an
action taken for purely administrative or logistical reasons, since the results of
the fingerprints comparison were the main reason to reject the asylum applica-
tion on the basis of Article  30(a)  of the Aliens Act  2000,  and mark it as a Dub-
lin claim. Therefore, the Administrative jurisdiction Department decided that,
due to the actions taken, the officers of the Aliens Police had begun with the
investigation of the asylum application on June 3,  2003:295
Given the kind of information gathered, it must be concluded that, by
reporting the results of the investigation of the asylum seeker's identity
on June 3,2003, the officers of the Aliens Police started with the inves-
tigation into the asylum application.
Finally, the Administrative jurisdiction Department quashed the IND decision
regarding the asylum application because Articles 3.111  (1) and 3.115  (2)  of the
Aliens Decree had been violated.
5.4.3 T E RESPONSE TO THE COURT DECISION
The Response of the IND
Already during the handling of the case in court, on October 7, 2003, the
lawyer who represented the IND in court doubted the strength of the argu-
nients: "The Administrative Jurisdiction Department was critical; 1 am not sure
our  case will stand.',296  Therefore,  two days after the handling  of the  case  in
court, the policy officers of the Litigation and Policy Execution staff units sent
a memo to the IND's managing director in which they outlined the risks of a
possible negative court decision. Still, they advised the managing director to
continue with the existing working practices until further notice. After all,
adjusting the IND working practice at this point in tinie would be inconsistent
with the arguments given in court to defend the then applied procedure for
checking ati asylum seeker's fingerprints. The IND's managing director was
advised to wait for the outcome  of the court decision.
The Interpretation of the Court Decision
As expected, however, the decision of the Administrative Jurisdiction Depart-
ment turned out negative. The Administrative jurisdiction Department judged
that the 48-hours procedure started when the asylum seeker's fingerprints were
compared with other prints already stored in the Eurodac database, and thus,
the IND had exceeded the 48-hours term for handling the asylum application.
294  Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, October 28,2003 (Iv
2003/559). See also Explanatory Memorandum to the Aliens Bill, TK 1997-1998 26
088 no. 3. See also TK 1999-2000 26 732 no. 8, p. 9.
295 Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, October 28, 2003 (JV
2003/559).
296 Interview policy officer no. 8.
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It was clear the INI) had to adjust its working practice. The policy officers also
realized that the court decision had consequences for the handling of applica-
tions iii which the asylum seeker's fingerprints had already been checked in
Eurodac, while the asylum seeker still stayed in an Application Center or Tem-
porary Facility. Therefore, the policy officers of the Litigation, Policy Execu-
tion, aiid Asylum staff units gathered in an ad hoc meeting with an official of
the  Departnient of Aliens Affairs  to put the  consequences of the court decision
into perspective.
Until the Administrative Jurisdiction Department had pronounced its judg-
ment,  the  IND had not regarded coinparing fingerprints of asylum seekers in
Eurodac as the start of the 48-hours terni. Norv the Administrative Jurisdiction
I)epartnient had decided otherwise, the policy officers had to come up with a
new way of handling asylum  applications  so  that the comparison of fingerprints
would be postponed  to the moment  of the asylum seeker's first interview with
an IND eniployee, wlien the investigation into the credibility of his asylum
claim effectually begins. On the other hand, the IND had to comply with the
Eurodac 1Zegulation, which provides: 'Protiiptly after an alien applies for asy-
lum fingerprints are taken, which will be checked in the Eurodac database'. A
solution to the dilemma was found by interpreting the term 'promptly' as: as
soon   as possible, which would allow the IND to not send the fingerprints to the
Eurodac database immediately, but some time after they were taken.
The Transformation of the Court Decision
The policy officers advised the IND's nianaging director to adjust the ititake of
asylum seekers. The Aliens Police could still take fingerprints from asylum
seekers, but the police officers should postpone the sending of the fingerprints
to the Eurodac database until the asylum seeker had officially signed his appli-
cation, and the initial ititerview with an IND employee actually began. Fur-
thermore, the policy officers considered the possibility that an asylum seeker
might leave a Temporary Facility (without returning), while he had not yet
signed his asylum application. 111 that case, the asylum seeker's fingerprints
could still be sent to the Eurodac database to notify other EU member states
that the asylum seeker had been in the Netherlands and, should the asylutii
seeker later apply for asylum in another EU member state, that the Netherlands
could be held responsible for examining the asylum application. Ill that way,
the Netherlands would still comply with the purpose of the Eurodac R.egula-
tion, although  it did not stick to the letter of the Regulation.
Nonetheless, the court decision had some far-reaching consequences for the
handling ofasylum applications. For instance, the applications of asylum seekers
who, at that time, were staying at an Application Center or Temporary Facil-
ity, could no longer be handled in the AC procedure. After all, their finger-
prints had already been checked in the Eurodac database and, because they still
waited for a decision on their application, the 48-hours term for handling their
applications in the AC procedure had definitely been exceeded. As a result,
these asylum seekers were eligible for accommodation in a Reception and
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Investigation Center, where their asylum application would be examined in the
normal asylum procedure, which offered more legal guarantees than the AC
procedure (see Section 4.3.5). Moreover, an asylum seeker whose application
was handled in the normal asylum procedure was entitled to accommodation in
a  Reception and Investigation Center during the  tillie  his  case was under judi-
cial review. Furthermore, the judginent of the Administrative Jurisdiction
Department had consequences for pending appeal cases. The court would
probably quash the decisions in these cases, now the IND had not decided
within 48 hours. To withdraw the decisions in these cases would imply that
these asylum seekers were also entitled to accommodation in a Reception and
Investigation Center. The IND Was thus confronted with additional costs for
the  accommodation of asylum seekers.
The Processing of the Court Decision
On the day the Administrative Jurisdiction Department pronounced its deci-
sion, 280 asylum seekers were staying at a Temporary Facility and about 80 in
an Application Center. Thus, 360 asylum seekers were entitled to accommoda-
tion in a Reception and Investigation Center. However, 50% of them (i.e.,
180 asylum seekers) would have been transferred to a 11-eception and Investiga-
tion Center anyway, since their applications would probably require a more
thorough and time-consuming investigation. Thus, extra accommodation had
to been found for about 180 asylum seekers. Furthermore, the asylum seekers
who had lodged an appeal against the decision to reject their application in the
AC procedure would regain the right to accommodation when the IND with-
drew its decision on their applications. However, since they were not entitled
to accommodation in an asylum seekers' reception center pending their appeal,
the  IND  did not know their place of residence. Therefore,  the IND could only
inform them about their regained right to accommodation through their attor-
neys. The number of asylum seekers concerned was estimated at 80 people.
They were asked to register at an Application Center, from where they would
be transferred to a Reception and Investigation Center.
As  a consequence  of the court decision, (180+80=) 260 asylum  seekers in total
gained the right to accommodation at a Reception and Investigation Center.
The Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers, however, could not
provide the extra space at once; the asylum seekers were accommodated at
Reception and Investigation Centers in phases.
Furthermore, the new working practice with regard to the taking of finger-
prints and sending them to the Eurodac database was laid down in an work
instruction, which was communicated to the Aliens Police and IND employees
on October 30, 2004. The new working practice for sending fingerprints to
the Eurodac database did not exactly follow the letter of the Eurodac Regula-
tion, so the policy officers thought the adjustment would only be temporary.
For that reason, they had advised the IND's managing director to investigate
the possibility to adjust the Aliens Decree so that an investigation prescribed by
international conventions or regulations could take place before the AC proce-
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dure started. However, the Aliens Decree did not need to be adjusted because,
after consultation, the EU member states agreed with the new working prac-
tiCe.
5.4.4 WHAT HAPPENED AFTERWARDS
The decision of the Administrative jurisdiction Department with regard to the
comparison of fingerprints in Eurodac appeared to be an occasion for asylum
seekers' attorneys to question other actions that took place before the investiga-
tion into an asylum application begins. For instance, the asylum seekers' finger-
prints are not only sent to the Eurodac database but are also checked in the
criminal investigation database of the Dutch police. This so-called NRI check
is meant to determine whether an asylum seeker applies for asylum for the first
time, or has been declared undesirable. If, for example, the asylum seeker has
already applied for asylum before, he is not entitled to accommodation at a
Temporary Facility. When an asylum seeker is declared undesirable lie may be
prosecuted for illegal stay in the Netherlands. Furthermore, when an asylum
seeker arrives at an Application Center, he is searched for documents and iden-
tity cards. This search includes the reading of the SIM card of the asylum
seeker's mobile phone. Finally, if an asylum seeker wants to file a new asylum
application (after an earlier application has been rejected) because new facts or
circumstances might support his renewed application, he has to contact the
IND by phone to make an appointment for an interview. In the months fol-
lowing the Administrative Jurisdiction Department's judgment in the Eurodac
case, these actions became subject to litigation.
Tlie NRI Check
On  February  16,  2004,  the Administrative Jurisdiction Department decided  in
three cases in which the checking of fingerprints in the NRI database was the
ground for appeal.297 One of these cases was brought before the Administrative
Jurisdiction Department by the Minister of I&I. On behalf of the Minister of
1&I, the State Advocate argued that the Aliens Division of the 's Hertogen-
bosch District Court had wrongly concluded that the checking of fingerprints
in the NRI database had started the 48-hours procedure. 298 The State Advocate
explained that the NIZI check simply takes place to determine whether the
asylum seeker is entitled to accommodation in a Temporary Facility. The re-
sults of the NRI check would have no implications for the investigation of the
asylum application. An NRI check can, for instance, result in an 'a', 'v' or 's'
indication. An 'a' indication means the asylum seeker has already applied for
asylum before. Consequently, his application will be handled in the Application
Center located in Ter Apel and, until then, the asylum seeker is not entitled to
accommodation. A 'v' indication means the asylum seeker may have been
297 Application nos. 200307534/1 Uournaal Freemdelinge,irec/it 2004 no. 37), 200308127/1,
and 2003()8695/1 Uoumaal Vreemdelingenrecht 2004 no. 36; JV 2004/113).
298 Aliens Division of the 's Hertogenbosch District Court, December  11, 2003 (Awb
03/60911; journaal Vreemdelingenreclit 2004 no. 20).
97
CHAPTER 5
declared undesirable, and an 's' indication means the asylum seeker has COIll-
mitted a crime and, therefore, may be handed over to the police. On the basis
of the State Advocate's explanation, the Administrative Jurisdiction Depart-
ment concluded that the NRI check did in fact take place purely for adminis-
trative reasons and was not related to the investigation into the credibility of
the asylum application. The Administrative Jurisdiction Department upheld the
Minister's appeal and set aside the District Court judgment. 299
The SIM Card
On May 6,2004, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department decided in an-
other case instituted by the Minister of I&I. According to the Minister of I&1,
the Aliens Division of the Arnhem District Court o had wrongly concluded
that, by reading the  SIM card of an asylum seeker's mobile phone, the officers
of the Aliens Police had started off the investigation into the credibility of the
asylum application.  In its judginetit, the  Administrative Jurisdiction Department
upheld the Minister's claim. The Administrative Jurisdiction Department re-
ferred to Article 55(2) of the Aliens Act 2000, which allows police officers to
search asylum seekers for documents and identity cards. The Appeals Court
further stated that the competence laid  down in Article  55(2)  of the Aliens Act
2000 was meant to preserve evidence that might be needed in the exanlination
of ati asylum application. According to the Appeals Court, the Minister of 1&1
had sufficiently demonstrated that reading a SIM card is analogous to making a
photocopy of documents and that the actions taken were solely meant to pre-
serve evidence. The Administrative Jurisdiction Departinent concluded that
reading a SIM card did not start the investigation, and quashed the decision of
the District Court. 301
Teleplione Contact Regarding Renewed Asyluin Applications
On  November  15,  2004, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department decided
iii  a  case  of an asylum seeker who wanted  to  file  a  new asylum application after
a first application had been rejected. On April 21, 2004, her attorney had con-
tacted the IND by phone to make an appointment for an interview. However,
the IND employee had refused  to  make an appointment if the attorney  did  not
give explicit information about facts or circumstances that would sustain the
new application. Only after the attorney had given the requested information, a
date  for an interview  at the Application Center  was  set.   On June   12,  20(M,
after the interview with the asylum seeker had taken place, the asylum applica-
tion was rejected. The asylum seeker lodged an appeal with the Aliens Division
of the Zutphen District Court iii which she stated that the  IND had wrongfully
clainied that the application could be rejected in the AC procedure since the
299   Adniinistrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, February  16, 2004 (IV
2004/113).
See alsojoumaal lirecindelin,tenrecht 2004 no. 3. pp 184-186.
3(* 1 Aliens Division ofthe Arnhem District C:ourt, February 10,2004 (Awb 04/3111).
301 Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, May 6, 20()4 Uournaal
Freemdelingenraht 2004 no. 93).
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term of 48 process hours had already started on April 21, 20()4, when her at-
torney had contacted the IND to make an appointment and was asked to Sup-
ply infomiation about the asylum application. The District Court, however,
dismissed the asylum seeker's claini302 so the asylum seeker lodged an appeal
with the Administrative Jurisdiction Department. In its judgment, the Admin-
istrative Jurisdiction Department concluded that since, on April 21, an IND
employee had specifically asked for information that would sustain the renewed
asylum application, the 48-hours term had started at the mortient of the tele-
phone call and that the asylum seeker had rightfully claimed that the INI) had
pot decided within 48 process hours. 3()3
5.5 THE AGE-TEST CASE
5.5.1 THE CONTEXT
71ie Injltix of Unaccompanied Minors
Since  1992, the Dutch asylum policy has incorporated specific guideliiies  for
the adillission, guardianship, atid residence of unaccompanied minors.3'14 Be-
cause they are niinors, the procedure for their admission provides extra legal
guarantees and when their asylum application is rejected, repatriation to the
country of origin is only possible if, according to local standards, adequate care
305is available in the country of ongln. In the second  half of the 1990s,  how-
ever, the Dutch authorities observed an iiicrease in the number of unaccompa-
nied niinors seeking asylum (see Table 5.2) Moreover, doubts existed as to
their minority. On September 26, 1995, Meniber of Parliament Dittrich  (D66)
asked the then Deputy Minister ofJustice Elizabeth Schmitz whether she had
taken notice of the fact that several welfare workers had estimated that about
50% of the unaccompatiied minors who had applied for asyluni were, iii fact,
over 18 years old.
306
Due to the increase of unaccompanied minors applying for asylum and the
doubts about their minority, the Dutch government focused on the procedure
for their admission. On March 24, 20()0, the then Deputy Minister ofjustice
presented a policy document on unaccompanied minors,307 which addressed a
new strategy for the adniission and residence ofthese asylum seekers. The poitit
302  Aliens Division of the Zutphen District Court, July 2,2004 (application no. Awb
(14/27<)()2).
303 Adniinistrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, November 15,2(*14 UV
2(1()5/25).
-414  On the basis of the UNHCIZ's Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with
Unaccompanied Children Seekitig Asylum, an unacaimpattied minor is defined as 'a persoil
under the age ofeighteen years who is separated from both its parents and riot being
cared for by an adult who by law  or custom  has responsibility to do so'  (TK  1999-2(1()(1
27 ()62 no. 2, p. 6).
305 TK 1999-2000 27 062 no. 2, p. 6.
11,6   Aanitangsel van de Handelingen TK 1995-1996 no. 227.
307    TK  1999-2000  27  062  no.  2  (Beleidsnota  Alleenstaande  Minderiange Asiel:oekers).
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of departure of the new policy  was in keeping with the restrictive character of
the general policy for the admission of asylum seekers. It assumed that unac-
conipanied minors who are not eligible for a residence permit should return to
their country of origin as soon as possible. Furthermore, with regard to unac-
conipanied minors, the Deputy Minister ofJustice distinguished two age lim-
its.3418 The Deputy Minister no longer only made a distinction between those
who have reached the age of majority and those who are under eighteen years
old, but also between those who are over, and those who are under fifteen
years old.
Table 5.2: Intake ofunaccompanied minors applying for asylum, 1992-2005.3,9
Year Number of Percentage of Total















Previously, all asylum seekers utider the age of eighteen were entitled to special
facilities with regard to their guardianship and residence. Under the new pol-
icy, asylum seekers over the age of fifteen whose asylum application has been
rejected are transferred to a reception center for unaccompanied minors where
they have to attetid a special program that is directed at repatriation to their
country of origin." The new policy for unaccompanied minors has thus cer-
tain implications depending on the age of the (underage) asylum seeker. To
prevent that (adult) asylum seekers misuse the facilities, it became necessary to
308 See TK 2()11()-20()1 27 ()62 no. 14, which is ati update of the policy document on unac-
conipanied minors.
1(,9
Figures 1992-1994 distilled from: TK 1995-1996 19 637 no. 143, p. 3. Figures 1995-
1997 distilled from 1/luchtelingen in getallen 2004, VluchtelingenWerk Nederland, 20()4.
Figures  1998-20()5 distilled from TK 2(1(95-201)6  19 637 no.  1025, Appe,idix, p.  35.
310 The new policy for the admission and residence of unaccompanied minors came into
force on January 4, 2()(11. See TBV 2(K)1 93(1, published in the Stacitscourant ofjatiuary 3.
2()()1, no. 2. Currently, the procedure for the adniission of unaccompanied niitiors is laid
down in Article C5/24 ofthe Aliens Act Implenietitation Guidelines.
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establish the asylum seeker's age. In practice, however, this is a complicated
matter because many asylum seekers enter the Netherlands undocumented.
Still, it is the asylum seeker's responsibility to provide decisive proof about his
or her age.
31 1
The  Introduction  of the  Age  Test
Since March 15, 1996. the policy for unaccompanied minors has provided the
possibility to  test the age of the asylum seeker.  As from April  1,  1996, an age  test
was regularly conducted on asylum seekers whose minority was doubted.312 In
those  days, the deternlination  of the asylum seeker's  age took place by means  of a
photo of the asylum seeker's face and an examination ofbone and teeth X-rays.
313
Six months after the introduction ofthe age test, 39 asylum seekers were tested. It
turned out that 35 of them had reached majority:14 In November 1996, however,
age-testing was brought to a halt because the Deputy Minister ofJustice wanted
to wait for a decisive court decision. On April 2,  1997, the Aliens Division of the
Hague District Court decided that the age test was not an infringement of the
asylum seekers' rights, because the age-test procedure provided that an asylum
seeker has to agree to undergo the test and can withdraw his permission at any
time during the procedure.315 However, age-testing was not resumed until Febru-
ary 1999. Since then, the age-test has consisted ofan examination ofX-rays of the
asylum seeker's col#bone and hand and wrist joint.316
Since April 2000, the age test usually takes place shortly after the initial inter-
view. This will allow the IND to handle the asylum application in the AC
procedure, if the age test shows the asylum seeker has already reached major-
ity.317 In 2000, the IND estimated to conduct 1,950 age tests a year. 318
The Age-Test Procedure
When an unaccompanied minor arrives at an Application Center, a police
officer of the Aliens Police estimates whether the asyluni seeker is probably
underage. Next, until the initial interview starts, the asylum seeker waits at a
Temporary Facility or in the Detention Center at Schiphol. During the initial
interview with an IND employee, the doubts about the asylum seeker's age
maybe cleared on the basis of the asylum seeker's statement or because docu-
nients are found that confirni the asylum seeker's minority after all. lf, on the
other hand, the asylum seeker cannot convince the IND employee that he is a
311 TK 1990-2000 27 ()62 no. 2. p. 16.
312 TK 1996-1997 19 637 no. 221, p. 3
313 Stiiit 1998, p. 178.
314 TK 1996-1997 19 637 no. 221, p. 3.
315 Aliens Division ofthe Hague District Court, April 2, 1997 (Awb 96/11197, Awb
96/13985, and Awb 96/13977 Vw 1967). See also TK 1996-1997 19 637 no. 253, p. 3
316 TK 1998-1999 27 062 no. 445, p. 36.
317 See  Interim Report of the Aliens Act Implenientation Guidelines concerning the intro-
duction of the  age test  into the AC  procedure  (TBV  20(}0/6).  published  in the Staatscm -
rant of March 31, 200(), no. 65, p. 14.
318 TK 20(10-2001 27 400 VI no. 2, p. 89.
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nlinor, he is offered the opportunity to undergo ati age test so that he can
prove his age.
319
After the asylum seeker has signed an agreement to undergo the age test, he is
transferred to the Regional Diagnostic Center in Eindhoven, where three X-
rays of his collarbone and one X-ray of his hand and wrist joint are taken. By
means of a tele-radiological network, the X-rays are sent to two radiologists
who, indepetidently from eacli other, examine the X-rays and determine
whether the skeletal growth is complete.  If the collarbones are full grown,  the
asylum seeker is niost probably at least 20 years old. Concurrently, the X-rays
of the asyluni seeker's  hand and wrist joint are examined to determine whether
the asylum seeker is over sixteen years.32(1 The radiologists send their findings to
an anthropologist, who reports the radiologists' findings to the IND.
In 2000,  16% of the unaccompanied minors took an age test. In 40% of the
cases, it turned out the asylum seeker had already reached majority; 45% was
assessed as a minor,  and iii  15%  of the cases, minority remained doubtful.321
(:riticism of the Age l'cst
The new policy For unaccotiipanied minors attracted much criticism from
interest groups and monitoring institutions. The age test especially was severely
criticized for several reasons. Firstly, the mahod of the age test was doubted. Ill
October 2()()(), SMAK,322 an interest group who acted on behalf of asylum
seekers, lodged an appeal with the Aliens Division of the District Court of 's
Hertogenbosch concerning ati age test of two asylum seekers. SMAK was sup-
ported by two epidemiologists  of the Utrecht University Medical Center, who
had condemned the method used. According to the epidemiologists, the stud-
ies that formed the basis of the  age test were not meant to the specific purpose
for which the iND used the age test. Moreover, the method was based on
Western studies, while most of the unaccompanied niinors who undenvent the
age test canie from China atid West African countries. Eventually, the District
Court decided that the IND had to reexamine the age of the two asylum seek-
ers:23 However, three years later, on October 10, 2()()3, the Aliens Division of
the Arnhem District Court judged in a similar case that was initiated by
SMAK, and concluded that there was no reason to doubt the results of the age
test.324 On March 3,2004, the Adnzinistrative Jurisdictioii Department affirmed
this court decisioil. 325
·31, Aliens Act Inipleinentation Guidelines, Article C5/24.4.3
320   TK 2001-2(1()2 26 732 no. 96, p.  3.  See also De Jong 2()()4.
121  TK 20()0-2(1(Il 27 062 no. 14. p. 11.
322 Literal translatioii: Medical Advice (irouping Associatioti.
323  Aliens Division of the 's Hertogetihosch District Court, October 10, 2()01 1 (Awb
99/8971 VRWET). See also Aa,thailesel van de Handch,igen TK 2(H)()-2(101 no. 844.
324  Aliens Division ofthe Amhem District Court. October 11). 2(103 (IV 21*)3/518)




Another matter of criticism was the protocol the IND used for conducting the
age test. On December 17, 2002, the National Ombudsman published a report
in which, among other things, the protocol of the age test was criticized.326 In
response to this National Ombudsman report. the IND adjusted the protocol.
However, in its report, the National Ombudsman also showed dissatisfaction
with the fact that the IND had ignored complaints of the Health Care Inspec-
torate concerning the reliability  of the  age test. Since  1998, the Health  Care
Inspectorate had urged the installation of an independent ethical commission,
which could nionitor the procedure and execution of the age test. Member of
Parliament Halsema (Groei,Links) supported tliis criticism.327 On May 14, 2003,
the Minister of 1&1 was asked once again what he thought about such an ethi-
cal commission. However, the Minister of 1&1 answered that the installation of
an ethical commission was not necessary because 'the age test is already safe-
guarded by qualitative as well as ethical standards.,328 These standards are laid
down in both the Age Test Protocol and the Aliens Act Iniplementation
Guidelines. Moreover, the Minister objected to the installation of an ethical
comniission since 'it might result in a lengthening of the handling of asylum
applications.,3-9
A final nzatter of criticism concerned the question of whether the asyluni seek-
ers had the right to k110W the names of the radiologists who examined the X-rays
taken from asylum seekers. According to the Health Care Inspectorate, the
asylum seekers were entitled to know the radiologists' names since the age test
was a medical examination. The Minister of I&I, on the other hand, stated that
the age test did tiot constitute a medical examination but an anthropo-
biological test that was not characterized by a doctor-patient relation and,
therefore, the asylum seeker did not need to know the names of the radiolo-
gists. In February 2003, SMAK started a disciplinary proceeding on behalf of
tliree Angolan asyluin seekers against a radiologist who had conducted their age
test. SMAK claimed that his name should be made known to the asylum seek-
ers. The disciplinary tribunal, however, dismissed seven of the eight com-
plaints, and concluded that the age test did not imply a medical doctor-patient
relation. Still, the radiologist was given an official warning because medical
specialists are not allowed to act anonymously and so the radiologist had acted
in contradiction with the code of conduct."' The two parties in this dispute,
SMAK as well as the radiologist, lodged an appeal against this judgment.
326  Report of the National Ombudsman no. 2()()2/386. See also Report ofthe Natiotial
Ombudsman no. 2001/124.
327  Aanhangsel van de Handelingen TK 2001-20()2 no. 1430.
328 TK 2002-2(j<)3 19 637 no. 737.
329 Ibid.
330 Amsterdam Disciplinary Tribunal, September 28,2004, <www.tuchtcollege-
gezondheidszorg. nl/regiotiaal_files/anisterdani/uitspraken/()3(126.ASD.htni>. See also




Owing to the threat of the disciplinary proceedings and the media coverage about
this dispute, Dutch radiologists decided to cease conducting the age test. They
feared that they would be intimidated if their names became known (which
happened, for example, to doctors who treated drug traffickers who were caught
at Schiphol Airport). Since August 2003, the X-rays of asylum seekers are there-
fore no longer examined by Dutch radiologists but by radiologists fi:om Belgium
who do not fall under Dutch disciplinary law.
In addition to the criticism of the age test outlined above, the following section
describes a judgtnent of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division that addressed
the ma,iner in which the age test was conducted.
5.5.2 THE JUDGMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION DEPARTMENT
On October 23, 2003, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department decided in
an appeals case initiated by the Minister of 1&[  against a judgment of the Aliens
Division of the Dordrecht District Court. The District Court had decided in a
case  of an asylum seeker  who,  on  May  12,  2003,  had  had an initial interview
with an IND employee and, because her registered age was doubted, had re-
quested  an  age  test.  On  May   13,  2003, four X-rays were taken which  were
sent to two radiologists who, independently from each other, examined the X-
rays. That same day, the radiologists reported their findings to the anthropolo-
gist. The findings of the radiologists were identical: The collarbones were full-
grown.  On the basis of these findings, the anthropologist concluded  that it  was
95% certain that the asylum seeker was 20 years or older. The anthropologist
signed his report and handed it over to the INI). The next day, an employee of
the IND showed the asylum seeker the report of her age  test.  On  May  15,
2003, her asylum application was rejected, partly because of the results of the
age test. The asylum seeker subsequently lodged an appeal with the District
Court against the refusal to grant her asyluni.
On May 17, 2003, tlie Aliens Division of the Dordrecht District ('.ourt con-
cluded that the Minister of 1&1 had to take a new decision on the asylum
seeker's application, because the liandling of the asylum seeker's case was not in
accordance with Article 3:9 of the General Administrative Law Act, which
provides that - if a decision is based on an investigation of facts or behavior
that is conducted by a specialist - the government agency must make sure that
the investigation is conducted carefully. According to the District Court, the
Minister had not complied with this condition, because the Minister's repre-
sentative in court did not know which specialist had conducted the age tests.
Besides, the Minister (i.e., the IND) had not taken notice of the findings that
formed the basis of the age test report nor had she checked whether the con-
clusion resulted from these findings.
In his appeal to the Administrative Jurisdiction Department, the State Advocate
claimed that the Aliens Division of the Dordrecht District Court had decided
wrongly. The Adniinistrative Jurisdiction Departtiient, however, judged that
the 1)istrict Court had rightly concluded that the manner iii which the Minister
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had obtained advice from the anthropologist was not in accordance with ad-
ministrative law. According to the Adniinistrative Jurisdiction Department, the
Minister had not violated Article 3:9, but Article 3:2 of the General Adminis-
trative Law Act, which provides that the Minister ensures the carefulness of ali
investigation that fornis the basis of a decision. The Administrative Jurisdiction
Departnient stated: 331
If the Minister wishes to (partially)  base a decision  on an asylutii applica-
tioti  on  ati age  test,  the  Minister inust - on the basis of Article  3:2 of the
General Administrative Law Act - ensure that the investigation is con-
ducted carefully. To ascertain that an investigation has been conducted
carefully, the Minister should have at her disposal a report of the find-
ings for wliich, according to the signature on the report, a specialist is
responsible, even if that specialist has good reasons not to report his
Ilaille.
Furthermore, the Adniinistrative Jurisdiction Department explained that only a
person with radiological expertise could determine whether the collarbones of
an asylum seeker are full grown. Because the report of the age test lacked the
signatures of tlie radiologists who had conducted the age test, the Minister had
failed to comply with Article 3:2 of the General Adniinistrative Law Act.
Therefore, the Administrative jurisdiction Department dismissed the Minister's
appeal.
5.5.3 THE RESPONSE TO THE COURT DECISION
Tlie Reaction in Parliament and the Media
The criticism of the age test for unaccompanied minors was given relatively
much niedia attention. hi newspapers, also the judgnient of tile Administra-332
tive Jurisdiction Department was mentioned.333 Furthermore, two weeks be-
fore the Adtilinistrative Jurisdiction Departnient decided on the case, the age
test of unaccompanied minors was subject of parliamentary debate.  In a niotioii
proposed by Karitni (GeenLi,iks), the Minister of 1&I was asked to stop exe-
cuting the age test.334 A few days after the Administrative jurisdiction Depart-
331 Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, October  23,2003  (IV
2(9()3/512; JB 2()03/321).
332 ' Ombudsman vindt testen met rilntgen onbehoorlijk'. in: NRC Handelsblad, December
21, 2002; 'Botonderzoek voor bepalen leeftijd omstreden', in: NRC Handelsblad,  May,
6,20(33; 'Rechters omzeilen kwestie botonderzoek', iii: NRC Handelsblad. August 29,
204)3, 'Vreemdelingenkamer: Botonderzoek correct', iii: NRC Handelsblad. October 10,
2()()3.
333  'Botonderzoek moet voortaan ondertekend'. in: NRC Handelsblad, October 24,20()3.
334 See Motions no. 781 and 782, proposed by Karitili (GroenLinks) on October 7,2003,




ment had published its judgment, Member of Parlianient Vos (GromLinks)
asked the Minister the same question again. 335
The Response of the IND
Because Members of Parliametit had asked the Minister of 1&1 about the con-
tinuation of the age test, an official of the Department of Aliens Affairs was
actively involved in the interpretation of the court decision. For the rest, the
court decision was an executive matter dealt with by policy officers of the
Litigation, the Policy Execution, and the Asyluni staff units.
The Interpretation of the Court Decision
The judgment of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department addressed the
government agency's obligation (laid down in Article 3:2 of the General Ad-
niinistrative Law Act) to ascertain that ati investigation, the results of whicli
form the basis of a decision, is conducted carefully and thoroughly. Although
the Administrative Jurisdiction Department's decision did not imply that the
IND had to stop the age test, the court decision was an unexpected one. Until
the Administrative Jurisdiction  Department had decided on the case, the IND
had taken for granted that the anthropologist could be asked for the radiolo-
gists' natnes. However, from the Adininistrative Jurisdiction Department's
decision, it followed that this was not adequate in light of Article 3:2 of the
General Administrative Law Act. The Administrative Jurisdiction Department
had judged  that the Minister must know the radiologists' names.
Furthermore, the policy officers found the court decision somewhat unclear.
The Administrative Jurisdiction Department had decided that the radiologists
could be considered specialists and, therefore, they could be expected to take
responsibility for the age test report by signing their findings. The policy offi-
cers wondered, however, what the court meant by the term 'signing'.
Throughout the years, the radiologists' signing of the findings had taken place
in various ways. First, they signed by putting their initials under the findings,
but froin the initials, the radiologists' names could be deduced and so their
anonymity was not guaranteed. Next, the radiologists sigtied their findings with
a signature that was more difficult to decipher. Yet, in response to the Admin-
istrative Jurisdiction Department's decision, 'signing' was interpreted as marked
with a sig,tati,re and letter aide but the policy officers were not sure ifthis (a trace-
able signature) would suffice or if the names of the radiologists should be nnade
known. According to the policy officers, it did not follow from the Adminis-




Questions asked by Vos (GroenLinks), published in Amiliangsel van de Handelit,ge,i  Ap-
peridix to Parliamentary Proceedings] TK 2()03-2()()4 no. 397, pp 853-854.
336   The anthropologist who was in charge ot-the age test sigtied a contract with the  INI) iii
which it was agreed that the radiologists who conducted the age test would remain
anonyinous (TK 2003-2()(}4 19 637 no. 768, p. 6)
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Besides, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department's decision was considered
not to be applicable to asylum applications in which the court had already
decided.337 Asylum seekers who wanted to lodge a renewed asylum application
(on the basis of Article 4:6 of the General Administrative Law Act) could not
use the Administrative Jurisdiction Department's judgment as a new fact or
changed circumstance, since the fact that the Minister had not met the re-
quirement of Article  3:2  in the execution of the  age test could  have been ques-
tioned during the first application. Therefore, the Administrative Jurisdiction
Department's judginent was only applicable to applications iii which the IND
had not yet decided, or that were pending.
The Transformation of the Court Decision
The judgliient of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department did not give rise
to a policy change with regard to the adniission of unaccompanied minors.
Nonetheless, it did necessitate the policy officers to take measures. Firstly, the
report of the age test findings needed an adjustment so the content of the court
decision had to be explained to the radiologists and the anthropologist. Policy
officers of the Asylum staff unit explained to them that, from now on, a signa-
ture  of the anthropologist did  not meet  the legal requirements. The radiologists
had to sign their findings theniselves. After consultation, the radiologists agreed
to the new procedure: They would mark their findings by their signature and a
letter code. In addition, the new procedure had to be laid down in the Age
Test Protocol. Although the anthropologist was primarily responsible for this
task, policy officers of the Litigation staff unit advised  him in drawing up a  new
protocol in which the responsibilities of the radiologists, the anthropologist,
and the Minister of I&I were described.
Furthermore, the IND employees had to be informed about the adjustment of
the age test procedure so policy oflicers of the Policy Execution staff unit
wrote a work instruction. By doitig so, the policy officers were confronted
with the question of what to do with applications in which an age test had
already taken place, while the results of that test had not been reported in ac-
cordance with the Administrative Jurisdiction Department's judginent. In the
work instruction, the policy officers informed the INI) employees on how to
hatidle the cases in which an age test had been, or would form, the basis for a
rejection of the asyluni application. When the age test was to be considered as a
crucial element for the decision (to be) taken, the X-rays had to be returned to
the radiologists so that they could report their findings in accordance with the
11ew procedure.
Finally, the Litigation staff unit informed the Aliens Division of the Hague
District Court  that  the IND wanted to withdraw the appeals of unaccompanied
minors in which an age test had formed the basis for rejecting the application.
After all, the court would quash these decisions since the manner in which the
337  See Aanhangsel van de Handelingen TK 2003-2(}04 no. 397, p. 854.
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age test had been conducted was not in accordance with the General Adminis-
trative Law Act. The IND had to take a new decision on these applications.
The Processing of the Court Decision
As from October 27,2003 (four days after the Administrative Jurisdiction De-
partment published its judgment), the age test has been conducted according to
the new procedure. The work instruction was officially ready on December 9,
2003, and the new Protocol for the age test was approved on March 9, 2004.338
Two days later, on March   1 1,  2003, the Minister  of 1&1 informed Parliament
that, due to the Administrative Jurisdiction Department's judgment, the radi-
ologists had  had to reexamine the X-rays of about  1,000 unaccompanied mi-
339nors.
The  Installation  of the  Age Test Commission
In her reply to questions from Members of Parliament about the Adniinistrative
Jurisdiction Department's judgment of October 23, 2003, the Minister of I&I
announced to go along with the installation of an ethical comnlission.340 Later, in
the Aliens Affairs annual report, the Minister explained her decision:341
The age test has been subject to judicial decisions. Given the importance
of the age test as evidence for the asylum seeker as well as the wish to con-
duet the age test in a careful and transparent way, it was decided to install
an Age Test Commission.
The task of the Age Test Commission is to monitor the age tests and to filnction
as an advisory commission during audits of the Health Care Inspectorate. The
342Age Test Commission was installed on April 27,2004.
5.5.4 WHAT HAPPENED AFTERWARDS
The judgment of the Adnliti istrative Jurisdiction 1)epartment of October 23,
2003,  was  not  the end of a series  of court decisions addressing the  age  test.  To
test the new signing procedure for the radiologists' findings, both asylum seek-
ers' attorneys and the Litigation staff unit of the IND lodged several appeals
with the Administrative jurisdiction Department. Consequently, on March 31,
2004, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department decided (again) iin two cases
concerning the Minister's obligation to ensure that the age test of unaccompa-
nied minors was conducted carefully.  In one of these cases, the Minister of I&1
had lodged an appeal against a judgment of the Aliens Division of the Hague
D istrict Court of January   15,   2004.   In the other  case, an asylum seeker  had
338  See WBV 2004/27, published iii the Stdatscoltrant of April 6, 2004, no. 67, p. 14.
3.19 TK 201)3-2(1(I4 19 637 no. 805. p. 25.
34,1  Aanhangsel van de Handelingen TK 2()()3-2(104 no. 397.
341  TK- 2()(j3-2(1(14 19 637 no. 8(15. p. 25.
342 Installatiori of the Age Test Coiiiniission, published in the Staatscourant of April 27,
2004, no. 8(),
p. 18. See also TK 20()3-2004 19 637 no. 815, p. 8.
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lodged an appeal against a judgment of the Aliens Division  of the 's Hertogen-
bosch District Court ofJanuary 22,2004.
In both cases, an age test had been conducted (on December 16 and December
17, 2003, respectively), and the findings of these tests had been reported and
signed by the radiologists according to tile new procedure. In his report to the
Minister of I&I, the anthropologist had added a statenient to the radiologists'
findings: 'The findings of the age test come from radiologists who have signed
and sent these findings. The Minister of 1&1 can, strictly confidentially, be
informed about the names of the radiologists involved.' In both cases, the an-
thropologist had concluded on the basis of the radiologists' findings that he was
95% certain that the asylum seeker was 20 years or older. The conclusions of-
the age tests were subsequendy shown to the asylum seekers.
In  its judginent of March  31,  2004, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department
stated that,  from the proceedings of the handling of both cases by the Aliens
Divisions of the District Courts, it followed that the Minister did not know the
names of the radiologists when they were commissioned to conduct the age
tests. As a consequence, the Minister of I&I had failed to comply with the
requirement stated in Article 3:2 of the General Administrative Law Act.
Therefore, the Aliens Divisions of the District Courts had decided rightly.
However, with regard to the asylum seeker's appeal against the judgment of
the Aliens Division of the 's Hertogenbosch District Court, the Administrative
Jurisdiction Department added to its conclusion that Article 3:2 of the General
Administrative Law Act did not imply that the asylum seeker should know the
radiologists' identity.343 Furthermore, the Administrative jurisdiction Depart-
ment concluded that - since the State Advocate had declared in court he knew
the names of the radiologists by then - the consequences of the decisions on
the asylum applications would sustain. 344
The response to the court decision
The judgments of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department of March 31,
2004, were (again) dealt with in the media345 and brought about a similar proc-
ess within the IND as described in section 5.5.3. However, the policy officers
of the IND found the later judgments of the Administrative Jurisdiction De-
partment more specific about the Appeals Court's objectives. These judgments
suggested that the Minister of I&I  (i.e.,  the IND) should have  a  list of the  radi-
ologists' names but the asylum seekers did not have to know the radiologists'
names. The consequences of these jzidgments were explained to IND employ-
ees in a work instruction. This tillie, however, it took somewhat longer before
the work instruction was ready, because a first draft brought about several
questions from IND employees, and also the authorization by the managing
143   Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, March 31,2004 (IV
24)(14/21  1).
344   Adniinistrative Jurisdiction Department ofthe Council of State, March 31, 2004 (IV
2004/210 and JV 2004/211).
345  'Leeftijd bepalen mag via botten'. in: NRC Handelsblad, March 3,2004.
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director took some time. Four months after the judgments were published, on
August 5,2004, the new work instruction was ready.
5.6 THE DEPORTATION CASE
5.6.1 THE CONTEXT
Return Policy
The policy on the return of rejected asylum seekers has been, almost literally,
the tailpiece ofDutch asylum policy. The subject was raised for the first time iii
a policy document ofJune  3,   1997,  of the then Deputy Minister of Justice,
Elizabeth Schmitz.346 In this policy document, she set out the problems relating
to the return and repatriation of rejected asylum seekers as well as the starting
points of government policy. The basic principle  was (and still  is)  that any alien
who has no residence permit is obliged to leave the country: 'No entry means
returning.' This basic principle also applies to asylum seekers whose asylum
application has been rejected. It is expected they leave the country voluntarily,
or cooperate with their repatriation. 347
Since most (rejected) asylum seekers entered the Netherlands undocumented,
however, the execution of the return policy appeared to be problematic. 348
The asylum seekers fled their country of origin by using fake documents, or
they got rid of their own passports during their flight,  often because their travel
agent had insisted that they do so. And without identity papers, the asylum
seekers' identity and nationality cannot be established on the basis of- official
documents, which complicates their return. Countries of origin do not easily
accept the return of a rejected asylum seeker, since it is not certain the rejected
asylum seeker is a citizen of that country. To return to the country of origin, a
'laissez passer' is needed, which can be supplied by the diplomatic representa-
tive of that country. It can take some time, however, before the country of
origin grants this request, because the identity of the asyluni seeker needs  to  be
checked.349 Furthermore,  some  of the rejected asylum seekers and, particularly,                       those who have stayed in the Netherlands for a longer period of time, are  not
very willing to return to their country of origin, despite the fact that, since
1994, they can be detiied accommodation when they do not cooperate with
repatriation.
346  TK 1996-1997 25 386 no. 1 (Tentikeennotitie)
347  Currently, this principle is laid down in Article 61 of the Aliens Act 2000.
348   See, for example, TK 2002-2003 19637 no. 731.
349   'Depending on the quality and accessibility of the population register in the country  of
origin, aiid the actual investigation methods available. it can take six months (or niore)
to check a person's identity,  and yet a positive result cantiot be guaranteed'  (TK  1996-
1997 25 386 no.  1, p.  11).
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The policy document on return policy also made it clear that coordination
between the organizations involved in policy execution was lacking.3So The
IND, the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers, the Aliens
Police, the Royal Military Constabulary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
local governments, all have their own responsibilities in the execution of the
return policy, while none of the organizations is hierarchically superior to
another. Local governments, for example, have objected to the discontinuation
of accommodation and reception facilities for asylum seekers who have ex-
hausted 311 legal remedies, or whose teinporary residence permit is withdrawn,
because local governments would then consider themselves responsible for
their accommodation because of their public duty to shelter the municipality's
inhabitants. By offering the rejected asylum seekers accommodatioii, however,
the local governments act contrary to the central government objectives,
which, according to the then DepuL> Mitiister ofJustice, had a negative effect
oii the public support for the goveniment's asyluin policy.
The problems surrounding the return of rejected asylum seekers had hardly
changed  when,  in   1999,  the then Deputy Minister ofJustice Job Cohen  pre-
sented Parliament with a second policy document on this topiC. In this351
document, the Deputy Minister proposed some new policy measures to en-
hance the effectiveness of the return policy.352 Since january 2000, reception
facilities for asylum seekers had been ended as soon as the asylum application
was irrevocably rejected and the legal tenn of 28 days had passed.353 An excep-
tion  to  this  rule  was  made  if the situation  in the country of origin had changed
for the worse and hindered repatriation. lf such a situation arose, the govern-
ment could decide to postpone the obligatory departure to the country for a
maximum of twelve months.354 The asylum seekers in question were entitled
to accommodation for as long as departure was delayed. Furthermore, the
possibility to declare a person undesirable was extended.  On the basis of Article
67  of the Aliens Act 2000, persons who  did not comply with  the duty to report
regularly to the Aliens Police and liad more than once been charged for a
criminal offence could be declared undesirable. Finally, to prevent illegal stay
and effectuate deportation, the Aliens Act 20()0 also offered the possibility to
take illegal aliens into custody. 355
In May 2003, when the second Balkenende Cabinet took office, the return
policy became one of the central issues of government asylum policy. In a
policy document of November 21, 2()03, the Minister of I&I, Rita Verdonk,
described the measures to be taken. For a large part, the policy document was a
reiteration of policy objectives formulated by her predecessors.
356
350 TK 1996-1997 25 386 no.  1, p.  12. See also TK 20()1-2002  19 637 and 26 646 no. 648.
35 1 TK 1998-1999 26 646 no. 1.
352 See Peper 20()0.
353 Currently. this measure is set out in Article 45 (1) ofthe Aliens Act 2(j( 0.
354  Article 45 (4) Aliens Act 2()(10.
-355  Article 59 (1) Aliens Act 2(1(H).
356 TK 2003-2004 29 344 no. 1, p. 17.
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The Ter Apel Return Center
On May 1, 1996, the then Deputy Minister ofJustice Elizabeth Schmitz estab-
lished a return center in Ter Apel. This accommodation was meant for rejected
asylum seekers whose removal to their country of origin was problematic because
the asylum seekers did not have identity papers. Still, it was expected that their
removal would take place within three to six months. Soon after the Ter Apel
Return Center had been opened, however, it turned out that many asylum seek-
ers who were supposed to stay in the return center did not register iii Ter Apel.
Therefore, in June 2000, the return center becanie a regular asylum seekers'
reception center. Four years later, however, on July 30,2004. (one year after the
second Balkenende Cabinet had taken omce and had declared the return policy a
central issue), the Minister of INI Rita Verdonk reconverted the reception center
into a return center.
The Reports of the Ministry of Foreign A#airs
The  Ministry of Foreign Affairs supplies the Department of Aliens Affairs  with
information about the countries of origin  for the benefit of government's  asy-
lum policy. These reports can address the general situation in the country of
origin or highlight a specific subject, such as the situation in a specific region,
the position of specific ethnic groups, military service, or the availability of
medical aid. On the basis of these reports, the Cabinet decides what policy is
appropriate for asylum seekers coming from a particular country of origin.
Usually, the Cabinet also takes into account the returti policy formulated by
other European countries. 357
358In  june 1998, Amnesty International and Dutch Members of Parliament
severely criticized a report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the situation
in Iran. On the basis of this report, the then Deputy Minister ofJustice had
decided to end the special protection policy with regard to asylum seekers from
Iran. Because this decision met with strong criticism, a temporary commission,
the so-called Wijnholt Commission, was given the task to formulate criteria for
the reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.359 By the end of October 1998,
the Commission came up with nine recommendations that were aimed at
improving the quality and verifiability of the report findings  as well  as the space
in which the findings were reported and made public.360 The Commission also
recommended that the reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should not
include any policy recominendations. Those who had criticized the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs' reports had complained that these reports included a conclu-
sion about the  implications of the findings  for the asylum policy.361  In that way,
357 TK 1997-1998 26 024 no. 9, p. 89.
358  See, for exaniple, Handelingen TK 1996-1997 110.27, and Motion by Dittrich (D66) of
June 26, 1997, TK 1996-1997 25 386 no, 16. See also the Report ofthe National Om-
budsnian no. 95/94 (RV 1995 no. 19)
359 Staatsblad [Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decreesl June 17, 1998, no. 443.
360  Strikker 2001. See also TK 1998-1999 19 637 no. 415.
361    Strikker 2001.
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would influence the decision made on the basis
of these reports too much, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might not be
totally impartial because of its interests in maintaining diplomatic relations  with
the countries of origin. In accordance with the advice of the Wijnholt Com-
mission, the reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs no longer include policy
recommendations.  It is  the task of the member of government responsible for
asylum policy (formerly, the Deputy Minister ofJustice and since August 2002,
the Minister of I&I) to draw up conclusions from the reports and to inform
Parliament about the government's objectives.
362
Tlte Media
In the summer of 1999, inefficiency in the deportation of rejected asylum  seek-
ers became a subject of discussion, especially after the Netherlands Court of
Audit had conducted an inquiry into the effectiveness of the return policy and
concluded that the IND lacked practical information.363 In addition, local gov-
ernments expressed their discontent over the ending of accommodation for
rejected asylum seekers.364 Finally, after the first Balkenende Cabinet had taken
office in August 2002, the Cabinets' goal to deport 26,000 rejected asylum
seekers (as well as an arrangement for 2,200 asylum seekers who had submitted
an application under the fornier Aliens Act and still awaited a judicial decision),
became the subject of a long-running political debate and a recurrent news
item on television. 365
Deportation to Somatia
Over the years, the Netherlands has received many asylum seekers from Sonia-
lia.366 Because of recurrent conBicts between various militias and the absence of
a central government that could offer protection against this violence, many
people have fled the country. Until 2001, the Dutch government offered spe-
cial protection to Somali asylum seekers. Because of the situation in their coun-
try of origin, asylum seekers that belonged  to a specific ethnic group, and came
from a specific region in Somalia, could apply for temporary protection. 367
362 On October  12, 2001.  the Administrative Jurisdiction Department concluded that the
reports ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs are to be considered as expert advice (RV 2001
I10. 12).
363  'Ter Apel zet bijna nieniand land uit', in: NRC Handelsblad, May 22, 1999. 'Justitie heeft
weinig zicht op resultaat terugkeerbeleid', in: NRC Handelsblad, June 29,1999.
364 'Duizenden asielzoekers op straat gezet; gemeenten druien voor het probleem op', in:
I/NG-magazine, November 17, 2000.
365 See <www.26000gezichten.nl>
.166   For exainple,  from  1999 to 2(}02, the Netherlands received about 2,000 Somali asylum
seekers a year. Consequently, Somalia was  one of the main countries of origin of people
applying for asylum in the Netherlands. See TK 2001-2002 19 637 no. 668.
367 The temporary residence permit (voorwaardel4ke vergunnin-9 tot verbliif) used to be granted
on the basis of Article 12 (b) of the Aliens Act 1965. At present, this provision is set out
in Article 29 (ld) of the Aliens Act 2000.
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on June 12, 2001, the Minister of Foreign Affairs published a new report
about the situation in Somalia. On the basis of this report, the then Deputy
Minister of Justice, Ella Kalsbeek, concluded that minority groups  were  no
longer persecuted or in danger in the relative safe areas of Somalia. Although
the  situation  for minorities there  was less secure, the situation  was  not  of such  a
nature that all persons belonging to a minority group would have to fear for
their safety. In these parts  of the country, people  belonging  to a minority group
could Fall victim to intimidation or abuse by members of armed militias, par-
ticularly because the minority groups were unprotected and unarmed. The
Deputy Minister of Justice stated that clans and minority groups who catne
from the relative safe areas or stayed there in large numbers had a safe area to
flee to so the Deputy Minister decided to end the special protection policy
with regard to Somali asylum seekers as of September 24, 2001.368 However,
due to so-called 'technical obstacles', actual removal to Somalia did not take
place until 2003. Because Somalia has not had a central government since
1991, nor an other officially recognized organization that might issue or
lengthen  the  term of travel documents  (such as a laissez-passer), it turned out to
be impossible to get the necessary travel documents to deport asylum seekers to
Somalia.
As of.lanuary 2003, however, the Dutch government started to deport rejected
asylum seekers to Somalia. Because there was no direct flight from the Nether-
lands to a safe area in Somalia, the removal took place via neighboring coun-
tries: the so-called Dubai route and the Nairobi route. Members of the Royal
Military Constabulary escorted the asylum seekers from Schiphol Airport until
arrival  at the airports of Dubai or Nairobi, where they handed  over the asylum
seekers to representatives of the local authorities, who brought them on board
an  airplane by which the asylum seekers continued their journey  to  (a  safe  area
in) Somalia. This second part of the journey, the asylum seekers traveled
alone.369 Their return to their country of origin took place  on the basis of a  so-
called 'EU document'. This 'EU document' had been developed by the EU
member states  for the removal of aliens  out  of EU territory. It finds its basis  in
a Recommendation of the European Council of November 30, 1994.370 In its
judgment of May 28, 2004 (which will be dealt with in more detail in section
5.6.2), the Administrative Jurisdiction Department declared the use of this EU
document unlawful, although not illegitimate. 371
368  TK 2001-2002 19 637 no. 606. See also TBV 2001/35, published in the Staatscourant of
November 30, 2001, no. 233, p. 10.
369 See interlocutory ruling of the Civil Division of the Hague District Court, April 16,
2004 (IV 2004/222).
370 See Aanhangset van de Handeh,Wen TK 2003-2004 no. 789, pp. 1691-1692. See also
WBV 2004/6, published in the Staatscourant of February 26, 2004, no. 39, p.  10.




It appeared that this Recommendation has not been transposed into
Dutch statutory law. The absence of a legal basis for issuing an 'EU
document' is not in accordance with the principle of legality. However,
this is not a reason to conclude that deportation by means of an 'EU
document' is illegitimate, since the asylum seeker is obliged to leave the
Netherlands and the Minister has convincingly argued that this docu-
ment can be (or is) used in other EU member states as well, and is ac-
cepted by third coutitries.
In 2003,26 rejected asylum seekers were deported to Somalia. They returned
to different parts of the country the Minister of Foreign Affairs had declared
safe areas. By the end of December 20()3, another 475 rejected Somali asylum
seekers stayed iii the Netherlands awaiting their removal. 372
Criticisin of Deportation to Sontalia
From January 2()04, Members of Parliament have criticized the deportation of
asylum seekers to Somalia. In particular, representatives of liberal and left-wing
parties like Vos (GroenLinks), De Wit (SP), and De Vries (PvdA) questioned the
Minister of I&1 about the manner in which the asylum seekers were deported
to Somalia.373 Interest groups also expressed their concern  for the fate of Somali
asylum seekers who were (about to be) deported to Somalia. With reference to
an UNHCR report  4 of January 2004 concerning the situation in Somalia,
they urged the Minister to stop deportation of rejected asylum seekers to So-
malia. Because the Minister did not reply to this request, two interest groups
(the VAJN and the VVN)375 opened interim injunction proceedings against the
376Dutch State. Three other interest groups joined them in their case, which
was brought before the Civil Division  of the Hague District Court. The inter-
est groups claimed that
-  the Dutch State should be prohibited from deporting persons origi-
nating from Somalia, until a written declaration of one of the de
facto authorities would prove access to Somalia was secure;
-  the Dutch State should be prohibited from deporting Sotiialis by
means of the 'EU document'.
-  the Dutch State should be prohibited from deporting Somalis by
means of documents that, from the outside, look like Somali travel
documents.
372   Distilled from the interlocutory ruling of the Civil Division of the Hague District Court,
April  16,2004 (IV 2004/222).  See also  Pahladsingh & De Jong 2004.
373 See Aanhangsel van de Handeli,wen TK 2()03-2004 no. 794, 798,800, 904 and 1082.
374  UNHER 2004.
375 The Association ofAttorneys for Asylum Seekers (vAUN) and the Dutch Refugee
Council ( FFN)
376 The three interest groups were: The Federation of Somali Associations  in the Nether-
lands (FS/IN), the INLIA Foundation, and the Alkmaar Foundation for Political Refu-
gees (.4 SP 10.
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-  the Dutch State should be obliged to escort rejected asylum seekers
during their journey to Somalia until they are handed over to de
facto authorities.
However, on May 6, 2004, the court ruled that the action was disallowed,
because the claims could be brought before the Aliens Division of the Hague
District Court by individual Somali asylum seekers themselves. 377 In response
to this decision, the interest groups lodged an appeal with the Hague Court of
Appeal, which, at the  time of writing,  had  not yet decided the case.
Interim Measures of tlze European  Court of Human Rights
In the first two months of 2004, the President of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights decided in six asylum seekers' cases to take an interim measure on
the basis of Rule 39  of the Rules of Court, which means  that the Netherlands
was asked to postpone the deportation  of the rejected Somali asylum seekers. 378
Furthermore,  in one of these cases, the Dutch state was asked to supply infor-
mation about (a) the actual situation in Somalia, including the UNHCR's most
recent view on forced repatriation to that country,  and  (b) the likelihood of the
applicant being sent to Somalia by the Abu Dhabi authorities.379 The Dutch
state provided the European Court with the requested information and decided
not to deport the asylum seekers in question, Until the Court had judged on
their cases. 380
A  few weeks later, on March   19,  2004, the Administrative Jurisdiction  De-
partment decided in a case concerning the deportation of a rejected asylum
seeker to Somalia that the interim measures of the European Court had no
implications for other asylum seekers' cases, because dhe European Court had
not given a further motivation. 381
On May 3, 2004, however, the President of the European Court of Human
Rights pronounced a tenth interim measure in a case of a Somali alien in
which the Court urged the Dutch state not to deport the Somali alien to
northern Somalia until the Court had decided the case. In contrast to the for-
377 Civil Division of the Hague District Court, May 6,2004 (IV 2004/251). See also its
interlocutory ruling of April 16, 2004 GV 2()04/222).
378   In its judgmetit of February 6,2003 (application nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99),the
European Court colicluded that atiy State Party to the Convention to which interim
measures have been given by the Court under Rule 39 ofthe Rules of Court, must
comply with those measures and refrain from any act or oinissioti that will undernzitie
the authority and effectiveness of the finaj judgment OV 2003/237; RV  1974-2003 no.
53).
379 European Court of Human lughts, January 21, 2004 case no. 2683/04, cited in judg-
ment ofthe Aliens Division  of the Amsterdam District Court, January 27,20()4  (Awb 0-
4/2699 BEPTDN).
38(1 Distilled from the interlocutory ruling of the Civil Division of the Hague District Court,
April 16, 2004 (IV 2004/222).




mer interim measures, this interim measure included a motivation. The Presi-
dent of the Court referred to the situatioti in northern Somalia and, in particu-
382lar, to specific minority groups.
On 30 April 2004, the President of the Chamber to which the case has
been allocated decided to indicate to the Government of the Nether-
lands, that it was desirable in the interests of the parties and the proper
conduct of the proceedings before the court not to expel the applicant
to Somalia until further notice. The President had regard to the current
situation in northern Somalia and in particular to the absence of an ef-
fective public authority capable of providing protectioll  to the  applicant,
who submits that he belongs to a iilinority and that he has no family or
clan ties in northern Somalia. The President further noted that there was
no guarantee that the applicant would be adniitted to northern Sonialia.
5.6.2 THE JUDGMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION  DEPARTMENT
By the end of May 2()04, the Administrative jurisdiction 1)epartment had de-
cided in three cases concernitig the deportation of Soniali aliens. In its judg-
ment of May 28, the Administrative Jurisdiction 11epartment stated the
following with regard to the tenth interitii measure of the European Court: 383
Regarding the nature of the motivation given by the President of the
European Court of Human Rights in its interitii nieasure - and taking
into account that the mentioned guarantee that the alien will be admit-
ted is currently not met - it has be to concluded that this interim ineas-
ure prevents deportation.
The case in which the Administrative Jurisdiction Department decided con-
cerned a Somali alien who was taken into custody on March 23, 2004, because
the Dutch authorities planned to deport him to Somalia. On April 7, 2()04, his
attorney lodged an appeal with the Aliens Division of the Assen District Court
against the decision to take the asylum seeker into custody. The District Court,
however, dismissed the appeal. In addition, on April 16, the attorney lodged an
appeal with the Administrative jurisdiction Department against the judgment of
the District Court. At the time the Adniinistrative Jurisdiction Department
decided on the case, on May 28,2004, the Somali alien had already been de-
ported. Nonetheless, the Administrative Jurisdiction 1)epartnient argued that
384the Minister had not acted unlawfully.
Since the decision to take the alien iii to custody dates from March 23,
2004, and the alien was deported on March 26, 2()()4, the Minister of
382 European Court of Human Rights,  May 3, 211(14. case rio.  15243/()4  OV 20()4/226).
383 Administrative Jurisdiction Departnient ofthe Council of State. May 28, 2004 OV
2()(14/278).




I&1 could not have reckoned with the motivated interim measure lof
May 3, 2004, VW] and, therefore, the custody of the alien was not
unlawful.
Three days earlier, on May 25, 2004, the Administrative Jurisdiction Depart-
ment decided in another case which concerned a Somali asyluin seeker. On
December 18, 2003, the IND had rejected his asylum application. The asyluni
seeker had lodged an appeal against this decision with the Aliens Division of
the Amsterdam District (2OUrt. However, the District Court had dismissed his
appeal as unfounded. In addition, the asylum seeker lodged an appeal with the
Administrative Jurisdiction Department, that handled the case on April 22,
2()04. On May 25, 2004, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department con-
cluded that the in terini measure of the European Court of May 3, 2004, did
not imply that the decision on the asylum seeker's application was illegitimate,
but, for as long as the interim measure would be in force, the asylum seeker
could not be obliged to leave the country. The Administrative Jurisdiction
1)epartment stated that the asylum seeker had rightfully claimed that, for as
long as the interim measure is in force, he is entitled to stay in the Netherlands
on the basis of Article  8(h)  of the Aliens Act 2(}()0.389 His removal to Somalia
would  be  unlawful.
5.6.3 THE RESPONSE TO THE COURT DECISION
Ille Reaction in Parliante,it
One day before the Adniinistrative jurisdiction Departiiient pronounced its
judgment, the asylum policy was the subject of parliamentary discussion. The
debate in Parlianient continued on June 9, 2004. Two days earlier, on June 7,
2004, the Minister of 1&I had informed Parliament in a letter about the Ad-
niinistrative Jurisdiction Department judgments conceniing Somali asylum
seekers. In her letter, she stated that the judgments of the Administrative386
Jurisdiction Department could have consequences for the policy with regard to
Somali asylum seekers and that she had therefore ordered the IND to take no
irreversible actions with regard the asylum seekers the Administrative Jurisdic-
tion Department had referred to.387 During the parlianientary debate held on
june 9, Member of Parliametit Vos (GroenLi,iks) drew attetition to the prob-
lems surrounding the deportation of Somali asylum seekers. She had expected
the Minister of I&1 to have taken more concrete measures in response to the
court decisions and stated:388
385   Administrative Jurisdiction  Departnient  of the  Council of State,  May 25,2()()4  (IV
2()()4/277).
386 TK 2()03-2()04 19 637 no. 820.
387 TK 2003-2004 19 637 110.82(1, p.1
388 See Handeli,lgen TX 2()()3-2<)(14 no. 82, p. 5310 (,ny tratislation)
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Already in january 12004, VW], the European Court of Human Rights
has declared in ten cases that the deportation of Somalis belonging to a
minority group or without family or clan ties in the northern part of
Somalia should be stopped.  (...) The European Court has motivated its
point of view in its most recent decision.  Even that did not suffice.  On
May 27, the Minister of 1&1 still denied, here in the House of ltepre-
setitatives, that the motivation given by the European Court in its most
recent interim measure should be applied to asylum seekers in similar
circuinstances.  (.  .) And still, it is not clear what the Minister is going to
do.
Another Member of Parliament De Vries (PvdA) was indignant about the Min-
ister's reaction with regard to the court decision as well. He stated: 389
The court has decided (...). The Cabinet, however, has Ilot Conle to the
obvious conclusion that, under these circumstances, deportation can no
longer take place. I have seldom heard such a brusque response to a
390court decision.
However, the two Members of Parliament belonged to the opposition parties
and thus represented a minority in Parliament, while the Minister of 1&I ex-
pressed the Cabinet's point of view. The question is, what did the policy offi-
cers of the  IND  do  in the nieantime?
Tile  Response  of the  IND
The Interpretation of the Court Decision
According to the policy officers who were involved in the INI)'s response to
the court decision, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department explained in its
judgnients of May 2(}04, how the interim measure of the European Court
should be interpreted. Although the President of the European Court had
given a further motivation in his interim measure of May 3, 20()4, until the
Administrative Jurisdiction Department had pronounced its judgment, the IND
had no idea what the iniplications of the tenth interim measure were for the
policy execution. The policy officers had talked about it, but had not (yet)
come to a sound conclusion. "That the President of the European Court had
taken interim measures in several asylum seekers cases was a relatively new
phenometion for the IND.-.391 Moreover, an interim measure was not a final
judgnient in which the Minister's arguments had been considered so, although
389 Admiiiistrative Jurisdiction 1)epartment of the Council of State, December 20, 2001  (1V
2002/44).
390 See Handelingen TK 2003-2()()4 no. 82, p. 5312 (niy translation).
391 Interview policy officer no. 5. However, in March 2()03, the European Court of Hu-
iii,iii liights decided to take ati interim measure with regard to an Iranian asylum seeker
 ·ho .i ·aired (and had appealed against) his deportation (See Aanhangsel van de Han-
delingen TK 20()2-2()()3 110. 1131)). Moreover, the first interim nieasure of the European
Court in which the President of the Court addressed the Netherlands dates  from  1983
(See 11.V 1983 no. 9).
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the European Court had taken interim measures, it had not yet judged the
lawfulness of the asylum seekers' deportation to Sonialia. Nonetheless, the
interim measure of May 3, 2004, was more explicitly formulated than the for-
mer interim measures taken in Soinali cases. According to the policy officers, it
meant the cases had to be 'put on hold for a while'.392 However, the exact
meaning of the tenth interim nieasure only became clear after the Adniinistra-
tive Jurisdiction Department had published its judgments.
The Administrative Jurisdiction Department's judgnients were published one
day before the Easter weekend. Consequently, the weekly meeting of IND
policy officers, wliich usually took place on Mondays, was cancelled. In the
week following the court decisions therefore, the policy officers of the Litiga-
tion staff unit informed the other IND staff units about the court decisions in a
memo. A policy officer of the Litigation staff unit  had analyzed the decisions  of
the Administrative Jurisdiction Department in a phone conference with the
State Advocate who had defended the cases in court. During that phone call, it
soon became clear that the court decisions could lead to only one conclusion:
The interitii measure meant that deportation of rejected Somali asyluni seekers
had to be postponed until further notice. In addition, the policy officers of the
Litigation staff unit informed the IND's managing director in a memo that the
judgment of the Administrative Jurisdiction Departinent necessitated postpon-
ing the obligatory departure of asylum seekers to northern Somalia on the basis
of Article 43 of the Aliens Act.393 However, an extension of the time liinit for
deciding on applications of Somali asylum seekers was not considered to be
necessary.394 After all, according to the Administrative Jurisdiction Departinent,
the IND could still decide on these applications. 395
The Transforrnation of the Court Decision
In  a memo addressed to the INI)'s managing director and other staff- units the
policy officers of the Litigation staff unit made it clear that the court decisions
necessitated taking measures. First of all, the aim of postponing the obligatory
departure of Somali aliens liad to be further explicated. Therefore, the Policy
Execution staff unit called a nieeting, which was attended by
-     a policy official of the Litigation staff unit who supplied information
about the court decision;
392 Interview policy officer no. 10.
393  On the basis of-Article 45 (4) ofthe Alietis Act 200(1, the Minister of I&I can decide to
postpone obligatory departure (vertrekmoratorium) for a maxitiiu,11 ofsix to twelve
months.
394   On the basis of Article 43 of the Aliens Act 20(10 the Minister of I&I can decide to
postpone the handlitig of applications of a specific group of asylum seekers (bes lilit,norato-
rium).
395 See judgnient of the Adnunistrative Jurisdiction Departme,it ofthe Council of State of
March 25,2004: 'The interim measure does iiot imply that the decision taken iii the
asylum seeker's application was unlawful' (IV 2004/277).
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-  a policy officer of the Asylum and Repatriation staff units, who
could supply information about implications of the court decision
for policy execution;
-   two IND employees of the IND Country and Language bureau,
who had expert knowledge about the position of minority groups iti
Sonialia;
-   an official of the Minister's Department of Aliens Affairs, because
the court decisic,n directly affected the Minister's policy goals with
regard  to the deportation of rejected asyluni seekers;  and
-     a policy officer of the  Policy Execution staff unit, who would coor-
ditiate the actions to be taken.
The transformation of the court decision into specific consequences was
somewhat complicated by the fact that, in its decision of May 25,2004, the
Administrative Jurisdiction Department had specifically referred to Somali
asylum seekers who belonged to a minority group and had no family or clan
ties in northern Somalia so,  on the basis of the reports of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and itifortiiation supplied by the employees of the C:ountry and
Language bureau, the policy officers considered which Soniali asylum seekers
in particular were addressed iii the court decision. Finally, it was decided that
the postponement of obligatory departure did not include Somali asyluni seek-
ers of particular clans in northern Somalia or minority groups that had clan or
family ties in northern Somalia. Thus, the postponement of obligatory depar-
ture only addressed a particular group of Somali asyluni seekers. A policy offi-
cer of the Policy Execution staff unit, however, would rather have postponed
obligatory departure of a broader group of asylum seekers. He explained:396
Such a measure would be much easier to implement. However, the pre-
sent political cliniate forced us to decide otherwise. A postponement of
obligatory departure that would encompass a broader group of asylum
seekers would 'open the floodgates', it was suggested, and every rejected
asylum seeker who cannot be deported costs money. But why make it
difficult for your own organization by interpreting the interim measure
so strictly?
The Processing of the Court Decision
During the first meeting, the policy of cers already drafted a provisional work
instruction to infonn the IND employees about the details of the policy ad-
justment. Later, this draft was finished by the policy officers of the Policy Exe-
cution staff unit. In addition to writing the official work instruction, they had
to adjust the Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines. Adjustment of the Aliens
Act Implementation Guidelines took place in collaboration with officials of the
1)epartment of Aliens Affairs who were responsible for the publication of the
postponemeiit of the obligatory departure. Both the decision to postpone




obligatory departure and the adjustment of the Aliens Act Implementation
Guidelines were published in the Government Gazette of une 16, 2004.397
In the work instruction, the policy officers of the Policy Execution staff unit
described in more detail how IND employees and the IND chain partners (i.e.,
the Royal Military Constabulary, the Aliens Police, and the Central Agency for
the Reception of Asylum Seekers) should apply the policy measures. Further-
more, the IND chain partners were informed about the policy adjustment by
the Repatriation staff unit and the Asylum staff unit. The Repatriation staff unit
informed the employees of the Royal Military Constabulary and the Aliens
Police about the temporary postponement of the deportation of (a specific
group of) Somali aliens; the Asylum staff unit informed the Central Agency for
the Reception of Asylum Seekers that Somali asylum seekers specified in the
work instruction were entitled to accommodation in an asylum seekers' recep-
tion center. The rejected Somali asylum seekers who had not been entitled to
accommodation because their application had been rejected were supposed to
register at the Application Center in Ter Apel.
5.6.4 WHAT HAPPENED AFTERWARDS
A few months later, on August 31, 2004, the President of the European Court
of Human Rights took another interim measure with regard to a Somali asy-
lum seeker.398 In his decision, the President of the European Court declared
that, in light of the then available information about the situation in northern
Somalia, repatriation of Somalis belonging to majority groups should also be
postponed. The interim measure would be in force until the Dutch Ministry of
Foreign Affairs had published a new report about the situation in Somalia and,
depending on the content of that report, the European Court could decide to
organize a fact-finding hearing on the basis of rule Al of the Annex to the
Rules of Court. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs published this report on
December 13, 2004.399 However, before the European Court, or Dutch  Par-
liament, could take notice of this report, the Administrative Jurisdiction De-
partment had to consider the implications of the new interim measure of the
European Court iii a case that was brought before the court by the Minister of
I&I.
The case in question concerned a Somali alien who had been declared undesir-
able and had therefore been placed iii a detention center awaiting his deporta-
tion. The Somali, however, had lodged an appeal with the Aliens Division of
the Zwolle District Court against his possible deportation to northern Somalia.
On December 2, 2004, the District Court held that the new interim measure
397 The decision to postpone obligatory departure of Somali asylum seekers was published
in the Staatscourant oflune 16, 2()04, no. 112 p. 15. The adjustnient of the Alietis Act
Implementation Guidelines (WBV 2()04/37) was published in the St(1&15(01'ra,11 ot-June
16, 2004, no. 112, p. 13.
398 European Court of Huinan Rights, August 31, 2()(14, case no. 20218/<)4 UV 2(1(N/444)
399 TK 2()04-2005 19 637 no. 894.
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of the European Court prevented the deportation of the Soniali alien and that
his detention should therefore be suspended. The Administrative Jurisdiction
Department, in turn, concluded on December 17, 2004. that the interim
measure of the European Court did indeed prevent deportation of Sonialis
who would be internally displaced upon return to northern Sonialia.41,0 None-
theless, the interim measure of the European Court was a temporary measure
and thus, under specific conditions, Sonialis who had been declared undesirable
could still  be  held in detention. However, the State Advocate had failed  to
bring forward this claim in first itistance and, therefore, the Administrative
Jurisdiction Department affirmed the Zwolle District Court's judgnetit.
Iii response to this judgment of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department,  the
Minister of 1&1 informed Parliament that she had to consider the consequences
of the court decision with regard to rejected Soinali asyluni seekers.4111 Eventu-
ally, in February 2005, the Cabinet agreed to postpone obligatory departure of
a broader group of Somali asylum seekers.402 The new departure moratorium
replaced the former departure  nioratorium  of June  2004,  atid  would  stay  in
force until 1 July 2()05. On June 29, 2005, when the tenn of the departure
moratorium came to an end, the Minister of I&I informed Parliament that, as
from 1 July 2005, Somali asylu111 seekers who do not originate from the safe
areas of Somalia would be granted temporary residence on the basis of Article
3.106 of the Aliens Decree. 403
4110 Administrative Jurisdiction Department ofthe Council of State, December  17. 2()()4 (IV
2()()5/70).
401 Aanhangsel van de HandelingenTK 2004-2(H)5 no. 797.
402 The group included those Somali asyluni seekers who do not originate from the so-
called safe areas (Somaliland, Puntland, and South Mudug). See WBV 20(15/8, published
in the Staatscourant of March 1, 2005 no. 42, p. 13.
403 TK 20()4-2005 19 637 nr. 956.
123
CHAPTER 6
THE IND's RESPONSE TO COURT DECISIONS
6.1    INTRODUCTION
The cases described in Chapter 5 give an impression of the actions the IND
takes iii response to court decisions. After all, this study is specifically focused
on court decisions that address the asylum procedure; The handling of thou-
sands of court deCiSiOllS in individual cases has been left out of the inquiry.  Iii
this chapter, the IND policy officers' niode of response to court decisions will
be assessed on the basis of the cases examitied. Firstly, this chapter gives an
overview of the contexts of the court decisions as well as a suininary of the
adniinistrative decision-making process iii response to the court decisions, and
the court decisions' ultimate effect (section 6.2). In addition, section 6.3 focuses
on the question to what extent the IND policy officers, in response to the
court decisions examined, addressed the letter and the spirit of the court deci-
sions.
6.2 THE IMPACT OF THE COURT DECISIONS
6.2.1 THE CONTEXT
The five cases described in Chapter 5 differed from one another as to the origin
of the litigation processes that resulted in the court decision and the policy
officers' reason to respotid. In the Dublin case, for instance, the European
Court of Human Rights had primarily addressed the United Kingdom because
of an intended transfer of an asylum seeker to  Germany.  The asylum seeker had
lodged an appeal with the European Court because he feared to be deported
from Germany to Sri Lanka, which, according to the asylum seeker, would be
in contravention of Article 3 of the ECHR. The European Court had declared
the asylum seeker's claim ill-founded but,  in  its judgment, the Court stated that
EU member states cannot automatically rely on the arrangements made in the
Dublin Convention and are supposed to ensure that an applicant is not, as a
result of a decision to expel, exposed to ati inhuman treatment contrary to
Article 3 of the Convention.404 In addition, divergent judgments of the Aliens
Divisions of the District Courts with regard to the interpretation of the Euro-
peati Court's decision brought about confusion among IND employees about
how to motivate a decision to niark an asylum application as a Dublin claim
which, in turn, necessitated the IND policy officers to respond.
In the AC case, the court decision followed froni criticism of interest groups
with  regard  to the decision  of the former Deputy Minister of Justice  to
404  European Court of Human Rights, March 7, 2(1()0, Application no. 43844/98, T.I. vs
the UK (R.V 100 no. 1)
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lengthen the AC procedure from 24 to 48 process hours. Since their criticism
had not resulted in a policy adjustment, they filed an appeal with the Civil
Division  of the Hague District Court. Eventually, the Hague Court of Appeal
concluded  that the conditions of residence  in the Application Center amounted
to a situation of detention, for which there was no legal basis.405 The Court
ordered the Dutch State (i.e., the IND) to adjust the AC procedure within 30
days after the Court had published its judgment.
Another court decision that had to do with the AC procedure was the Eurodac
case. This case, however, did not follow from severe criticism or a long-
running debate. The appeal to the Administrative Jurisdiction Department was
lodged by an asylum seeker who claimed that the AC procedure had started
when the Aliens Police had sent his fingerprints to the Eurodac database and
had asked him whether he had applied for asylum in another EU member state.
Therefore, the 48 process hours had been amply exceeded when the IND had
decided on his application, so the IND could not reject his asylum application
in the AC procedure. The Administrative Jurisdiction Department upheld the
asylum seeker's claim406 and, because this judgment had consequences for the
handling of other asylum seekers' cases, the court decision necessitated the  IND
policy officers to adjust the working practices.
In the Age-Test case, interest groups as well as supervisory institutions (such as
the National Ombudsman, the Health Care Inspectorate, and Members of
Parliament) had criticized the reliability of the method used to establish the age
of unaccompanied minors and had more than once asked for an independent
commission that could see to the execution of the age test. The Minister of
INI, however, expressed a different opinion and allowed the IND to continue
executing the age test in the usual manner. However, on October 23, 2003,
the Administrative Jurisdiction Department concluded that the manner in
which the age test was conducted did not comply with Article 3:2 of the Gen-
eral Administrative Law Act.407 Although this court decision did not imply that
the IND had to stop executing the age test, it did necessitate the IND policy
officers to take measures.
The final court decision concerned a judgment of the Administrative Jurisdic-
tion Department with regard to rejected Somali asylum seekers who were
about to be deported to northern Somalia. Since January 2004, Members of
Parliament and interest groups had drawn attention to the difficulties relating to
the deportation of rejected Somali asylum seekers. They referred to a report of
the UNHCR. and interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights,
and urged the Minister of I&1 not to deport rejected asylum seekers to north-
405 The Hague Court of Appeal, October 31, 2002, nos. KG 99/1281 and 99/1251 (RV
2002 no. 22, JV 2002/467)
406   Administrative Jurisdictioii Department of the Council of State, October 28,2003 (IV
2()03/559).
407   Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, October 23,2003 (IV
2003/512).
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ern Sonialia. According to the Minister, however, the interim measures of the
European Court gave no cause to alter the asylum policy with regard to the
deportation of rejected Soniali asylum seekers  and, oii March   19,  2004,   the
Minister's position was affirmed by a judi:nient of the Administrative Jurisdic-
tion Department.408 However, on May 25, 2004, the Administrative Jurisdic-
tion Department judged rather differently with regard to the tenth interim
ineasure of the European Court of Human Rights concernitig a Somali asylum
seeker who belonged to a minority group and feared inhuman treatment or
torture if he was deported to northern Somalia.409 In contrast to the fortner
interim measures,  the tenth interim nieasure of the European Court included a
niotivation, which, according to the Administrative jurisdiction Department,
prevented deportation of a particular group of Somali asyluni seekers. Soon
after the Adininistrative Jurisdiction Department had published its judgment,
the IND policy officers realized that this court decision had consequences for
other rejected Somali asylum seekers as well.
6.2.2 T E DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
In Chapter 5, the process of administrative decision-making in response to the
court decisions was described in detail. Froni the description of the decision-
making processes that followed the court decisions, it follows that the policy
officers' response to the court decisions displays a coninion pattern: Only a few
days after the court had published its decision, the policy officers discussed the
consequences, advised the IND's managing director about necessary measures,
and informed caseworkers and other relevant parties about changes in working
practices. Moreover, the changes in working practices were formulated in
guidelines and work instructions. The Dublin case, however, was somewhat
exceptional because, in this case, the adjustment of the Aliens Act  Implementa-
tion Guidelines took place some nionths after the European Court had pub-
lished its judgment, and the 'adjustment' of the Aliens Act Iniplementation
Guidelines concerned an explanation (rather than a change) of the already
existing procedure and working practice. An overview:
-Ilie Dubli,1 case
According to the policy officers of the IND, the Dutch procedure for the
transfer of Dublin claimants did comply with the European Court's judgment.
Besides, the Netherlands was not be in the position to question the asylum
procedure in other EU member states, since that was a matter of inter-state
trust, which meant that the Netherlands relied on the premise that other EU
member states comply with the requirements stated in the ECHR. and the
Geneva Convention. However, the European Court's decision led to divergent
judgments of the Aliens Division of the District Courts and, therefore, the
408 Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, March  19,2004 (IV
2004/200).




IND policy officers decided  to  lay down the official interpretation of the  Euro-
pean Court's judgment in the Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines. Although
this interpretation was affirmed in  a judgment ofthe Administrative Jurisdiction
410Department, the matter remained subject to litigation.
71te AC case
In response to the AC case, the policy officers first considered the possibility of
creating a legal provision for the detention of asylum seekers in the Application
Center so that the handling of asylum applications would not be disrupted.
However, given the restrictions defined in Article 5 of the ECHR to detain
asylum seekers, this did not seem a realistic option. Therefore, the policy offi-
cers sought ways to adjust the regime in the Application Center so that it no
longer constituted illegitimate detention. After consultation of the IND em-
ployees working in the Application Center, the IND policy officers decided to
niake the regime in the Application Center less strict. The decision of the
Hague Court of Appeal resulted in an adjustment of procedures and working
practices within the period ordered by the court. However, even after the
rehhme in the Application Center was adjusted, the AC procedure remained
subject of discussion.
l'lie Eurodac case
In response to the Eurodac case, the policy officers aimed to bring the agency's
working practices iii conforniity with the court decision. in order to do so,
they decided to interpret the regulations of the Eurodac Regulation differently
than they had done before. They concluded that the sending of an asylum
seeker's fingerprints could be postponed to the moment the initial interview at
an Application Center actually begins. In a work instruction, the Aliens Police
was informed of the change in the fingerprint procedure. Furthermore, the
policy officers concluded that the applications of 80 asylum seekers whose
asylum applications had already been rejected,  atid of another  180  asylum seek-
ers whose asylum applications otherwise would have been rejected in the AC
procedure, were supposed to be handled in the normal asylum procedure. The
asylum seekers in question were entitled to accommodation in a Reception and
Investigation Center.   In a short period  of time, 440 (instead  of 180) asylum
seekers were placed in a Reception and Investigation Center.
The Age-Test case
From the Administrative Jurisdiction Department's judgment in the age test
case, the policy officers concluded that the radiologists should sign their find-
ings in a different nianner. hi response to the court decision therefore, the
radiologists were instructed to report their findings differently and the age test
procedure was adjusted accordingly. Moreover, the Minister of 1&1 declared to
410   Administrative Jurisdiction Departinent ofthe Council of State, October 25, 2()01  (RV
2001 no. 15; JV 2()(11/328)
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Parliament that, due to the agitation against the age test, she had decided to
appoint an Age Test Commission. A few months later, however, it turned out
that the manner in which the age test was reported was inconsistent with the
Administrative Jurisdiction Department's judgment. On March 31, 2004, the
Administrative Jurisdiction I)epartment decided in two other cases concerning
the age test of unaccompanied minors and concluded that the Minister of 1&1
still failed to comply with the requirements of Article 3:2 because, at the time
the assignments to conduct an age test were giveii, the Minister had not known
about the names of the radiologists.4" The policy officers therefore closely
exanlined the court decisions once again and adjusted the procedure of the age
test. This tillie, however, it took some months before the caseworkers were
infortned about the changes to the age test procedure.
The Deportation case
In response to Deportation case, the IND policy officers advised the Minister
of 1&1 to postpone obligatory departure of rejected Somali asylum seekers who
belonged to a minority group and had no clan or family ties in northern Sonia-
lia.  Personnel of the Aliens Police and the Central Agency for the Reception  of
Asylum Seekers were infonned that these asylu111 seekers were not to be de-
ported and had a right to accommodation. Still, a few months later, the Presi-
dent of the European Court of Human Rights took another interim measure,
which concerned a Somali asylum seeker who belonged to a majority group
and, again, the Administrative jurisdiction Department considered the implica-
tions of the interim measure. On December  17,  2004, the Administrative Juris-
diction Department judged that the interim measure of the European Court
prevented deportation of other Somali aliens as well.4,2 In response to this
judgment, the Minister of ItkI postponed obligatory departure of a broader
group of Somali aliens. Eventually, when the term of the departure morato-
rium came to an end, the Minister of I&I decided to alter the asylum policy
with regard to Somali asylum seekers. As from July 2005, they are granted a
temporary residence permit and are entitled to accoinmodation.
6.2.3 THE EFFECT
The examined cases reveal that court decisions seldom are the end of a discus-
sion.  On the contrary, the court decisions formed part of an ongoing process  of
policy adjustments, legal proceedings, and adjustments to administrative proce-
dures. Since studies  on the impact of judicial review have often stressed  the
linlited impact of court decision on policy execution, it is remarkable tllat the
court decisions examined had at least a procedural effect. The changes in ad-
ministrative working practices that followed from the court decisions were laid
down in the Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines or in work instructions.
41 1 Adnlinistrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, March 31, 2004  UV
204)4/210 and JV 2004/211).




One of the court decisions (i.e., the Deportation case) even led to an adjust-
ment of the official asylum policy. In addition to the procedural adjustments,
the policy officers mentioned that, in the Eurodac case and the Deportation
case,  the  IND  had  to  bear the additional costs  of the reception of asylum seek-
ers. None of the court decisions, however, directly led to a reconsideration of
the agency's weighing of interests or, more specifically, to a proposal on how
to prevent that a similar situation would arise in the future.
6.3 THE DOMINANT MODE OF RESPONSE
In  Chapter  1, four modes of administrative response to court decisions  were
distinguished. They were labeled as the well-considered response, the instru-
mental response, the principle-based response, and the non-response. The four
modes of response followed from the distinction that was made between tile
letter and the spint of a court decision. The question was: Do the policy officers,
in responding to court decisions, pay attention to both the letter and the spirit
of the court decision? In this section,  the IND policy officers' dominant mode
of response will be assessed.
6.3.1  THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE COURT DECISIONS
Table 6.1 gives an overview of the letter and the spirit of the Court decisions
examined.  As  has been explained in Chapter  1, the letter  of a court decision
refers to the court ruling, while the spirit of a court decision relates to the
values and principles the court took into account in its judgment. Although
opinions may differ as to what should be considered as 'the letter' or 'the spirit'
of the court decision in a specific case,  it will be clear (from Table 6.1)  that the
court decisions have two dimensions that significantly differ. ln the right-hand
column ofTable  6.1, the response of the IND policy officers to the court deci-
sions is summarized.
Table  6.1  (a): The letter and the spirit of the court decision and the IND policy
omcers' response.
The letter of the court The spirit ofthe court The IND policy officers'
decision decision response
1  The asylum seeker's claim EU member states cannot The European Court's
is dismissed automatically rely on the judgment did not necessi-
arrangements made in the tate adjusting the Dutch
Dublin Convention. They asylum procedure. The
should ensure that an official response to the
asylum seeker is not ex- court decision (stating that
posed to treatment de- the Netherlands relies on
fined in Article 3 ECHR   the premise ofinter-state
trust) has been formulated
in internal guidelines.
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Table  6.1  (b): The letter and the spirit of the court decision and the IND policy
officers' response.
The letter of the court The spirit ofthe court       The IND policy officers'
decision decision response
2    The conditions of resi- Given the vulnerable The regulations on the
dence iii the Application situation of asylum seekers obligatory residence of
Center amount to deten- (because of tlieir flight asylum seekers at the
tioii, for which there is tio from their country of Application Center as well
legal basis.  If the situation origin), one should take as the regulatiotis 011 the
of illegal detention is not       into  account the type,  the     use of mobile phones and
dealt with within 30 days,  duration, the effects, atid personal toiletries have
the AC procedure should the niantier of their deten-   been  niade  less  strict.
be shortened to 24 process  tion.
hours.
3   The  comparison  of the The AC procedure must The Aliens Police has
asyluill seeker's finger- comply with legal provi- been inforlned that the
prints in the Eurodac sions.  One of these  is the fingerprints of asylunl
database fornis part of the 48-hours tenn, which is seekers are to be sent to
investigation into the Illeant to ensure that, in the Eurodac database at
credibility ofthe asylum the AC procedure, only the nioment the initial
application and, therefore, those asylum applications interview with an asyluni
the IND decision is iii are handled which do tiot seeker actually begitis.
violation of the Aliens require an extensive in-
Decree. quiry.
4  Pursuant to Article 3:2 of Govemnient agencies are   The radiologists have been
the General Adniinistra- responsible for the care- instructed to sign their
tive Law Act, radiologists fulness ofthe investigation  findings with a signature
must sign their research into an application; the and a letter code; the
fitidings,  and  the  Minister      handlitig of applications  is      atithropologist was asked
sliould know their names.  supposed to be organized to adjust the age test
iii such a way that this procedure accordingly.
requirenient of good Besides, the Minister of
governance is met. 1&1 has appoiiited an Age
Test Commission that
monitors the age tests.
5   The 1()'h iriterini measure     Dependiiig on their moti- The Minister of 1&1 has
of the European Court vation, intenm measures been advised to postpone
prevents deportation of of the European Court are obligatory departure  of
rejected Somali asylum not oilly applicable to the rejected Somali asylum
seekers (who belong to a individual case; they can seekers who have no clan
minority group) to north-  have consequences for or family ties iii northerti
em Somalia. other asylum seekers' cases Somalia. The Aliens
as well. Police and the Central
Agency for the Reception
ofAsylum Seekers have
been informed that these




From the cases examined, it follows that the IND policy officers were generally
willing to correct the detected error and searched for ways to comply with the
court decision. The IND policy officers responded to all the court decisions
examined in one way or another. Contrary to what might have been expected,
non-response did not occur. However, if only the judgment of the European
Court had been exaniined, it would seem as if the IND was not so willing to
respond. After all, in this case, the policy officers adjusted the administrative
guidelines only after asylum seekers' attorneys had referred to the European
Court's judgment iii legal proceedings, which resulted in divergent judgments
of the Aliens Divisions of the District Courts and confusion among case-
workers. The policy officers therefore decided to set out the official inter-
pretation of the European Court's decision in the Aliens Act Implementation
Guidelines. This interpretation  of the European Court decision emphasized the
letter of the court decision, that is, the fact that the European Court had dis-
niissed the asylum seeker's claim. Furthermore, in the ofIcial response to the
European Court's decision, it was stated that the Netherlands could rely on the
premise of'inter-state trust'.  On the one hand, the official response may there-
fore be considered to be in conflict with the spirit of the European Court's
judgment (as summarized iii Table 6.1). On the other hand, the contradiction
between the spirit of the European Court's judgment and the Dutch govern-
ment' s response shows the coniplexity ofEuropean asylum law.
However, not only in the Dublin case did the policy officers emphasize the
court ruling. Although the policy officers responded more quickly in the other
cases examined, also in these cases they primarily focused on the letter of the
court decision. In the AC case, for instance, the policy officers distilled from
the court decision a list of factors on the basis of which the Hague Court of
Appeal had concluded that the accommodation in the Application Center
constituted detention: The asylum seekers should at least be able to use their
own toiletries and mobile phones and have the option to leave the Application
Center. Ultimately, the policy officers advised the Minister to adjust the repjme
iii the Application ( enter, and offer the asylum seekers the possibility to leave
the Application Center between 22:00 and 07:30.1n addition, the State Advo-
cate lodged an appeal with the Dutch Supreme C:ourt against the decision of
the Hague Court of Appeal to find out whether the Supreme Court considered
it admissible that interest groups use civil law procedures to raise questions that
address the admission and residence of asylum seekers. The response to the
court decision, however, did not include a reconsideration of the agency's
working practices iii light of the spirit of the court decision.
Similarly, in the Eurodac case, the policy officers focused on the letter of the
court decision. They agreed with the judgment of the Administrative j,irisdic-
tion Department that the coniparison of fingerprints formed part of the investi-
gation into an asylum application and, by interpreting the Eurodac Regtilatioti
differently, it was decided to postpone the comparison of fingerprints lititil ail
asylum seeker had signed his application and the investigation into the credibil-
ity of the asylum application actually began. Although this case, too, showed
132
THE IND's RESPONSE TO COURT DECISIONS
the difficulties the IND faces due to the complexity of national and interna-
tional regulations, the values and principles embedded in the court decision
were  not used to check whether the intake of asylum seekers was in contraven-
tion with other legal provisions. On the other hand, in legal proceedings that
followed the Administrative Jurisdiction Department's judgment, asylum seek-
ers' attorneys did question whether other matters relating to the intake of asy-
lum seekers were legitimate. In at least one of these cases, the asylum seeker's
claim was upheld.
In the Age-Test case, the policy officers struggled with  the  interpretation of the
Administrative Jurisdiction Department's judgment. They focused on the ques-
tion of whether a better traceable signature would suffice  or if the names  of the
radiologists should be made known. Iii order to comply with the court ruling,
the policy officers asked the radiologists to sign their findings in a different
manner, and assisted the anthropologist with the adjustment of the age test
procedure. Their response did not include a reconsideration of the agency's
working practices in light  of the spirit of the court decision. However,  in  addi-
tion to the policy officers' response, the Minister of I&1 decided to install an
Age-Test Commission to monitor the age test procedure. In accordance with
the values and principles expressed in the court decision, this additional meas-
ure was meant to contribute to the carefulness of the investigation into asylum
applications.
Lastly, in the Deportation case, the policy officers advised the Minister of I&1
to postpone obligatory departure of rejected Somali asylum seekers. However,
in responding to the Administrative Jurisdiction Department, they focused on
the definition of the group of rejected Soniali asylum seekers who, because of
the Appeals Court's interpretation of the interim measure of the European
Court of Human Rights, could not be deported to northern Somalia. The
policy officers did not learn from the court decision that interim measures of
the European Court can have consequences for other asylum cases than the
one in which the European Court had decided. After the President of the
European Court took another interim measure, an official response did not
follow until the Administrative jurisdiction Department had concluded  that this
later interim measure had consequences for other cases as well. It must be men-
tioned, however, that in this case, the administrative response was to some
extent influenced by the fact that senior officials of the Minister's Department
of Aliens Affairs were actively involved in the interpretation of- the court deci-
sion.
6.3.2 CONCLUSION
From the cases examined, it follows that, in response to the court decisions
examined, the IND policy officers primarily focused on the letter of the court
decision and aimed to comply with the court ruling. In instances where the
court had criticized the agency's working practices, the policy officers checked
the court decision for the specific error the IND had allegedly made in execut-
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ing the asylum procedure. In responding to the court decision, the policy offi-
cers did not use the values and principles expressed in the court decision either
to fashion an adverse response to the court ruling, or to reconsider the agency's
priorities in the execution of the asylum procedure. Therefore,  the IND policy
officers' response to the court decisions examined was mainly instrumental.
As  a result, the court decisions  led to adjustments of administrative procedures
and working practices. Overall, the response to the court decisions did not
include a reconsideration of the agency's weighing of interests in light of the
spirit of the court decisions, which could have resulted in a proposal on  how  to
safeguard or enhance the values and principles embedded in the court deci-
sions. Due to the instrumental mode of response, the IND showed a single-
loop learning process. Consequently, the effect of the court decisions remained
limited to ad hoc adjustments of the asylum procedure.
Perhaps the most striking example of the limited impact court decisions have
had on the execution of the asylum procedure is the AC case.  In this case, the
Hague Court of Appeal referred to a former court decision  of 1988, in which
the Dutch Supreme Court had criticized the conditions of residence of asyluni
seekers at Schiphol Airport. This previous court decision had not prevented
that, ten years later, a similar situation arose with regard to the accommodation
of asylum seekers in the Application Center. Moreover, in response to the
judgment of the Hague Court of Appeal, the policy officers resolved the ille-
gitimate detention of asylum seekers, but (still) did not take measures to pre-
vent that a similar situation could arise in the future.
A similar remark can be made with regard to the Deportation case. Although
interim nieasures of the European Court were a relatively new phenomenon,
from the Administrative jurisdiction  Department's judginent of May 2004,  the
policy officers could have learned that a motivated interim measure can have
consequences for other asylum seekers' cases as well. However, when the
President of the European Court took another interim measure (in August
2004), it took months, or rather another decision of the Administrative Juris-
diction Department. before the Minister of 1&1 decided to postpone obligatory
departure ofa broader group of Somali asylum seekers.
Nonetheless, there was also a sign  of a more considered response. After all,  the
judgment of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department in the Age-Test case
not only led to  an  adjustment of working practices,  it also partly contributed  to
the installation of an Age Test Commission. In accordance with the values
expressed in the court decision, this additional measure was meant to contrib-
ute to the carefulness of the iiivestigation into asylum applications. Therefore,  it
can be coiisidered as an example of a well-considered response.
The question that still remains to be answered is why the IND policy officers
mainly opted for ati instrumental approach. Or, to put it differently: What
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factors contributed to the fact that the policy officers applied an instrumental
mode of response,  and what factors hindered the policy officers to apply a well-
considered mode of response, in which the values and principles expressed in a
court decision are more consciously considered? This question will be ad-




THE IMPACT OF COURT DECISIONS:
AN EXPLANATION
To me, that is of great importance because 1 strictly adhere to the principle
that court decisions are put into effect.
- Rita Verdonk, Minister of 1&1 (2003-2006)
In: TK 2002-2003  19 637 no.757, p. 21
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Iii the previous chapter, it was concluded that the IND policy officers mainly
used an instruniental mode of response to court decisions. The policy officers
primary focused on the letter of the court decisions and, in addition, tried to
correct the detected non-conformity with the law. However, they paid little
attention to the values and principles that were embedded in the court deci-
sion. Although the court decisions examined did result in adjustnients to the
asylum procedure, the policy officers' response did not include measures that
were meant to safeguard the values and principles the court had expressed in its
judgment. Consequently, the impact of the court decisions was limited to ad
hoc adjustments to administrative procedures.
The question that still remains to be answered is why the instruniental mode of
response was the IND policy officers' dominant mode of response. Or, more
specifically: What factors stimulated the IND policy officers to respond to court
decisions in an instrumental manner, and what factors hindered or prevented
them from applying a well-considered mode of response in which the spirit of
the court decisions is taken into account? In Chapter 3, nine hypotheses were
raised with regard to the factors that may influence the impact of court deci-
sions. The factors were categorized into three domains: The characteristics of
the governliient agency, the law, and the government agency's political envi-
ronment. Starting with the characteristics of the IND, I will set out in this
chapter what factors limited, and what factors contributed to the impact of the
court decisions.
The information presented iii this chapter is based on desk research and inter-
views. The ten policy officers who were interviewed because of their involve-
ment in the agency's response to the court decisions examined were also asked
about their view on subjects relating to the impact of court decisions, such as:
the dissemination of legal knowledge and information, the clarity of court
decisions, the relation to their political superiors, and the role of the media and
interest groups. In addition, the unit managers of the Litigation staff unit and
the Policy Execution staff unit were interviewed, as well as a policy officer of
the Asylum staff unit, a lawyer working at the Litigation Division, a caseworker
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working at AC Schiphol, the (former) State Advocate, and a judge.413 These
additional interviews had a more open structure and were meant to put the
research findings in perspective.
7.2   CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IND
7.2.1 LEGAL COMPETENCE
The first factor that could influence the impact of court decisions is the policy
officers' legal competence. The hypothesis was that the impact of court deci-
sions would be enhanced if the policy officers' capacity to interpret court deci-
sions is greater. The research findings  tend to support this hypothesis.  The  IND
policy officers were perfectly capable of interpreting court decisions. Due to
the policy officers' legal competence, court decisions were translated into prac-
tical consequences, and adjustinents to administrative procedures were laid
down in internal guidelines.
On the whole, the IND is staffed with highly trained personnel. Policy officers
are assigned specific tasks, on the basis of work experience. Some are special-
ized in the AC procedure, others in the Age Test procedure or the Dublin
Convention. Furthermore, the policy officers of the Litigation Division are
specialized in the handling of legal proceedings. The Litigation staff unit, which
consists mainly of lawyers, fulfills a central role in the interpretation of court
decisions. It is the first to know about court decisions and responds accord-
ingly Court decisions that addressed the asyluiTi procedure and therefore could
have consequences for the handling of other asylum applications received im-
niediate attention: "Of course, court decisions that have implications for the
handling of a single case are not always dealt with  in time. However, if court
decisions address 'the process' [of handling asylum applications, VWj, we al-
ways take action immediately. „414
The five cases described in Chapter 5 are examples of this type of court deci-
sion. The policy officers examined these court decisions in detail  and,  if it was a
judgment of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department and the policy officers
doubted whether they had interpreted the court decision correctly, they
brought before the court two or three new cases that had been dealt with ac-
cording to the new procedure. As a result, there was a constant fine-tuning of
adniinistrative procedures and working practices to court decisions. With re-
gard to the agency's response to judgments of the Administrative Jurisdiction
1)epartnient, a policy officer of the Litigation staff unit remarked: "It is about
the legal limits of the law, and  our employees operate at the maximum of their
knowledge of administrative law and aliens  law. „415
413
See Appetidix 2.
414  Iliterview policy officer no. 4.
415 Jaarverstag IND 2002, p. 35.
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The research findings show that the IND policy officers had no particular diffi-
culties in interpreting court decisions. The policy officers mentioned that they
had difficulty in interpreting a judgment of the Administrative Jurisdiction
Department only in exceptional instances. A judgment that turned out difficult
to interpret was, for example, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department's
decision in the Age-Test case.  For the policy officers of the IND, it was un-
clear how the Minister's obligation 'to ascertain that the age test was conducted
carefully and thoroughly' should be interpreted. Did it mean that the names of
the radiologists should be niade publicly known, or would a better traceable
signature of the radiologists suffice? Because the policy officers were not sure
whether their interpretation would meet the Administrative Jurisdiction De-
partment's point of view, they saw to it that some new cases were brought
before the appeals court. A few months later, however, it turned out they had
not fully understood the earlier Administrative Jurisdictioti Department's
judgnent.
Cotlellisioll
The research findings suggest that the policy officers' legal competence has
contributed to the impact of court decisions. The policy officers were able to
distill from the court decision the error the agency had made in executing the
asylum procedure and they neatly translated the adjustments to administrative
working practices into work instructions and administrative guidelines. How-
ever, when interpreting court decisions, the policy officers primarily focused on
the court ruling and hardly paid any attention to the values and principles that
were expressed in the court decision. Due to the one-sided interpretation of
tlie court decisions, their impact reniained limited to ad hoc adjustments to
administrative procedures. Still. the reason why the policy officers primarily
paid attention to the letter of the court decisions, and less to their spirit, had
not so much to do with a lack of legal competence.  hi this chapter, it will be
argued that the policy officers' one-sided interpretation of court decisions re-
sulted  from  a  lack of legal  conscientiousness and from influences  from  the gov-
ernnient agency's environment.
7.2.2 DISSEMINATION OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION
In addition to legal competence, the dissemination of legal knowledge and
information has also been defined as a factor that may contribute to the impact
of court decisions. The assumption was that IND policy officers would dis-
seminate information concerning court decisions across the organization and, in
that way, contribute to the impact of court decisions.  From the cases described
in Chapter 5, it already appeared that the policy officers fulfill a central role in
supplying information to, for instance, caseworkers and external parties, but
their activities extend beyond those already described.
Normally, the policy officers of the staff units of Litigation and Policy Execu-
tion  meet on Monday with the State Advocate and representatives of the De-
partment of Aliens Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  In this weekly
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meeting, they discuss interesting court decisions of the week before. If they
expect that a court decision requires taking measures, a policy officer of the
Litigation staK unit writes  a  memo  to the other staff units, including the  IND's
managing director, in which the content of the court decision is explained and
possible measures are suggested that, in light of the policy goals, seem most
urgent in order to continue the execution of the asylum procedure. In addi-
tion, a policy officer of the Policy Execution staff unit makes sure a meeting is
held with experts of the various IND divisions to talk through the conse-
quences of the court decision and discuss how these can  best be communicated
to caseworkers and other relevant parties. Soon thereafter, the policy officer of
the Policy Execution staff unit explains the changes in working practices in a
work instruction that is Sent to the caseworkers via the intranet. Usually, the
caseworkers can respond to a provisional draft before an official work instruc-
tion is published.
On the intranet, IND employees can (also) find information about case law,
recent changes in rules and regulations, and updates on the Minister's state-
ments with regard to specific events. Furthermore, the Litigation staff unit
conducts analyses of court decisions on specific themes,  such as the AC proce-
dure,416 or the imprisonment of rejected asylum seekers. The Litigation staff
unit also provides a helpdesk which caseworkers and IND lawyers can turn to
for advice on matters concerning the handling of applications.  And,  of course,
if a caseworker doubts how to decide on a specific case, he or she can always
ask advice from a senior caseworker or the unit manager. Besides, the Litiga-
tion staff unit has developed standard texts to ensure an unambiguous motiva-
tion of the decisions on asylum applications. In that way, the caseworkers and
IND lawyers can handle the applications more efficiently. 417
A plea is for a large part drawn up from standard pieces of text. Writing
up this text in not that interesting. More important is the composition of
the text (...). IND lawyers now build their case by choosing options and
then the text of the speech is automatically generated. This is a profes-
sional approach, which also serves the judges and the asylum seekers'  at-
torneys. A standard working process and a report compiled of standard
pieces of text  (...) make a good impression.
In response to court decisiotis, these standard texts sometimes need revision,
which is also  a  task  of the Litigation staff unit. Finally, the Litigation and Policy
Execution staff units organize workshops for caseworkers once a year. For
example, in December 2003, a workshop was held about the legal implications
ofjudicial decisions with regard to the AC procedure. 418
416 In Section 5.4.1,  I described some of the central issues iii case law concerning the AC
procedure.
413   jaawerslag IND 2002, p. 37.
418  See also TK 2003-2004 19 637 no. 826, p. 5.
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Colidlisio, 1
The IND policy officers provide caseworkers and IND lawyers with a com-
plete collection of relevant information. The policy officers see to it that419
information that follows froni court decisions is disseminated across the agency
within a short period of time. From the moment the agency takes notice of a
court decision, it generally takes a month until guidelines and work instructions
are disseminated across the agency. Of course, technological developments
have added to the speed of itlforniation exchange but a tilliely response to
court decisions tliat address the asylum procedure also serves the iiiterest of the
INI).In Chapter 4, it has been mentioned that the agency's operational goal is
to handle applications for a residence permit within the legally restricted period
oftitne and, to avoid backlog in the handling ofapplications, the policy officers
are therefore on the alert for court decisions that might disrupt the handling of
asylum applications. As far as the policy officers' effort is concerned, it can be
concluded that the exchange of legal knowledge and information has certainly
contributed to the impact of court decisions. Still, the question remains
whether the infomiation provided to caseworkers is optimally used. The IND
is  an organization  that has  a high turnover of personnel.420 Besides,  in his study
on the handling of asyluiii applications, Mascini found that, due to their work-
load, INI) caseworkers do not fully make use of the information the policy
officers provide,42' which could diniinish the actual impact of court decisions.
7.2.3 LEGAL CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
The third characteristic of the government agency that has been defined as a
factor of particular importance to the impact of court decisions is the policy
officers' legal conscientiousness. It was expected that the IND policy officers
care about acting lawfully and apply their legal knowledge thoughtfully to the
full range of their decision-making and advisory tasks, so as to foster the impact
of court decisions. In interviews, the policy officers nientioned that they do
care about acting lawfully and, fronl the research findings, it appeared that they
take their task seriously to adequately respond to court decisions. However, the
research findings also show that legal conscientiousness among IND policy
officers was not very strong.
First of all, the IND policy officers take judicial review of IND decisions for
granted. The agency has been confronted with many judicial appeals for years.
Still, they show a readiness to respond to court decisions. As has been men-
tioned, the policy officers  of the Litigation staff unit are the first to know about
court decisions and are well trained in interpreting court decisions. It is their
419  The mantier in which information is disseminated across the organization is, to a large
extent,  comparable to the disseminatioti of information in other government agencies,
such as the 1)utch Tax Authority (Bclastingdienst) and the Employee Insurance Agency
Cl 'itt'of·Tiligsorgattis,irie  Wf·rk,Veversverzekeringen).
42(, The IND particularly attracts young lawyers, who gain some practical experience and
then leave the organizatioti for a job in a law firm.
421  Mascini 20(M.
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job to defend IND decisions in the appeals court and to translate court deci-
sions into legal consequences. In addition, policy officers of the Policy Execu-
tion staff unit (and the Asylum staff unit) think of the practical consequences,
including the communication of executive adjustments to caseworkers and
external parties. However, in response to the court decisions examined, the
policy officers primarily focused on the court ruling and did not consider the
values and principles expressed in the court decision. The following quote
from a policy officer of the Litigation staff unit is a typical example of the pol-
icy officers' attitude to law. 422
Cases that are brought before the court, always address a question of
law, an issue that is still unclear. Law is not an exact science; various
points of view are possible. When interpreting the law, we search for
the  boundaries  tof the  law,  VW],  and  it  is  up  to the court to decide
whether that interpretation is legally acceptable.
Thus, instead of using their legal knowledge and the information from court
decisions to enhance the impact of a court decision, the policy officers searched
for  'the  boundaries'  or  'the  legal  limits  of the law':23 When interpreting court deci-
sions, the policy officers, and most notably the lawyers of the Litigation staff
unit, aimed to find 'an explanation that is most advantageous to the government
agency'.424 And since the primary goal of the  IND is a timely handling of appli-
cations, the adjustments made should not, or only as little as possible, disrupt
the  timeline for the handling of asylum applications.
Besides a timely handling of applications, however, the IND is supposed to
meet other legal principles as well. The court decisions examined also consid-
ered 'the carefulness of the investigation' and 'safeguarding the asylum seekers'
human rights' as values of importance (see Table 6.1). However, the INI)
policy officers did not address the values and principles embedded in the court
decisions to question, for instance, the agency's weighing of interests, or to
consider whether tlle detected error resulted from a lack of consideration for
other values to which the government agency is supposed to adhere. Instead,
the IND policy officers complied with just the letter of the court decisions.
Still, some policy officers and, in particular, those of the Policy Execution staff
unit, expressed their discomfort with the strict interpretation of the court deci-
sions. One of them mentioned: "The juridification of aliens law has gone too
far. Asylum is not the policy field to play such a tough game. However, the„425
policy officers who criticized the manner of interpreting court decisions did
not effectively express their doubts about the agency's weighing of interests,
because they did not find themselves in the position to do so, or because they
thought that their criticism would not be heard.
422 Interview policy officer no. 4.
423 See footnotes 422 and 415 respectively.
424 Interview policy officer 110. 6.
425 Interview policy officer no. 8.
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Conditsio, 1
The one-sided interpretation of the court decisions can be attributed to a lack
of legal conscientiousness among IND policy officers. The policy officers'
attitude to the law was strongly influenced by the operational goal of the IND
to handle asylum applications within the legally restricted period of time.
When interpretitig court decisions, the policy officers gave preference to ati
explanation that would least disrupt the agency's working practices and, to that
end, they searched for the boundaries of the law. Because their legal conscien-
tiousness was not particularly strong, the policy officers did not consider
whether the values and principles the court had expressed in its judgment were
deeply enough embedded in the agency's weighing of interests. Instead of
paying attention to both the letter and the spirit of Court decisions, the IND
policy officers just focused on the breach  of a specific  rule.
Due to a focus on the letter of court decisions, the policy officers showed an
instmniental niode of response, which resulted in a single-loop learning proc-
ess: Court decisions were translated into ad hoc adjustments to administrative
procedures.  If the policy officers would have expressed a stronger commitment
to legality and applied their legal knowledge more thoughtfully to the full
range of their decision-making and advisory tasks, the policy officers could
have produced a well-considered response atid then the impact of the court
decisions would have  been  more profound.  Therefore,  a  lack of legal conscien-
tiousness among IND policy officers litnited the impact of court decisions.
However, iii tlie following of this chapter, it will be argued that besides a lack
of legal conscientiousness among policy officers, infuences from the agency's
environment limited the impact of the court decisions as well.
7.3   THE LAW
Iii Chapter 3, it has been suggested that, in addition to the characteristics of the
governnient agency, the inipact of court decisions could also be influenced by
factors stemming from the law. Two factors in particular were defined as fac-
tors of importatice: The characteristics of the field of law (defining the relation
between the government agency, its clients, and the court), and the clarity of
court decisions. In this section, the research findings with regard to these two
factors will be considered.
7.3.1 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ALIENS LAW
Introdtiction
In Chapter 3, attention was drawn to the tensions that are itiheretit to the field
of adrtiinistrative law. On the basis of Halliday's study, two types of tension426
were distinguished. Firstly, there could be tension between the interest of the





tension between the government agency and the court. The hypothesis was
that the more the 'agency interest' model and the 'agency autonomy' model
dominate at the expense of the 'individual interest' model and the 'judicial
control' model, respectively, the less likely court decisions will be to have an
impact on administrative procedures and working practices.
The findings of the present study  tend to support this hypothesis. However,  the
two types of tension defined by Halliday do not provide a sufficient explana-
tion for the extent to which court decisions have an impact. The research
findings show  that the extent to which the field  of law is juridified also forms a
distinctive characteristic that can in0uence the impact of court decisions.  In this
study, juridification is defined as:
-  the extent to which procedures are specified in legislation and addi-
tional regulations, and;
-  the extent to which the government agency's decisions are subject
to judicial appeal.
A highly juridified field of law  is thus characterized by detailed rules and regu-
lations and a large number of judicial appeals.  In a less juridified field of law,
procedures are not (yet) specified in detail and relatively few judicial appeals are
lodged. In this section, I will elucidate the argument that the impact of the
court decisions was limited because Dutch aliens law is a strongly juridified
field of law, and because, in the field of aliens law, bureaucratic efficiency is
favored at the expense of the opportunity for asylum seekers to defend their
case, while the court allows the IND much discretion on how to pursue the
policy goals. The argument is that policy officers of a government agency that
has to handle a large number of legal proceedings within strict time limits and
that is frequently criticized for the manner in which it decides on applications,
while the appeals court adheres to a strict interpretation of the law, Will 1110St
likely opt for an instrumental mode ofresponse.
The Juridijication  of Aliens  L:w
In the past, the IND has frequently been criticized for the poor quality of its
decisions in asylum applications. For example, in 1995, the Netherlands427
Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer) conducted an inquiry into the function-
ing of the IND and concluded that the planning and control of the handling of
asylum applications showed severe shortcomings.428 A poor quality of decisions
in asylum applications led to delay and unnecessary legal proceedings. At the
same time, a similar conclusion was drawn from an evaluation  of the Aliens Act
1994.429 Both reports showed that the problems with regard to the handling of
asylum applications were primarily caused by the influx of asylum seekers and,
so it seemed, could not be dealt with within a short period of time. Conse-
427 See Section 4.5.1.
428 TK 1995-1996 24 440 nos. 1-2.
429 TK 1995-1996 19 637 no. 138. See also TK 1995-1996 19637 and 24 440 no. 145.
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quently, a few years later, the large numbers of pending judicial procedures
were the main reason for the then installed Cabinet Kok-11 (1998) to introduce
a new Aliens Act.
Because the second Kok Cabinet aimed to limit the number of appeal proce-
430dures and, thereby, shorten the asylum procedure, it incorporated a number
of changes into the Aliens Act 20()() (see Chapter 4). Conseqitently, the Alieiis
Act 2()(1() differs from soine legal provisions defined in the General Administra-
tive Law Act. For example, the Aliens Act 2()0() does not provide the possibil-
ity of administrative appeal against decisions in asylum applications, and the
legal term to file an appeal with the court is shorter.431 Despite the coming itito
force of the Aliens Act 2()()0 (in April 2001), however, the IND is still coil-
fronted  with a relatively large nuniber of judicial appeals. In coniparison  to
decisions from other government agencies, such as the Employee Insurance
432Agency (EIA)   and the I)utch Tax Authority (1)TA), the IND decisions on
asyluni applications result more often in judicial appeal. 433
Tlic Agency's Interest and the Individual's Interest
By drawing attention to the distinction between legality and legitiniacy, Van
der Linden has tried to explain the tension that is inherent to asylum law.434 In
the discussion about the admission of asylum seekers, she states, there are tWO
competing images of'the asylum seeker: On the one hand, the asylum seeker
is pictured as 'a fortune hunter' who misuses the asylum procedure because he
wants to escape from economic misery in his country of origin. Those who
support a restrictive asylum policy usually project this image. On the other
hand, the asylum seeker is pictured as 'a trauniatized person', who needs all
legal aid and assistance available. In general, this image is expressed by those
who speak up for the rights of asylum seekers. Of course, both views give a
biased description of people who apply for asylum,  and Van der Linden raises
the question of what 'justice' means in such a situation: Does justice refer to
legality or legitimacy?  ls it justice if procedures are strictly executed according
to legal rules and regulations, or does justice require that the interests of those
who are subject to the law have been included in the democratic decision-
making process? Since this later option is not applicable to aliens law, Van der
Linden concludes, an asylum seeker should be given the benefit of the doubt.
Admitting an asylum seeker on inaccurate grounds would be less harmful than
denying admission to an asylum seeker who has a rightful claim. 435
430  See, for example, TK 1999-2000 26 732 no. 7, p. 55, and TK 1991-1992 22 735 no. 3,
p. 58.
431  See also Van Asperen & Hoogvliet 20()3.
432  The EIA (Uitvoeringsorganisatie :Verkgeversverzekeringen) is the governmental body respoii-
sible for implementing employee insurance programs.
433 The results ofthe comparison between the INt), the EIA, and the DTA are more
elaborately described in Appendix 4.
434 Van der Linden 2003.
435  Van der Linden 2003, p. 79.
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The call for more efficiency in the handling of asylum applications, however,
appears to have restricted the procedural protection enjoyed by individual
asylum seekers. Although, in the Netherlands, asylum seekers are entitled to
legal aid, asylum seekers' attorneys as well as legal scholars and advisory organi-
zations have more than once criticized the short time periods for asylum seek-
ers to provide infomiation that could support their case.436 Especially for
asylum seekers whose application is handled in the AC procedure, the time
available to supply additional information in response to the intention to reject
the asylum application, or lodge an appeal with the court, is considered to be
too short to prepare a well-argued case. The Minister of I&I, however, did not
acknowledge this criticism. In reaction to reports that criticized the accelerated
handling of asylum applications, the Minister of 1&1 relentlessly referred to the
outcome of court decisions: "The fact that a large number of IND decisions
withstand judicial review procedure shows that the pace of handling asylum
applications  does not  harm  the  carefulness of the investigation. 1 437
A remarkable finding of the comparison between, on the one hand, the IND,
and, on the other hand, the EIA and the DTA was, however, that the Court
distilissed a relatively large number of IND  decisions.438 Although the  IND did
not significantly differ from the EIA and the I)TA as to the percentage ofjudi-
cial appeals that were upheld by the court (in general, the percentages of ap-
peals that were upheld by the court ranged between 20% and 35%), the
decisions of the INI) on asylum applications resulted more often in judicial
appeal thaii did decisions by the EIA and the DTA. In 2002, for example,
about 80% of the decisions taken in the AC procedure resulted iii an appeal
with the Aliens Division of the  Hague I)istrict Court. With regard to decisions
in the normal asylum procedure, this percentage was 35%. For the EIA and the
DTA, the percentages of decisions that resulted in judicial appeal were consid-
erably lower (about 0.5% and 0.05% respectively). Since the court upheld 20%-
35% of the appeals, the court dismissed a relatively large percentage of IND
decisions in first instance.
According to the coordinator of the Aliens Division of the Hague District
Court, a large part of the judicial appeals against decisions of the IND were
upheld because the IND exceeded the legal term to decide on an asylum appli-
cation.439 Moreover, by the time the Court decided on an asylum seeker's case,
it could consider new facts or circumstances, including possible changes in the
situation in the country of origin. Because that situation could have changed
for the worse, the court could quash the decision on the asylum applicatioii as a
436  See, for example, Adviescomtiiissie voor Vreemdelingenzake,i 20(,4, Vellenga 2()()3:
Hoftijzer 2(I{)3, Kruijen 2()()3: Doornbos 2(1(13b; Human Right Watch 2(1(13, and
'Nieuwe wet oridennijnt rechtshulp asielzoekers' iii:  Trouu,, February 14, 2()(12.
437 TK 2()(,3-2()()4 19 637 no. 826, p. 4 (11)y tratislatio„). See also Aanhailes(,1 va,2 de Ha,ide-
lineen TK 2(1(13-2(M)4 no. 1082.
438
See Appendix 4.
439  Bi,ineniands Bestitur. September 27, 2()(12 p. 38.
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result.440 On the other hand, the reports from legal scholars and advisory or-
ganizations suggest that,  in the field of aliens law,  a timely handling of applica-
tions dominates at the expense of the carefulness of the investigation iii asylum
applications.
In addition, it may be expected that the court fulfills a prominent role in the
relation to the IND to counterbalance a possible domiIiance of the agency's
interests over the interests of asylum seekers. Steendijk, for example, argues:  "I f
a governmetit agency can be regarded as a 'decision-making factory' and, as a
consequence, the quality of decisions in individual cases can be questioned,  the
court should act as an inspector of government. It appears, however, that„441
the perceived imbalance between the interests of the IND and the interests of
asylum seekers is intensified rather than diminished by the manner in which the
court carries  out its judicial function.
Tlie Role of the Court
In the field of aliens law, the relation between the  IND  and the court  has been
subject to change. Under the former Aliens Act, for example, representatives of
the  IND used to criticize the Aliens Divisions of the District Courts for giving
too divergent judginents, while the Rechtsee,iheidskamer, which was installed to
preserve the unity of law, would interfere too niuch with the content of the
asylum policy. The Rechtsemlieidska,ner would therefore violate the principles of
the tries politica.
Since the coming into force of the Aliens Act 2()00, which introduced the
Administrative Jurisdiction 1)epartment of the Council of State as the appeals
court in aliens law, legal scholars have closely monitored the role of the court
and, in particular, the role of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department. In
2002, for example, Spijkerboer published a report in which he argued that the
Administrative Jurisdiction Departinent had taken a standpoint in favor of the
IND.442 He stated that some prominent judges of the Administrative Jurisdic-
tion Department underestimated the distinctive characteristics of aliens law in
comparison to other fields of administrative law. Some judges of the Adminis-
trative Jurisdiction Department held the opinion that, according to the princi-
ples of administrative law, the government agency gives expression to the
general interest and, therefore, the court should gave wide scope to the gov-
ernment agency to pursue the policy goals and only exanline the procedural
requirements. Of course, this view was in accordance with the theory of443
niarginal judicial review, which implies that the court does not interfere with
the core of governmental activity and only checks the reasonableness of the
decision in light of the interests at stake. However, the point Spijkerboer made
was that the interests of immigrants and asylum seekers are not fully expressed
440
'Cohen: een vijfde van besluiten IND fout' in: NRC Handelsblad, October 24,2000.
441  Steendijk 2001, p. 195 (my translation).
442 Spijkerboer 2002a. See also Spijkerboer 2003.
443  Daalder & Schreuder-Vlasblom 2000.
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in the general interests the government agency is supposed to represent. Be-
sides,  as a consequence of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department's percep-
tion of the role of the court, the court currently seldom judges an asylum
seeker's case on its merits.  On the basis of a legal analysis ofjudgments of the
Administrative Jurisdiction Department, Spijkerboer further showed that the
Administrative Jurisdiction Department held to a strict interpretation of na-
tional legislation, even when that interpretation appeared to be in conflict with
international regulations or the legislator's point of view set out in parliamen-
tary papers.444 By denying the distinctive characteristic of aliens law and strictly
interpreting asylum legislation, Spijkerboer concluded, the Administrative
Jurisdiction Department pemiitted the IND to follow its preferences, exercise
its expertise, and trust its own judgment, while there was little scope for the
asylum seekers to defend their cases.445 The Administrative Jurisdiction De-
partment would therefore  take a standpoint in favor of the  IND.
Similar criticism has been expressed by Koers, who mentioned that, under the
former Aliens Act, the Aliens Divisions of the District Courts were more ac-
commodating and actively involved in reviewing the asylum seeker's case. 446
Later the Administrative Jurisdiction Department restricted the role of the
court in examining an asylum seeker's case447  and both the attorneys of asylum
seekers and the Aliens Divisions of the District Courts had to get used to the
new role of the court. The coordinator of the Aliens Divisions of the Hague
District Court observed: "The former Aliens Act provided us more possibili-
ties. We had more political influence. Under the Aliens Act 2000, that has
changed  (...). The court  can no longer review the merit:s of a case.',448  Fur-
thermore, Lodder argued that,  due to judgments of the Adrninistrative Jurisdic-
tion Department, former working practices and agreements between the IND
and asylum seekers' attorneys have come to an end, and that legal assistance to
asylum seekers has become a more difficult task as a result. 449
The manner in which the Administrative Jurisdiction Department decides may
indeed be different from other Dutch courts of appeal  such  as the  Tax Division
of the Court of Appeal or the Central Appeals Tribunal (Centrale Raad van
Beroep) that decides in social security matters. The decisions of the EIA, for
example, are reviewed by the Central Appeals Tribunal, which, in some re-
444 With regard to the handling of renewed asylum applications, see textbox in Section
7.3.2, and Spijkerboer 2002a, pp. 46-73. With regard to the formalities of the appeal
procedure, see Spijkerboer 2002a, pp. 13-15 and p. 31.
445  See also 'Raad van State geeft vluchteling geen kans' in: Trouw, January 21, 2003,
446  Koers 2()02. See also 'Nieuwe wet ondermijnt rechtshulp aan asielzoekers' in: Trouw, 14
February, 2002, and the Deputy Minister's reaction to questions from Member of Parli-
ament Halsema (CmenLinks) published in Aanhanisel van  de  Handelingen TK 2001-20()2
no. 911.
447 Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State, January 27, 21)(13 (IV
2003/ 103).
448  From an interview with the coordinator of the Aliens Division of the Hague District
Court in: Binnenlands Bestultr, September 27,2002, p. 39 (my tratislation).
449 Lodder 2003b. See also Boeles 2002.
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spects, interprets the General Administrative Law Act quite differently from the
Adniinistrative Jurisdiction Department.450 However, there is no study yet that
can provide conclusive proof on this matter. Nonetheless, in interviews, policy
officers of the INI) also mentioned that the Administrative Jurisdiction De-
partnient adheres to a strict interpretation of the Aliens Act, but they also
pointed out the 'positive' effects of this approach.
Now that the Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of
State acts as an appeals court, the unity of law has improved. But some
judges do not want to abjure their former role; they actually have less to
say. Only in old asyluin cases Ithat are dealt with on the basis of the
fortner Aliens Act, VW} can the Aliens I)ivisions of the District Courts
decide what they want. 451
The niatiner in which the Administrative jurisdiction Department moti-
vates  its judgments leaves the Minister discretion. 452
While formerly IND employees perhaps presumed that the court would
check the decision on an asylum application, the IND now realizes that
the organization itself is responsible. In that respect, the organizational
culture has changed. 453
In the following section, the policy officers' view regarding the clarity of court
decisions will be discussed in niore detail. As far as the relation between the
IND and the court is concerned, it may be concluded that the characteristics of
aliens law placed the IND in a dominant position in comparison to the court.
Conclusion
In this section, the focus was on the question of whether the characteristics of
aliens law influenced the impact ofcourt decisions. The research findings reveal
that aliens law differs from other fields of administrative law.  In the first place,
aliens law is a strongly juridified field of law. The Aliens Act 2000, in part,
deviates froni procedural requirements defined in the General Administrative
Law Act and because decisions iii asylum applications touch upon matters of
great importance,  the  IND is confronted with a relatively large number of legal
proceedings. Besides, the court quashes a relatively large percentage of the IND
decisions in first iiistance.
Furthermore, the characteristics of aliens law Seem to favor bureaucratic effi-
ciency  at the expense of the interests of the asylum seekers, while the Adminis-
trative Jurisdiction Department, which acts as an appeals court in asylum cases,
restricted  the  role of the court, thereby giving wide scope to  the  IND to follow
450  Spokerboer 20021, p. 47
451 Interview policy officer no. 3.
452 Interview policy officer no. 8.
453  Interview policy officer no. 2.
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its preferences, exercise its expertise, and trust its decisions on asylum applica-
tions. The characteristics  of aliens  law thus placed  the  IND  in a dominant posi-
tion in relation to both the asylum seekers and the court.
Under these circumstances, the IND policy officers primarily applied an in-
strumental mode of response to court decisions in which the court criticized
the manner in which the asylum procedure was executed. As a consequence,
the impact of these court decisions remained limited to ad hoc adjustments to
administrative procedures and working practices.
7.3.2 THE CLARITY OF COURT DECISIONS
The foregoing quotes from IND policy officers already gave an indication of
their view of the judgments of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department.  1n
this section, the IND policy officers' view of judgments of the various courts
the IND has had to deal with will be described in more detail.
The authority of the court, it has been suggested, relates to the motivation of
its judgments.454 Nigel has poetically described the role of the court as 'giving
direction to a moral goal'. 455
The Court is supposed to lead alienated combatants towards the pursuit
of mutual accommodation. It should provide a forum for the application
of moral philosophy to public affairs. It should speak out as a prophet,
calling the nation back to its animating moral vision. It should be the
voice of the spirit, reminding us of our better selves.
Socio-legal studies have shown, however, that ambiguity in court decisions can
limit the impact of a court's judgment.456 The hypothesis was therefore that
inconsistent and unclear court decisions would limit the impact. The findings
of the present study show, however, that ambiguity in court decisions was  not
the main factor that affected the impact of the court decisions. The question
was rather to what extent the court was heard. It turned out that ambiguity iii
court decisions only influenced the rate at which adjustments were laid down
in formal regulations.
Policy officers of the IND speak about judicial authorities and their decisions in
terms of 'the competence' of the court and 'the significance' of particular
judgments. For instance, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department and the
Courts of Appeal are appeals courts that serve to guard the unity and develop-
ment  of law. Because of their competence,  the IND policy officers attach great
significance to the judgments of the appeals courts. Judgments of appeals courts,
including judgments of the European Court, are found  to  be of particular im-
454 De Werd 2003. p. 568.
455
Nagel 1989, p. 124.
456  See, for example, Halliday 2004: Hertogh 2001 and 1997; Neerhof 1995; Van Zoest
1992 and 1989.
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portance  if they imply a change  in case law.  If a judgment  of an appeals court
does not differ from the body of case law, the policy officers explained, the
IND can proceed with its working practices. Although this remark may be
illustrative of policy officers who apply an instrumental  mode of response  (and
primarily focus  on the letter of court decisions),  this was, according  to  the
policy officers, the main reason why the European Court's judgment in the
Dublin case had not led to an adjustment ofadministrative procedures.
In its judgments, the European Court usually elaborates on both the values and
principles at stake and the specific characteristics of the individual case in ques-
tion. However, the policy officers of the IND generally found judgments of
the European Court to be unclear: "Judgments of the European Court are
quite long, which does not benefit the clarity, and they often too specifically
deal with the individual case in question.',457 As a result, the judgments of the
European Court were  not,  as a  matter of course, found to be applicable to cases
other than the one in which the European Court had decided.
The judgment of the Hague Court of Appeal, on the other hand, was found
abundantly clear and even more clear than judgments of the Administrative
Jurisdiction Department. For example, in the AC case, "[T]he Hague Court of
Appeal dealt with all the objections that were raised in the judicial appeal,
while the Administrative Jurisdiction Department usually starts with the objec-
tion that is most likely to decide the case and then does not consider the re-
maining issues.',458 The Hague Court of Appeal mentioned seven reasons in
total why the AC procedure constituted in detention for which there was no
legal basis. From this judgment, the policy ofIcers could distill the unlawful
aspects that  had to be dealt with. Furthermore, the Hague Court of Appeal had
set a strict term, which stimulated the policy officers to respond within a short
period of time. Although the policy officers had considered the possibility to
shut the Application Center for a while, the conditions of residence in the
Application Center could be adjusted in time.
Judgments of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department were considered to
be clear, too, but they were also found to be concise. As a consequence, judg-
ments of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department left scope for new legal
proceedings  or,  as a policy oUicer of the Policy Execution staff unit put it,  they
led to 'a progressive understanding' of what the law required. 459 Furthermore,
the opinion that the Administrative Jurisdiction Department held to a legalistic
interpretation of the law was also expressed by the policy officers of the IND:
"The Administrative Jurisdiction Departnient bases its judgment on the literal
text of the Aliens Act,  even if a specific legal provision turns out to differ from
the  text of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Aliens Bill."460 An example  of
the Administrative Jurisdiction Department's interpretation of the law which
457 Interview policy officer no. 1.
458  Interview policy officer no. 7.
459 Interview policy officer no. 9.
460 Interview policy officer no. 2.
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turned out not to be in line with the policy intentions is the Administrative
Jurisdiction Department's interpretation of Article 4:6 of the General
Administrative Law Act. This example is elucidated in the textbox below.
Article 4:6 of the General Administrative Law Act
Article 4:6 of the General Administetive Law Act provided the possibility to
lodge a renewed asylum application on the basis of new facts and circumstances.
In several judgments, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department stated that
Artide 4:6 did not apply to facts and circumstances that could have been known
at the time the asylum seeker lodged his first application.461 The Administrative
Jurisdiction Department aimed to prevent that the IND would be flooded with
renewed applications, which would disturb an orderly handling of applications.
Thus, according to the Administrative Jurisdiction Department, the IND could
reject a renewed application that was based on facts or circumstances that could
have been known at the time of the first application by simply referring to the
earlier decision on the asylum application:
462
Even in the case of removal to a country where the asylum seeker claims
to face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR, the
Minister has to comply with procedures defined in national legislation.
(...)  Only in exceptional circumstances that concern the individual  case,
might it be necessary not to comply with these rules.
This strict interpretation ofArticle 4:6. however, became a subject of debate.  The
Administrative Jurisdiction Department's ititerpretation would imply that a re-
newed application of an asylum seeker who, due to psychological trauma or
shame, had not, during the handling of the first application,  told the IND about,
for example, torture or sexual abuse, could simply be rejected, while the aSyhin
seeker in question might rightfully fear inhuman treatment in the country of
origift.463 Because the Administrative Jurisdiction Department's interpretation of
Article 4:6 led to confusion among caseworkers about how to decide on renewed
asylum applications, the IND policy officers decided to explain the official inter-
pretation in an Interim Report  of the Aliens  Act Implementation Guidelines,  so  as
to prevent the removal of asylum seekers whose return to their country of origin
would be in cont:ravention with Article 3 of the ECHR.464
Despite the fact that the Administrative Jurisdiction Department adhered to a
strict interpretation of the law and only briefly motivated its judgments, how-
ever, the policy officers of the IND were able to interpret the Administrative
Jurisdiction Department's judgments. Besides, if the policy officers doubted
461 See judgments of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State.
September 5,20(11 UV 2001/285 and RV 2001 no. 61); October 8,2()01 (IV 2002/168
and R.V 2001 no. 6), March 5,2002 (IV 2002/125), and May 16, 2002 (IV 2002/222).
462 Administrative Jurisdiction Departnient of the Council of State, March  5,2002  (IV
2()02/125).
463 See Spijkerboer 2()02a, and Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken 2002, pp. 26-
27. See also UNHCR 2003.
464 TBV 2003/24, published iii the Staaiscourant of August 11, 2003, no.  152, p.  10. See
also, TK 2003-2004 19 637 no. 845, and TK 204)4-2005 19 637 no. 877.
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whether their interpretation was in line with the Administrative Jurisdiction
Department's intentions (which they did, for example, in the Age-Test case)
they brought new cases before the court. In the Age-Test case, it turned out
that the policy officers had not fully understood the Administrative jurisdiction
1)epartment's judgment. In a subsequent judgment concerning the age test of
unaccompanied minors, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department concluded
that the Minister still failed to comply with the requiremetits of Article 3:2 of
the Getieral Adininistrative Law Act. In response to this court decision, it took
the policy officers four months (instead of one) to prepare an official response.
A policy officer who was involved in the agency's response to tilese judgments
nientioned that it would have been more convenient for the IND if the Ad-
niinistrative Jurisdiction Department had been more specific in its earlier judg-
ment. The nianner in which the Administrative Jurisdiction Department
decides 'keeps you occupied'.465
Conclitsion
On the basis of the research findings, it can be concluded that, for the well-
trained lawyers of the IND, interpreting court decisions is generally not a diffi-
cult task. Only iii an exceptional case, the policy officers had difficulty in inter-
preting a court decision. When the policy officers did not fully understand
what the court had meant and doubted whether their interpretation would
stand up in a new judicial review procedure, it took more time before adjust-
ments were implemented. Therefore, anibiguity in court decisions infuenced
the rate at which adjustments were laid down in formal regulations.
However, the fact that IND policy officers primarily focused on the letter, and
paid less attetition  to the spirit  of a court decision,  had not so much  to  do  with
atiy ambiguity in the court decisions. This can rather be attributed to a lack of
legal conscientiousness among the IND policy officers. As a consequence, they
did not address the values and principles expressed in a court decision but pri-
marily focused on the words of the court ruling. In addition,  it has been argued
that, to some extent, the policy officers were stimulated to focus on the letter
of the court decisions by the characteristics of aliens law and, in particular, by
the manner in which the Administrative jurisdiction Department decided in
asylum cases. Still, the factors described so far do not yet completely explain the
policy officers' dominant mode of response. It will be argued that the policy
officers' instrumental mode of response gradually became an organizational
routine to which other factors, steminitig from the government agency's politi-
cal environment, contributed as well.
7.4 THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE IND
Iii addition to the factors examined above, the impact of court decisions can
also be inBuenced by factors emanating from the government agency's political
465 Interview policy officer no. 9.
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environment. In particular, the policy officers' commitment to the Minister's
policy goals, and pressures from Parliament, the media, and interest groups
have been defined as factors of importance. The extent to which these factors
have  infuenced the impact of court decisions will be described in this section.
7.4.1 COMMITMENT TO THE MINISTER'S POLICY GOALS
In Chapter 3, the first factor that relates to the government agency's political
environment and could influence the impact of court decisions was defined as
the policy officers' commitment to the Minister's policy goals. The assumption
was that policy officers who work at the middle management level of a gov-
ernment agency may demonstrate a strong commitment to the policy prefer-
ence of their political superior which could, in turn, limit the impact of court
decisions, especially if the content of the court decision was in contradiction
with the Minister's policy intentions. The findings of this study show that the
IND policy officers were indeed committed to the Minister's policy goals.
However, the effect of this conimitment on the impact of court decisions
turned out to be twofold. On the one hand, the policy officers' commitment
to the Minister's policy goals contributed to the fact that the policy officers
responded to court decisions within a short period of time, in particular to
court decisions that addressed the AC procedure. On the other hand, it con-
tributed to the fact that the court decisions were interpreted strictly, or rather
restrictively. In this section, I will explicate this observation.
In a report that was published in 2005 and that addressed the manner iii which
the IND handled regular residence permits, the Netherlands Court of Audit
noted that IND policy officers express a strong commitment to the Minister's
policy goals.466 On the basis of interviews with IND personnel, the Nether-
lands Court of Audit found that IND employees were very loyal to the man-
agement of the organization, while the management, in turn, showed a strong
loyalty to its political superior. As a consequence, the IND was inclined to go
along with policy measures which the management or political leaders whished
to implement, even when the organization was not ready to do so.467 This
happened, for instance, when the IND was supposed to take over administra-
tive tasks from the Aliens Police which, in the summer of 2004, resulted in a
backlog in the handling of regular residence permits and ultimately led to the
abovementioned investigation  of the Netherlands Court of Audit. One of the
reasons why the tasks of the Aliens Police were assigned to the IND was that
the IND faced a surplus of personnel  due  to the decreasing number of asylum
applications.468 In reallocating the tasks, however, the management of the IND
had underestimated the technical implications of combining varying data-
bases. In an interview, a policy officer commented on this incident: "At469
times, policy adjustments were implemented that afterwards appeared to be
466 TK 2004-2005 30 240 nos. 1-2.
467 TK 2004-2005 30 240 no. 1-2, p. 57.
468  'IND dreigt aan eigen succes ten onder te gaan', in: NRC Handelsblad, June 1, 2(102.
469   'Ook IND maakt soms beoordelingsfouten', in: De Folkskrant, May 4,2005.
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'one step too far' and, as a result, led to complications in the years thereafter. A
policy officer has little influence to prevent such mistakes. "470
Furthermore, the findings of the present study show that the policy officers
were well aware of the tasks that were assigned to the IND organization.  The
IND must prevent a backlog  in the handling of applications and restrict  the
costs for the accommodation of (rejected) asylum seekers.Iii general, the policy
officers did not find themselves in the position to question these policy goals or
the measures that were designed to attain them. The following statements of
IND policy officers illustrate their point of view: 471
It is the task of the Litigation staff unit to advise the Minister to what
extent political goals fit iii with the legal possibilities, or how to under-
pin a specific policy nieasure. However. what Parlia,nent or the Cabinet
want is not always feasible. Still, politics goes first atid, iii these itistances,
a legal form must be found that will be accepted by the Administrative
Jurisdiction Department.
If a court decision is unclear or leaves several possibilities, the Litigation
staff unit writes a memo and then it is the Minister who decides.
I have already mentioned that the IND policy officers kept an eye open for
court decisions that address 'the process'  for the handling of asylum applications
and, so it appeared, they were especially attentive to court decisions that ad-
dressed the accelerated AC procedure. The AC procedure fulfills an important
function in the asyluiii procedure. It serves to filter out manifestly unfounded
and abusive asylum applications that can be rejected without thorough investi-
gation. The asylum seekers in question are then no longer entitled to ac-472
commodation and must leave the Netherlands within 28 days. Two of the
court decisions examined had to do with the AC procedure: the AC case and
the Eurodgic case. In both cases, the IND policy officers dealt with the court
decision within a month after the court had published its judgment. A speedy
response to these court decisions was found to be important because a hold-up
in the AC procedure would mean that the asylum applications must be handled
in the normal asylum procedure, which cost more time and effort and, more-
over, meant additional costs for the accommodation of asylum seekers. In the
Eurodac case, the policy officers specifically considered the financial conse-
quences that followed from the court decision. In response to the Administra-
tive Jurisdiction Department's judgment, the policy officers informed the
IND's managing director that the IND might have to bear additional costs for
the  accommodation of asylum seekers, even before the Administrative Jurisdic-
non Department had published its judgment.
4741 Interview policy officer no. 9.
471  Interview policy officer rio. 3 and no. 4 respectively.
472  See TK 2()03-2(104 19 637 no. 826; TK 2002-2()03 19 637 no. 738, and TK 1993-1994
19 637 no. 104.
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The IND response to the Dublin case and the Age-Test case, on the other
hand, took much longer. In the Dublin case, for instance, it took almost two
months before  the then Deputy Minister of Justice answered questions  from
Meniber of Parliament Halsema (Groe,iLi,iks) and, in the Age-Test case, it even
took four months before the new Protocol for the age test had been approved.
On the other hand, these court decisions did not directly address the acceler-
ated procedure for the handling of asylum applications but rather the careful-
ness of the investigation. Nonetheless, in response to the Age-Test case, the
working practice of the radiologists was already adjusted within four days after
the Administrative Jurisdiction Department had published its judgment so that
the handling of asylum applications could continue. Thus, due to the fact the
AC procedure fulfilled a central function in the asylum procedure and the
policy officers were committed to the Minister's policy goals, court decisions
that addressed the AC procedure were dealt with within a short period of time.
On the other hand, the court decisions exaniined show that the policy officers'
conitiiitment to the Minister policy goals resulted in a restrictive interpretation
of court decisions that were in conflict with the Minister's policy intentions.
For instance, in the Deportation case, the Administrative Jurisdiction Depart-
ment's judgment directly affected the Minister's policy goals with regard to the
deportation of rejected asylum seekers. In response to this court decision, the
policy officers advised the Minister to postpone the obligatory departure of
Somali asylum seekers. The postponement of obligatory departure, however,
was only applicable to a narrowly defined group of Soniali asylum seekers,
since 'any rejected asylum seeker who cannot be deported would bring about
additional costs for accommodation.,473 Moreover, the response to this court
decision did not include a postponement of the handling of asylum applica-
tions. Only after the European Court had pronounced another interim measure
concertiing a Soniali alien who belonged to a majority group and the Adininis-
trative Jurisdiction Department had concluded that this new interim measure
prevented deportation of other Somali aliens as well, did the Minister of 1&1
decide to alter the asylum policy with regard to the admission of Somali asyluni
seekers. Furthennore, in the AC case and the Eurodac case, the adjustments
made to administrative procedures and working practice were designed in such
a way that they did no damage to the scheme of the AC procedure. In an
interview, a policy officer mentioned that he only felt able to use his discretion
if the court decision did not directly affect the Minister's policy goals.474 An
example of such a decision was the Administrative Jurisdiction Department's
judgtnent with regard to the interpretation of Article 4:6 of the General Ad-
ministrative Law Act (see textbox in section 7.3.2).
473 'Every asylum seeker that can be rejected saves the govern Illent about EUR 13.(IC)(1 on
accommodation.'The forrner IND's managing director quoted in: 'IND dreigt aan ci-
geti succes ten onder te gaan', NRC Handelsblad, Jutie  1, 21)(,2.
474  Interview policy officer no. 10.
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COitillisit),1
In respotise to the court decisions, the IND policy officers expressed a strong
commitment to the Minister's policy goals. Because they tried to prevent a
backlog in the handling of applications and restrict the cost for accommodation
of asylum seekers, it was generally considered important to quickly respond to
court decisions that could disrupt the timely handling of asylum applications.
Therefore, the policy officers' commitment to the Minister's policy goals was
sigtiificant to the impact of the court decisions. However, the policy officers'
comniitinent to the Minister's policy goals also limited the impact of court
decisions because, when confronted with a court decision, the policy officers
did not find themselves in the position to question specific policy measures or
the agency's priorities in executing the asylimi policy. ('.onsequently, the policy
officers primarily focused on the letter of a court decision and  did not take the
tinie to consider the agency's weigliing of iiiterests in light of tlle values atid
principles embedded in a court decision. The policy officers' conunitment to
the Minister's policy goals thus contributed to an instniniental mode of re-
sponse atid, at the sanie time, hindered the policy officers from applying a well-
considered mode of response. Therefore, the policy officers' commitment to
the Minister's policy goals linlited the impact of the values and principles em-
bedded in the court decisions in particular.
7.4.2 PRESSURE FROM PARLIAMENT
In addition to the policy officers' commitment to tlie Minister's policy goals, it
was suggested that pressure from Parliament may influence the impact of court
decisions as well. On the basis of the norniative principles of the Dutch
reclitsstaat described iii Chapter 2, it was expected that Parliament closely ob-
served the implementation of court decisions. The hypothesis was that the
impact of court decisions would be enhanced if Members of Parliament put
questions to the Minister about the manner in which court decisions are im-
plemented. Yet, the research findings show that pressure from Parliament not
only stimulated the IND to respond to Court decisions, they also contributed to
the fact that the IND policy officers focused on the letter of court decisions
and, as a result, applied an instrumental mode of response.
Since the 199Os, the Dutch asylum policy has frequently been the subject of
parliamentary debate. Members of Parliament, most notably members of oppo-
sition parties, have questioned the Minister of 1&1 (and formerly the Deputy
Minister of Justice) about the problems relating  to the admission of asylum
seekers. In February  1999, for instance, Member of Parlianient R.osenm8ller
(Groci,Links) asked for a parliamentary inquiry into the execution of the asylum
procedure.475 More recently, the age test of unaccompanied minors and the




deportation of rejected asylum seekers has given rise to (intense) parliamentary
debate.476
Those who observed the political context of the Dutch asylum policy have
argued that the political pressure from Parliament lias had a disturbing influence
on the IND as an organization. In their view, the asylum policy is characterized
as a tug-of-war between restrictive regulations on the one hand and the wish to
make exceptions in individual cases on the other. Because such a political di-
lemma usually results in ad hoc policy measures, it is argued, the IND is acting
like an oyster, a closed and defensively operating organization: 477
First, the Aliens Act had to be adjusted, then the return policy and, in
addition, tasks of the Aliens Police were supposed to be carried out by
the IND. The organization is constantly confronted with policy activi-
ties. It shows so little respect for the employees, who make every effort
to perform their tasks well.  (.. .) And the political sentiment is predict-
able, too. Politicians will proclaim it is absolutely necessary to intervene,
while they themselves have caused the problems in the first place.
Because asylum policy is so susceptible to political debate, the IND policy
officers were generally well aware  of the notion that 'mistakes'  and, in particu-
lar,  a backlog in the handling of asylum applications  must be prevented. There-
fore, court decisions that criticized the manner in which the asylum procedure
was executed and which could cause a backlog in the handling of asylum appli
cations received immediate attention. Parliamentary pressure thus stimulated
the IND to respond to court decisions.
However, pressure from Parliament also limited the extent to which court
decisions had an impact. In section 7.3.1, I explained that the characteristics of
aliens law stimulated the IND policy officers to just focus on the letter of court
decisions and pay less attention to their spirit. Since Parliament, or at least a
majority in Parliament, agreed to the legal context in which the asylum policy
niust be executed, Parliament has partly contributed to the fact that the IND
policy officers applied an instruniental (rather than a well-considered) mode of
response.
Furthermore, the cases examined show that Members of Parliament did ask
questions about specific court decisions. In three cases, the court decision was
the subject of parliamentary questions: the Dublin case, the Age-Test case, and
the Deportation case. In the Age-Test case, persistent pressure from Members
of Parliament may have been a contributory factor in the eventual installation
of an Age Test Commission that monitors  the age test procedure which,  in  this
study, was considered as ati example of a well-considered response. In the
Deportation case, however, the policy officers were given little leeway to ad-
476 See section 5.6.
477 Boonstra cited in Jansen & Prij 2004. See also:  Hes  1999, pp.  54-56.
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dress the spirit of the court decision. In fact, because parliamentary questions
had to be answered, the emphasis was placed on the letter of the court deci-
sion. This peculiar influence of parliamentary pressure in the aftermath of a
court decision was explained by a policy officer of the Policy Execution staff
unit who stated: "If Members of Parliament put questions before the Minister
about the implementation of a court decision, it usually means that a represen-
tative  of the Department of Aliens Affairs is actively involved  in the response  to
the court decision and sees to a restrictive interpretation of the court deci-
„478sion.
Conchision
On the basis of the research findings, it can be concluded that, by monitoring
the  execution  of the asylum polic'>, Parliament stimulated  the IND policy
officers to respond to court decisions. However, pressure from Parliament also
limited the impact of court decisions. Since (a majority in) Parliament gave its
approval to the terms and legal conditions for the handling of asylum applica-
tions, it contributed to the fact that the IND policy officers applied an instru-
mental mode of response. In response to the court decisions examined, they
hardly paid any attention to the values and principles embedded in a court
decision and just focused on the court ruling. Furthermore, the research find-
ings suggest that, when Members of Parliament put questions to the Minister
about the implications of a specific court decision, the policy officers generally
emphasized the letter of the court decision in question. Thus, although persis-
tent pressure from Parliament stimulated the IND to respond to court deci-
sions, they limited the impact of especially the spirit of court decisions.
7.4.3 THE MEDIA
Parliamentary debates about the execution of the asylum policy usually go
together with reports in the media. Policy problems that are the subject of
political debate generally receive media attention and, if the media address
specific issues concerning the admission or residence of asylum seekers, they
often become the subject of parliamentary debate. Since the media have  come
to play a prominent role in the policy process, the hypothesis was that the
impact of a court decision would be enhanced if the media reported on the
outcome  of the court decision.
Since the 1990s, the IND and its political superior have been frequently criti-
cized in the media for the manner in which the asylum policy was executed.
Firstly, in the mid-199Os, the backlog in the handling of asylum applications
gave cause for concern.479 The delay in the asylum procedure meant that asy-
lum seekers stayed in an asylum seekers' reception center for more than two
years.   In   the   fall  of 1998, housing asylum seekers in tents seemed  the  only
478 Interview pOlicy officer no. 10.
479 'Asielbeleid deugt nog steeds niet; enorme vertraging bu afhandeling zaken', in: Trouw,
October 6, 1995. 'Schmitz wijst weer kritiek van de hand', in: Trouw, May 26, 1996.
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possibility to accommodate the large number of asylum seekers, but tlien, the
conditions of the reception facilities gave rise to criticism.480 Furthermore,
there were, of course, 'the incidents' of rejected unaccompanied minors who
rebelled against the daily regime  in the closed reception center,  and of rejected
asylum seekers who resisted their deportation.
In the press, the IND has been depicted as 'the most criticized government
agency' or 'a bunker'.481 Referring to reports of the National Ombudsman,
newspapers reported that the 'IND is too lax in implementing court deci-
sions and 'IND does not care about court decisions.,483 But, in comparison,482
to the attention given to the problems in the execution of the asylum proce-
dure, the media seldom gave attention  to the outcome of court decisions  or  the
issues that were the subject oflegal proceedings.
With regard to the court decisions examined, newspapers did mention the
Hague Court of Appeal's judgment in  the  AC  case and especially the Age-Test
case received much attention. The media attention given to the Age-Test case
may  indeed have contributed  to the ilnpact  of this specific court decision.
Shortly after the Administrative Jurisdiction Department had decided on the
Age-Test case, the Minister of I&I decided to establish an Age Test Commis-
sion. However, the overall impression from interviews with the IND policy
officers is that they have become used to the negative picture the media have
sketched of the organization. They attribute the gulf between the media pic-
ture and their own experience to the ignorance of both the public and the
media about the actual situation in specific cases. The only thing they can do,




Although the media did report  on the outcome of some of the court decisions
examined, the research findings suggest that the news coverage of distressing
asylum cases and problems in the execution of the asyluni procedure had a
more profound itifluence on the policy officers' response to the court decisions.
It appears that the continuous media attention the IND has been exposed to
have stimulated the IND policy officers to adopt an instrumental mode of
response in which the focus is on the letter of a court decision. Moreover, the
possibility that 1ND policy officers could have applied a well-considered mode
of response may have been frustrated by the negative image the media created
480  'Kok: opvangen asielzoekers kan niet nieer', in: De Volkskrant, October 3, 1998. 'Dit
gaat te ver; Tentopvalig kan zo tiiet', in: Trouw, October 14,  1998.
481  See, for example, 'De bunkermetitaliteit van de IND', iii: NRC Handelsblad, February 2,
1998.
'De klachten konien uit de vreemdelingenhoek', in: De Folkskrant, March  19,  2003.
482  'IND te laks met vonnissen rechter', in: De Folkskrant, March 19,2(103.
483  'IND slaat vonnissen rechter in de wind', in: NRC Handelsblad, July 4,2005.
484 Interview policy officer no. 2.
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of the organization that yet finds it difficult to be open and, instead, tries to
avoid (negative) publicity.
7.4.4 INTEREST GROUPS
The final factor that was thought to be of importance for the impact of court
decisions  was the influence ofinterest groups. The hypothesis was  that, if inter-
est groups were actively involved in the policy execution, they would be able
to enhance the impact of court decisions. It turtied out, however, that although
interest groups were actively involved in the execution of the asylum proce-
dure, they did not fulfill a significant role in the agency's response to the court
decisions. Of course,  in  the AC  case and the Eurodac case, interest groups  and,
more specifically, the asylum seekers' attorneys were informed about the
changes in working practices since they have their offices at the Application
Center. However, their influence on the 131) response was more profound485
iii the period that resulted in the court cases.
Because of tlieir expert knowledge, interest groups are aware of the legal diffi-
culties in the execution of the asylum procedure and, if necessary,  they file an
appeal with the court. In three of the cases examined, interest groups fulfilled a
prominent role. Firstly, they filed an appeal with the Civil Division of the
Hague District Court against the lengthening of the AC procedure from 24 to
48 hours, which eventually resulted in the judgment of the Hague Court of
Appeal concerning the conditions of residence in the Application Center (the
AC case). Secondly, interest groups challenged the age test of unaccompanied
minors, which led to a judgment of the Administrative Jurisdiction Department
in which the court concluded that the reports of the age test must be signed by
the radiologists and that the Minister of 1&1 must know their names  (the Age-
Test   case). Finally, interest groups fulfilled an active   role in questioning   the
deportation of rejected asylum seekers to northern Somalia (the Deportation
case).
The disproportionately involvement of interest groups in the cases examined
can be explained by the distinction Galanter makes between 'one-shotters' and
'repeat players'.486 Because repeat players take part in legal proceedings regu-
larly, they have developed expert knowledge and, in comparison with one-
shotters, have a better understanding of their chances of winning a case in
court. Since repeat players frequently appear in court, they become familiar to
the judges who, in addition, will consider their claims more seriously than
those of an inexperienced one-shotter. Moreover, while one-shotters are fo-
cused on winning the individual case, repeat players are more interested in
in luencing the interpretation of a general rule for the benefit of a series of
cases.
485 Iii the AC case, the policy officers were not so willing to inform the asylum seekers'
attorneys, since the interest groups had caused the problems the IND had to deal with in




In accordance with Galanter's definition, interest groups can be regarded as
repeat players. Owing to the developnients in asylum law, not only the IND
has become better organized, the asylum seekers' attorneys had to adopt a more
professional approach as well.487 It has already been mentioned that, under the
former Aliens Act, the asylum seekers' attorneys were used to an active in-
volvement of the court in reexamining the merits of an asylum seeker's case
and, since the Administrative Jurisdiction Department acts as an appeals court,
the asylum seekers' attorneys had to adjust to the strict manner in which judi-
cial review took place. Because of their expert knowledge and experience,
interest groups and associations of attorneys were able to do so. At present,
interest groups act as repeat players who, because of their expert knowledge,
have a better chance of winning their judicial appeal than an individual one-
shotter. Besides, because they bring up issues that concern a specific group of
asylum seekers, the court decisions on these cases will most likely require an
administrative response.
Conclusion
Contrary to what was expected, interest groups were not involved in the
IND's response to the court decisions. However, the contribution of interest
groups to the impact of court decisions was not insignificant. Because interest
groups brought cases to court that concerned a particular group of asylum
seekers, the court decisions in question could necessitate the IND to respond.
Although their attempts were not always successful, by starting legal proceed-
ings, interest groups were  so to speak 'the initiators'  of an impact process.  They
created the opportunity for the IND to learn from court decisions.
7.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the factors that influenced the impact of court decisions were
examined. The question was what factors stimulated the IND policy officers to
respond to court decisions (in an instrumental manner), and what factors hin-
dered or prevented them to more carefully take into account the spirit of the
court decisions. Three factors in particular turned out to have contributed to
the fact that the IND policy officers responded to court decisions. On the
other hand, some of the factors identified (also) limited the impact of court
decisions.
Factors Enhancing tile Impact
The first factor that contributed  to the impact of court decisions was the policy
officers' commitment to the Minister's policy goals. Because the policy officers
were committed to the Minister's policy goals, they saw to a speedy response
to court decisions that could disrupt a timely handling of asylum applications.
Secondly, pressure from Parliament made the IND policy officers attentive to
487 Boeles 2002.
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court decisions. The policy officers were on the alert for court decisions that
could disrupt the asylum procedure and, consequently, cause a backlog in the
handling of asylum applications because this could lead to parliamentary ques-
tions. And, if Members of Parliament had questioned the Minister about the
consequences of a particular court decision,  it was difficult for the IND policy
officers not to respond to the court decision in question. Thirdly, the IND
appeared to be a professional organization that had become used to responding
to court decisions. Owing to the policy officers' legal competence and the
speedy and extensive exchange of legal knowledge and information, the IND
was able to respond to the court decisions within a short period oftime.
Factors Limiting tile Impaa
On the other hand, some of the 6.-tors identified hindered the IND policy
otlicers from applying a well-considered mode of response and, in that way,
limited the extent to which court decisions had an impact. Firstly, the IND
policy officers showed a lack of legal conscientiousness. 1n deciding over the
consequences of a court decision, the policy officers based their decision  on  the
IND's operational goal, that is, a timely handling of asylum applications. The
(other) values and principles expressed in the court decisions, such as 'the care-
fulness of decisions' or 'safeguarding the asylum seekers' human rights' were
given far less attention. Besides,  this lack of legal conscientiousness was closely
related to the policy officers' commitment to the Minister's policy goals. It
turned out that the policy officers specifically focused on the court ruling (and
paid little attention to the values and principles that were expressed in the court
decision),   if a court decision  was  in  conflict  with the Minister's policy goals.
The findings of this study thus show the 'policy tension' that may arise be-
tween the message of the court and the policy the agency is supposed to im-
plement, which Hertogh defined as a barrier to the impact of court decisions.488
However, the policy officers' lack of consideration for the spirit of court deci-
sions also  had to  do  with the characteristics  of the field of aliens law. Aliens law
is a strongly juridified field of law, in which procedures and time limits are
specified in detail. Besides, a relatively large number of IND decisions result in
judicial appeal. Furthermore, the appeals court in aliens law adheres to a strict
interpretation  of the law. The research findings suggest that these characteristics
of aliens law stimulated the IND policy officers to apply an instrumental mode
of response or, to put it in a different way, did not stimulate them to apply a
well-considered mode of response. Therefore, the characteristics of aliens law
limited the impact specifically of the values and principles embedded in the
court decision. The clarity of court decisions,  in that regard, turned out to be a
factor of secondary importance. Policy officers found court decisions to be clear
if the court addressed all the issues raised in the judicial appeal. However, even
when the court clearly considered all the issues of the appeal, the policy officers
hardly paid any attention to the values and principles addressed in the court
decision.
488 Hertogh 1997b. See also Hertogh 2001, and Canon 1991.
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Furthermore, pressure from Parliament turned out to have had a negative side
effect with regard to the extent to which court decisions had an impact. Since
(a majority in) Parliament agreed to the way in which the asylum procedure
niust be executed,  it  has  in fact created the characteristics of asylum law, which,
as has just been mentioned, limited the impact of the values and principles
expressed in the court decisions. Moreover, if members of opposition parties
asked the Minister questions about the implications of a court decision,  it gen-
erally meant that emphasis was placed on the letter of the court decisions in
question.
As to the influence of the media on the impact of court decisions,  it has been
mentioned that the attention given to the Age-Test case might have contrib-
uted to the impact of this specific court decision. However, for the rest, the
media hardly drew any attention to issues that were subject to legal proceed-
ings. Moreover, by focusing attention on distressing asylum cases and on prob
lems in the execution of the asylum procedure, the media stimulated the IND
policy officers to strictly focus on 'the rules'. Thus, although the media may
contribute to the impact of court decisions, it appeared that influences from  the
media rather limited than enlianced the impact of court decisions.
Tlie Start of the Process
Finally, interest groups did not influence the impact of the court decisions,
simply because they were not involved in the agency's response. However,
since they were able to raise issues that concerned a specific group of asylum
seekers, and court decisions in these cases usually necessitated the IND policy
officers to respond, interest groups turned  out  to be of vital importance  to  the





Consciousness is not a prerequisite of action; individuals and societal units
ofteii act without awareness of their actiotis, of themselves, or of others.
Consciousness is, however, a prerequisite of an active unit, one which is
self-reviewing and self-correcting in order to realize more fully its values.
- Amitai Etzioni (1968)
Iii: 7'he Active Society, p. 226
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This study shed light on the impact of court decisions on the Dutch asylum
procedure. The study focused iii particular on the response of the policy offi-
cers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) to court decisions
criticizing the manner in which the agency executed the asyluin procedure. 489
Furthermore, attention was paid to the factors that influenced the policy offi-
cers' response. The central question was:
How do policy officers of the IND respond to court decisions that ad-
dress the asylum procedure, and what factors limit or enhance the court
decisions' impact?
This chapter provides an overview of the main research findings. Sections 8.2
and 8.3 summarize the findings with regard to the IND policy officers' re-
sponse to court decisions, and the factors that influenced the court decisions'
impact.  Next, in section 8.4, the research findings are considered in light of the
underlying theme of this study. The section addresses the question of how the
IND niay learn more from court decisions. The chapter concludes with some
suggestions for future research.
8.2 ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE TO COURT DECISIONS
In this study, the policy officers' response to court decisions was explored by
identifying four possible modes of administrative response. The four modes of
response followed from the distinction that was made between the letter and the
spidt of court decisions. The four modes of administrative response differ as to
the manner in which a government agency learns from court decisions. They
were labeled as the well-considered response, the instrumental response, the
principle-based response, and the non-response.
489 This study  did  not go into the impact of court decisions on the handling of individual
asylum cases. Other studies considered that subject in more detail. See, for example, the
Report of the National Ombudsman no. 2(*)3/385.
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Iii a well-considered mode of response, the policy offcers address both the
ultimate court ruling and the values expressed in the court decision. The policy
officers examine to what extent administrative procedures and working prac-
tices are in contravention with the court ruling and consider the possibility that
the non-conformity detected was caused by an imbalance in the agency's
weighing of interests. Policy officers who apply a well-considered response use
the values embedded in the court decision to question the organization's nor-
mative assumptions. If policy officers apply a well-considered mode of re-
sponse,  it has been suggested, the government agency is capable of double-loop
learning. As a result, the effect of the court decision includes both adjustments
to administrative procedures that are meant to bring administrative working
practices in conformity with the court ruling and measures that are meant to
ensure that a similar mistake is not easily made.
In an instrumental  mode of response, the policy officers primarily focus on the
letter of the court decision: the breach of a specific rule. They search for ways
to correct the detected error and take measures to bring administrative working
practices in accordance with the court ruling. In an instrumental mode of re-
sponse, however, the policy oUicers do not address the spirit of a court deci-
sion. They do not use the values and principles expressed in the court decision,
for example, to question the organizational normative assumptions or to fash-
ion a response that differs from the court ruling. When policy officers apply an
instrumental mode of response, it has been suggested, the government agency
shows a single-loop learning process: The court decisions result in ad hoc ad-
justments to administrative procedures and working practices. However, the
court decisions have no effect on the organization's normative assumptions that
define effective performance.
In a principle-based mode of response, the policy officers primarily address  the
spirit of the court decision. In response to the court decision, they refer to the
law's general intention or the court considerations, but do not fully follow the
letter of tlie court decision,  because  they do not agree with the court ruling. As
a consequence, the effect of the court decision cannot be directly assessed.
After a period of time, it may become clear whether administrative working
practices and official rules are brought into conformity with one another, and
whether the court decision has contributed to this development. When it turns
out that administrative working practices and the official rules still differ from
one another,  the impact of the court decision has clearly been minimal.
Finally, iii the non-response mode, no reference is made to the spirit or to the
letter of the court decision. The policy officers do not respond to court deci-
sions at all, due to ignorance or resistance, and, therefore, the government
agency does not learn from the court decisions. Consequently, court decisions
have no effect on adnlinistrative procedures and working practices whatsoever.
The four modes of administrative response form a conceptual framework that
serves to analyze the policy officers' response to court decisions. By means of
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this model, it was possible to deterniine the IND policy officers' dominant
mode of response and subsequently examine what factors influenced their
response.
8.2.1 THE IND POLICY OFFICERS' DOMINANT MODE OF RESPONSE
In this study, the IND policy officers' response to five court decisions was
examined in detail. The court decisions came from three different courts,
though all five judgments specifically addressed the asylum procedure and, as
such, required a reaction by the IND. The first court decision examined was a
judgment of the European Court of Human R.ights and dealt with the transfer
of asylum seekers on the basis of the Dublin Convention. The second judg-
ment came from the Hague Court of Appeal. In this judgment, the Hague
Court of Appeal concluded that the conditions of residence in the Application
Center constituted detention for which there was no legal basis. In addition,
the IND policy officers' response to three judgments of the Administrative
Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State was examined. The first ad-
dressed the intake of asylum seekers and, more specifically, the comparison of
asylum seekers' fingerprints in the EU database called Eurodac. The second
judgment of the Administrative jurisdiction Division dealt with the manner in
which the age test of unaccompanied minors was conducted. And in the final
judgment, the Administrative Jurisdiction Department concluded that, because
of the motivation given, an interim measure of the European Court prevented
deportation of rejected Somali asylum seekers to northern Somalia.
The IND policy officers' response to the court decisions was described by
means of Hertogh's implementation model.49  In this model, three phases are
distinguished: the phase of information, the phase of transformation, and the
phase of processing. While the phase of information and the phase of transfor-
mation provided insight into the policy officers' consideration with regard to a
specific court decision, the phase of processing shed light  On the ultimate effect
of the court decision. On the basis of the empirical inquiry, the IND policy
officers' dominant mode of response was assessed. It followed that the IND
policy officers primarily focused on the court ruling and paid little attention to
the values and principles that were expressed in a court decision. The IND
policy officers mainly applied an instrumental mode of response.  As a result,  the
court decisions had an effect on administrative procedures and working prac-
tices. However, the effect of the court decisions was limited to ad hoc adjust-
ments, and did not include measures that were meant to secure that the asylum
procedure is executed in accordance with the values and principles embedded
in the court decisions.
4,4 Hertogh  1997.  Hertogh 2(}(11.
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8.3 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE IMPACT OF COURT DECISIONS
In order to explain the IND policy officers' dominant mode of response, this
study examined what factors influenced the IND policy oficers' response to
the court decisions examined. From impact studies and the body of literature
on policy implementation, nine hypotheses were distilled that each defined a
factor that could limit or enhance the impact of court decisions. Following
Halliday's study, the factors were grouped into three domains.491 Three factors
were identified with regard to the characteristics of the government agency: the
policy officers' legal competence, the dissemination of legal knowledge and
information, and the policy officers' legal conscientiousness. With regard to the
domain of the law, tWO factors were identified that could influence the impact
of court decisions: the characteristics of the field of law,  and the clarity of court
decisions. Finally, four hypotheses were examined with regard to factors relat-
ing to the political environment of the government agency. These addressed
the policy officers' conimitment to the Minister's policy goals, pressure from
Parliament, influences  from the media,  and  the  role of interest groups.
In this study, the hypotheses were tested against empirical data. The following
section provides an overview of how the various factors influenced the IND
policy officers' response and, in that way, the impact of the court decisions
examined.
8.3.1 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE IND POLICY OFFICERS' RESPONSE
The study into the factors that could influence the impact of court decisions
focused on the question of what factors stimulated the IND policy officers to
respond to court decisions (in an instrumental manner) and what factors hin-
dered or prevented them to more carefully take into account the spirit of the
court decisions. Starting with the characteristics of the IND, this section pro-
vides an overview of how the factors identified influenced the IND policy
officers' response.
Characteristics of the IND
Firstly, the policy officers' legal competence as well as the nianner in which
they disseminated legal knowledge and information across the agency turned
out to have contributed  to the impact of court decisions. The research findings
suggest that the policy officers of the IND are legal professionals who are used
to responding to court decisions. Due to their legal competence and the exten-
sive dissemination of legal knowledge and information, the IND was able to
respond to court decisions within a short period of time. The research findings
suggest that for court decisions to have an impact, the policy officers niust be
well versed in the law and disseminate their legal knowledge and information
across the organization.
491  Halliday 2004.
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However, the extent of specialization can become an obstacle  for the extent  to
which court decisions have an impact. If organizational routines come to
dominate at the expense of the policy officers' legal conscientiousness, the
inipact of court decisions is limited. In line with Halliday's definition, legal
co,iscientiousness was defined as the policy officers' cominitnient to legality;
their effort to apply legal knowledge to  the full range of their decision-making
and advisory tasks. 2 As to the policy officers of the IND, however, this study
shows that their attitude to the law was subject to other, political and organiza-
tional, interests and, therefore, they focused on the letter of the court decision
and hardly considered the values and principles that were expressed in a court
decision. Moreover, those policy officers who had doubts about the manner in
which court decisions were interpreted did not express their discoiitent with
the organization's priorities. Consequently, the Court decisions did not result in
measures that were illeallt to safeguard the legal quality of the agency's func-
tioning.  Thus, due to a lack of legal conscientiousness ainong IND policy offi-
cers, the itiipact of court decisions and, in particular, the inipact of the values
and principles set out in a court decision was limited.
Die Lati,
In this study, it has been argued that the characteristics of Dutch aliens law
contributed to the fact that the INI) policy officers applied an instrumental
mode of response. Firstly, Dutch aliens  law  is a highly juridified field  of law
and therefore might be quite different from other fields of administrative law,
such as social security law or tax law. The large number of legal proceedings in
asylum cases and the strict deadlines the IND must meet appeared to have
stimulated the IND policy officers to focus on the letter of court decisions.
Besides, the characteristics of aliens law and, in particular, the strict manner in
which the Administrative Jurisdiction Department interprets the law turned out
to foster both the agency interests (at the expense of the interests of asylum
seekers) and the agency autonoiny (at the expense ofjudicial control). 1n that
way, the characteristics of aliens law limited the impact of the values and prin-
ciples expressed in the court decisions.
In  addition, the clarity of court decisions turned out  to  be a factor of secondary
importance to the impact of court decisions. For the well-trained lawyers of
the INI), interpreting court decisions was generally not a difficult task. More-
over, unanibiguous court decisions could not prevent  that  the IND policy
officers primarily focused on the letter of the court decision, while in instances
where the IND policy officers found a court decision ambiguous and therefore
difficult to interpret, it only took more time before the court decision was
translated into practical consequences.
492  Halliday 2(M)4.
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Tlie Political Enviro,mient of the IND
As to the political environment of the government agency, this study shows
that the policy officers' commitment to the Minister's policy goals influenced
the impact of the court decisions. In accordance with what was expected, the
IND policy officers expressed a strong commitment to the Minister's policy
goals. However, this conitiumient not only limited the impact of court deci-
sions,  it  in fact, turned out  to  be an essential factor to the impact of court deci-
sions. Because the IND policy officers were committed to the Minister's policy
goals, they saw to a speedy response to court decisions that might disrupt a
timely handling of asylum applications.  On the other hand, the research find-
ings suggest that, due to the policy officers' commitment, the consequences of
the court decisions were interpreted strictly: The IND policy officers focused
on the court ruling and hardly paid any attention to the values and principles
that were embedded in a court decision. The policy officers' commitment thus
enhanced the impact of the letter of court decisions and, at the same time,
limited the impact of the spirit ofcourt decisions.
Similarly, influences from Parliament turned out to have had a dual effect as
well. On the one hand, pressure from Parliament made the IND policy officers
on the alert for court decisions.  I f Members of Parliament asked  the  Minister of
1&1 about the consequences of a specific court decision, it was difficult for the
IND policy officers not to respond to the court decision in question. However,
since (a majority in) Parliament gave its approval to the terms and legal condi-
tions for the handling of asylum applications, it contributed to the fact that the
IND policy officers, in response to court decisions, hardly paid any attention to
the values and principles embedded in a court decision and just focused on the
court ruling. Moreover, if Members of opposition parties asked the Minister
questions about the implications  of a specific court decision, it generally meant
that emphasis was placed on the letter of the court decision. Thus, although
persistent pressure from Parliament stimulated the IND to respond to court
decisions, influences from Parliament also limited the impact of particularly  the
spirit of court decisions.
As to the role of the media, it has been suggested that the media can contribute
to the impact of court decisions if it addresses the issues at stake in a judicial
process. However, since the niedia sketched a negative image of the IND or-
ganization, they appear to have limited rather than enhanced the impact of
court decisions. Finally, and contrary to what was expected, interest groups
were not actively involved in the agency's response to court decisions. How-
ever, since they filed appeals with the court that concerned a particular group
of asylum seekers,  they can be regarded as 'the initiators' of the whole process.





To conclude this section, Figure 8.1 pictures the factors examined in relation
to the three phases of Hertogh's implementation model. lt shows that some of
the factors identified influenced the interpretation of the court decisions, while
other factors played a role during the transformation of a court decision. A
number of factors, however, could not be linked to one of the three phases of
the implementation model but turned out to have a niore general influence on
the IND policy officers' attitude to the law.
Figure 8.1: Factors influencing the impact of court decisions:  The  IND and its
environment.
Pressure Commitment
Interest The from to the Minister's














the  Field  of Law
8.4   LEARNING FROM COURT DECISIONS
A remarkable finding of this study is that the IND policy officers responded to
the five court decisions examined. Although the policy officers' response to the
court decisions was mainly instrumental, to a certain extent, the message of the
court was heard. As a result, the court decisions had a procedural effect. The
changes in administrative procedures that followed from a court decision were
laid down in work instructions and/or the Aliens Act Implementation Guide-
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lines:93 The research findings thus suggest that the current balance of power
between Parliament, the government agency, and the court enables the IND to
learn from court decisions. However, the research findings also suggest  that,  if a
more considered response to court decisions is preferred, additional conditions
must be met. The conditions have to do with the IND as an organization, the
role of the Administrative jurisdiction  Department  of the Council of state,  and
the role of Parliament.
Tlie IND
The research findings show that the IND is a professional organization that is
capable of adequately interpreting court decisions. The policy officers' profes-
sional attitude to court decisions seems to logically follow from the develop-
ments that took place in the field of aliens law since 1994. In that year, the
IND became a government agency, which was assigned the difficult task to
execute a restrictive asylum policy. In addition, the influx of asylum seekers  in
the mid-199()s, and the large numbers of appeal procedures against IND deci-
sions, called for more efficiency in the handling of asylum applications.  On the
basis of the Aliens Act 2000, the IND niust meet strict time limits, while it has
to base its decisions on qualitative information that is difficult to assess. More-
over, since decisions on asylum application address matters of great iinportance,
the execution of the asylum policy has been frequently subject of political
debate. This study shows that this specific legal and political context in which
the IND is operating contributed to the fact that the IND policy officers
mainly applied an instrumental mode ofresponse.
However, if a well-considered response is preferred, the management of the
IND organization could stimulate the policy officers' legal conscientiousness.
As mentioned, policy officers who are legally conscientious express a commit-
ment to legality. The perceived lack of legal conscientiousness among IND
policy officers, however, had mainly to do with their role perception with
regard to their political superiors. The IND policy officers considered it to be
their task to strictly execute the policy goals the Cabinet (and Parliament) had
set. And since the goals in asylum policy required a timely handling of asylum
applications, the policy officers did not consider the agency's priorities in light
of the other values and principles expressed in a court decision, such as 'the
carefultiess  of decision-making'  or the  'asylum  seekers' human rights'.
In principle, the policy officers' role perception with regard to their political
superiors is in accordance with the doctrine of the separation of politics and
administration. As I have explained in Chapter 2, this doctrine aims to foster
political leadership as well as administrative expertise. In the context of the
Dutch democratic reclitsstaat, this doctrine is explicated by two components: the
493 This study was confined to the.formal effects of court decisions:the possible changes in
the agency's internal rules and regulations,  and  the dissemination of these standards.  This
study did not address the question ot whether a procedural effect had actually resulted in
a behavioral change among front-line officers and external parties (See Chapter 3).
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primacy   of  politics   and  administrative tietitrality. This means that the administration
should be directed from the Cabinet of Ministers, and may not interfere in the
political process.  In accordance with the doctrine of the separation of politics
and administration, the policy officers of the IND leave it to the Cabinet  (and
Parliament)  to set out the goals of the asylum policy. However, the manner iii
which the asylum policy is executed must comply with national as well as
international rules and regulations, and, in its judgments, the court gives direc-
tion about how statutes are to be interpreted.
In this study, it has been argued that, for a government agency to fully learn
from feedback information set out in a court decision, the policy officers
should address both the letter and the spirit of a court decision.  Only  then,  the
agency would be able of double-loop (rather than single-loop) learning.  Dou-
ble-loop learning requires that members of the organization are open to errors
detected in the organization's functioning and question the organization's un-
derlying norms and assumptions that define effective performance on the basis
of this feedback information. To develop such a reflective attitude among IND
policy officers, the political and administrative management of the IND could
stimulate the policy ofIcers' legal conscientiousness, and create an atmosphere
where people working in the organization share their professional views about
the manner in which the asylum procedure is executed. The fact that the IND
is 'just' an executive agency does not imply that the organization is not allowed
to reflect on the feasibility of the organization's operational goals in light of
court decisions.  On the contrary, the IND organization itself is responsible for
the legality of its working practices,  and it  is  up  to  IND  management to guar-
antee the legal quality  of the government agency's functioning.
The Court
In this study, five judgments were examined which came from three different
courts: the European Court of Human Rights, the Hague Court of Appeal,
and the Administrative Jurisdiction Department of the Council of State. This
study shows that the court decisions were seldom the end of a discussion. In
fact, they formed part of an ongoing process of policy adjustments, legal pro-
ceedings, and adjustments to administrative procedures.
The clarity of the court decisions was mainly studied from the IND policy
of cers' perspective. In general, the policy officers were able to distill from the
court decision the error the IND had made in executing the asylum procedure.
However, the European Court's judgment in the Dublin case as well as its
interim measures in the Deportation case were found to deal too SpeCifiCally
with the individual case in question. Therefore, the European Court's decisions
were  not,  as a matter of course, found  to be applicable to other asylum seekers'
cases. In the Dublin case, the official interpretation of the European Court's
judgment was confirmed in a judgment of the Administrative jurisdiction De-
partment. However, in the Deportation case, the Administrative jurisdiction
Department judged that, because of the nature of the motivation given, the
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interim measure of the European Court had consequences for other asylum
seekers as well.
The judgment of the Hague Court of Appeal, on the other hand, was found
abundantly clear and even more clear than the judgments of the Administrative
jurisdiction Department, which were generally found to be (too) concise. Still,
in response to the judgments of the appeals courts, the policy oRicers primarily
focused on the letter of the court decision.  In this study, it has been suggested
that the IND policy officers' instrumental mode of response was partly the
result of the manner in which the Administrative Jurisdiction Department
decided in aliens law cases. While the Appeals Court allows the Minister of I&I
(i.e., the IND) much discretion on how to pursue the goals of the asylum
policy, it adheres to a strict interpretation  of the law.
If a well-considered response of the IND policy officers is preferred, therefore,
the IND and the court should learn to more fully understand one another.
When policy officers mention that they find judgments of the Administrative
jurisdiction Department to be too concise, it is up to the Appeals Court to
direct them more clearly. Still,  the fact that the policy officers of the  IND  paid
little attention to the values and principles embedded in a court decision
stemmed first and foremost from the policy officers' role perception with re-
gard to their political superiors.
Parliament
Due to its legislative and controlling powers, Parliament has the ability to influ-
ence the impact of court decisions. The findings of this study suggest  that pres-
sure from Parliament stimulated the IND policy officers to quickly respond to
court decisions. However, pressure froni Parliament also contributed to the fact
that, in response to the court decisions, the emphasis was placed on the letter of
a court decision and, as a result, the IND displayed a single-loop learning proc-
ess. In order to stimulate the IND to double-loop learning, Parliament should
alter the nianner in which it gives direction. Instead of laying stress on  'num-
bers' and 'individual cases', Parliament could be more emphatic about the
values and interests that warrant consideration in policy execution.
8.5   SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study aimed to enlarge the insight into the impact of court decisions on
administrative procedures and working practices. To that end, this study fo-
cused  on the policy officers who function  at the middle management level  of a
government agency. The study shows that these policy officers fulfilled a key
role in the government agency's response to court decisions. They were the
first to know of court decisions,  and it was in their domain  how to respond.
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Furthermore, this study shed light on factors that inUuenced the impact of
court decisions, or had the potential to do so. It turned out that the impact of
court decisions was not only influenced by the characteristics of the govern-
ment agency, but also by factors emanating from the field of law in which the
government agency is operating, and by factors from the government agency's
political eiivironment. For a different government agency, operating in a dif-
ferent (legal and political) context, the factors identified may have a different
effect on the policy officers' response and, therefore, on the inipact of court
decisions.
The Employee Insurance Agency (FIA) and the Dutch Tax Authority (DTA),
for exaniple, operate in a different legal context. In comparison to the IND,
the decisions of these government agencies result less often in judicial appeal.
Depending on the characteristics of the goveniment agency and the infuences
from the agency's political environment (such as pressure from Parliament and
the role of interest groups), the relatively small number of court decisions may
induce these government agencies to a mode of non-response. On the other
hand, the EIA and the DTA aim to establish good relations with their clients,
which may motivate them to opt for a principle-based or a well-considered
mode of response. It would be a question for future research to find out under




APPENDIX 1: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Dutch English translation
ABRvS Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak Administrative jurisdiction De-
van de Raad van State partment of the Council of State
AC Aannieldcentrum Application Center
ACVZ Adviescommissie voor Vreem- Aliens Affairs Advisory Commis-
delingenzaken sion
Awb Algemene wet bestuursrecht General Administrative Law Act
COA Cetitraal Orgaan opvang Asiel- Central Agency for the Reception
zoekers of Asylum Seekers
EK Eerste Kamerstukken Parliamentary Papers  of the Upper
House (Senate)
IND Immigratie- en Naturalisatie Immigration and Naturalization
Dienst Service
Jv                  Jurisprudentie Vreeindelingen- Monthly journal on Dutch aliens
recht case law
NAV NieuwsbriefAsiel- en Vluch- Asylum and Refugee Law News-
telingenrecht letter
NJB Nederlands Juristenblad Dutch Journal for lawyers
NJCM Nederlands Juristen Comita Dutch section ofthe International
voor de Mensenrechten Commission oflurists (ICI)
OC Opvang- en onderzoekscen- Reception and Investigation Cen-
trum ter
RV Rechtspraak Vreemdelingen- Annual overview of Dutch aliens
recht case law
SMAK Stichting Medisch Advies Medical Advice Grouping Associa-
Collectief tion
Stc Staatscourant Netherlands Government Gazette
TBV Tussentijds Bericlit Vreemde- Interim report of the Aliens Act
lingencirculaire Implementation Guidelines
TK Tweede Kamerstukken Parliamentary Papers ofthe Lower
House (House of Representatives)
TNV Tijdeluke Noodvoorziening Temporary Facility
UNHCR   VN Hoge Commissariaat voor United Nations High Commis-
Vluchtelingen Sioner for Refugees
VAJN Vereniging Asiel juristen Ne- Association of Attorneys for Asy-
derland lum Seekers
Vb Vreemdelingenbesluit Aliens Decree
VC Vreemdelingencirculaire Aliens Act Implementation Guide-
lines
VVN VluchtelingenWerk Nederland Dutch Refugee Council
VW Vreemdelingenwet Aliens Act




DTA Dutch Tax Authority Belastingdienst
EIA Employee Insurance Agency Uitvoeringsorganisatie Werkgevers-
verzekeringen (UWV)
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APPENDIX  2:  LIST  OF  RESPONDENTS
Table  1: The policy o fficers interviewed
Working atNo   Staff unit Case Date of interviewIND since
1 Litigation Dublin 1996 December 15, 2004
2 Litigation AC 1994 March  16, 2004
3 Litigation Eurodac 1994 Deceniber 16, 2004
4 Litigation Age-Test 2000 November 30,2004
5 Litigation Deportation 1999 November 23,2004
6 Policy Execution Dublin 2()0() October  11,  2()04
7 Policy Execution AC 1998 January 4,20()4
8 Policy Execution Eurodac 1998 October 5,2004
9 Policy Execution Age-Test 1988 October 5,2004
10 Policy Execution Deportation            - - September 29,2004
Table 2: Additional interviews IND personnel.
Occupation Date of interview
1.        Manager of the Litigation staff unit June  1, 2005
2.        Manager of the Policy Execution staff unit August 24,2005
3. Senior Policy officer of the Asylulll staff unit March  16, 2004
4. Senior Lawyer, Litigation Division, unit South June 13, 20()3
5.   Caseworker, AC Schiphol April 20,2005
Table 3: Additional interviews non-IND personnel.
Occupation Date of interview
1. former State Advocate March 16, 2005
2.
Judge ofthe Aliens Division ofthe Anisterdani
January 6,2004District Court
3.
Head ofthe Litigation Division of the Employee
April 27,2()05Insurance Agency
4.       Senior
policy officer of the Dutch Tax Authority
(Policy Execution) April 28,2005
5. Senior policy officer of the Ministry of Finance April 28,2005
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APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW CHECKLIST
Introduction
Given its tasks, the IND is frequently confronted with court decisions. The aim
of this research is to describe the actions the IND takes in response to court
decisions. However, this study does not go into the specific consequences for
the asylum seeker's case. This study is confined to court decisions that address
the execution of the asylum  procedure and,  therefore,  may have consequences
for the handling of other asylum seekers' cases  than  the one in which the court
decided. For example, the court decision may address a particular group of
asylum seekers or the niatitier in which the asylu 111 procedure is executed.
An  example  of this type ofcourt decision is: [X]
Questions with regard to the IND response:
1.     Wliat did the court decision say?
- What did the Court meant to say with this court decision?
Was the court decision clear?
2.      Wliat  did  the  court  decision  mean for  the  organization?
- What were the consequences of the court decision for the organization?
What were the considerations?
3.       What  is  done  in  response  to  the  court  dedsion?
- What actions have (actually) been taken?
- What was the ultimate effect of the court decision for the agency's
working practices?
Questions with regard to influencing factors
1.   Who were involved in the agency's response to this court decision and
what was your (staff unit's) role in the process that followed in response to
the court decision?
2. Were there (at the time the court decided) specific factors that itifluenced
the agency's response to the court decision?;
- Did the media report on the outcome of the court decision?
-  Did Members of Parliament react to the court decision?
- Were interest groups involved in the agency's response to the court
decision?
3.      How do you regard judicial review? Was the court decision as clear as
other court decisions?
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APPENDIX 4: THE IND COMPARED TO THE EIA AND
THE DTA
Introduction
In this Appendix, the findings are presented of a comparison between, on  the
one hand, the IND, and, on the other hand, the Dutch Tax Authority (DTA)
and the EIA.494 The comparison is based on data distilled from the government
agencies' annual reports with regard to their administrative and judicial appeal
procedures. Furthermore, an expert meeting was held with employees of the
three government agencies to find an explanation for some remarkable differ-
ences and similarities in the government agencies' performance.
The Three Government Agencies
Like the IND, the EIA and the DTA take a large number of decisions. The
DTA is by far the largest of the three government agencies. In 2002 to 2004,
the DTA took between 6,500,000 and 8,500,000 decisions a year with regard
to income tax and corporation tax. The EIA is somewhat smaller and is, among
other things, responsible for the handling of applications for unemployment
benefits. With regard to unemployment benefits for (partially) disabled persons
and for those who have been dismissed, the EIA took in 2002 to 2004 between
1,300,000 and 1,600,000 decisions a year.  In comparison to these two govern-
ment agencies, the IND is much smaller. In the years 2002 to 2004, the IND
decided on 25,000 to 43,000 asylum applications a year (see Table 1).
Table 1: Number of decisions taken by  the  IND, EIA,  and DTA, 2002-2004.
Organization 2002 2003 2004
IND
Decisions taken in the AC
7,665 4,701 3,245
procedure
Decisions taken in the
35,298 28,25() 21,802normal asylum procedure






people who have been 719,591 880,694 908,230
dismissed
Total 1,348,954 1,521,084 1,387,725
494  The EIA is the governmental body responsible for implementing employee insurance
programs.
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Organization 2002           2003          2004
DTA
Decisions relating to per- 5,986,0()0 8,(}32,()00 6,25(),4 N W)sonal incoille tax
Decisions relating to corpo-
458,000 523,000 549,(}00rate inconie tax
Total 6,444,000 8,555,000 6,799,000
Table 2 presents the percentages of decisions (of the IND, the EIA and the
DTA) that resulted in an appeal with the court. From the percentages shown in
Table 2, it follows that, in comparison to the EIA and the DTA, the decisions
of the IND result niore often in judicial appeal.  In 2002, for example, 80% of
the decisions taken in the AC procedure resulted in an appeal with the court.
For the  EIA and the DTA, the percentages of decisions that resulted iii judicial
appeal are considerably lower.
Table  2:  Number and percentage of decisions that resulted ill judicial appeal (first
itistance), 2(}02-2004.49,
Organization 2002 2003 2004
IND
Decisioiis taken iii the AC 6,132 4,147
procedure 8<).0% 88.2%
Decisions taketi iii the nonnal 12,165 21,455
asyluni procedure 34.5% 75.9%
EIA
Decisions concerning (par- 3,433 3,519 4,751
tially) disabled persons 0.5% ().5% 1.0%
Decisions concerning people 1,492 1,472 2,229
who have been dismissed 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
DTA
Decisions relating to persotial 3,157 2,()76 1,147
111(01lle tax 0.05% c).03% 0.02%
Decisions relating to corporate 194 356 177
Iticome tax 0.1)4% 0.07% 0.03%
Differences and Similarities
The fact that, in coniparison with the 1)TA and the EIA, the IND is con-
fronted  with a large number  of judicial appeals  can be explained,  to a large
extent, by the differences in the govertiment ageticies' allocation of tasks and
working practices. First of all, the I )TA and the EIA primarily concentrate on
495 The appeals that have been withdrawri or foutid inadmissible are not included. The
percelitages are based on data adapted frotii the annual reports of the IND, the Aliens
Division of the Hague District Court, the EIA, and the DTA.
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the distribution of money, while the decisions of the IND can imply that the
applicant has to leave the Netherlands or is granted a residence permit. Since
the decisions of the IND touch upon matters of greater importance, asylum
seekers are (probably) more willing to challenge a rejection of their application.
Besides, the IND is supposed to execute a restrictive asylum policy, and it has
been suggested that,  in the case of restrictive legislation, applicants more easily
object to a negative decision on their application. Or, as a participant at the
expert nieeting mentioned: "Clients who notice that their situation gets worse
as a result of the introduction of restrictive legislation will more easily object
[the decision on their application, VWI."
A second distinction between the government agencies is that decisions of the
DTA niainly follow from computerized data systetiis that check the quantita-
tive infortnation that individual citizens have filled in on their tax forms, while
decisions of IND, on the other hand, are based on qualitative information that
is more difficult to assess. This difference in working process may form an
additional  explanation   for  the  differences  in the numbers  of judicial appeals.
After all, an individual will probably more easily object a consideration of
qualitative information, such as an asylum application, than a decision that
automatically follows from a computerized check of quantitative information
the individual supplied hiin- or herself.
Another difference in working practices is that both the DTA and the EIA
make considerable effort to prevent legal proceedings. Since establishing good
relations with their clients is one of their main priorities,  the I)TA and the EIA
spend much time in reconsidering and explaining their ultiniate decision when
a  citizen has filed a notice of objection against a decision. For instance,  in  some
cases, DTA and EIA use mediation to prevent that a client's objection results in
judicial appeal, if the client's claim is mainly based on non-legal issues. More-
over, both government agencies revise a relatively large number of decisions
during the objection procedure. For example, in 2003 and 2004, the EIA
agreed to 32% of the objections filed by applicants against decisions in unem-
ployment benefits,496 while the DTA agreed to about 47% of the objections
filed by citizens against decisions in personal income tax cases and to 69% of
the objections against decisions in corporate income tax cases.497 The EIA and
the DTA thus fully use the administrative appeal procedure to communicate
and reconsider their decisions. However, the IND is not able to do so because
the Aliens Act 2000 does not provide the possibility to  file a notice of objec-
tion against decisions in asylum applications: asylum seekers can only directly
lodge an appeal with the Aliens Division of the Hague 1)istrict Court. As a
consequence, the INI) is confronted \vith a relatively large number of legal
proceeditigs
496   UWV Jaarverslag; statistische bijlage  2004 (dra , p. 51.
497   Beheersverslag Belastingdienst 2004. p. 95.
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Furthermore, policy officers of the IND mentioned that, because,  in  the  Neth-
erlands, legal aid to asylum seekers is subsidized, asylum seekers even lodge an
appeal with the court in cases with very little chance of success. This could,  or
rather should, increase the chances of the IND of winning the case in court.
However, the percentages of appeals that were upheld by the court seem to
contradict this statement (see Table  3).
Table 3 shows the numbers of court decisions (in first instance) as well as the
percentages of appeals that were upheld by the court. Table 3 shows that, in
2002 and 2003, the Aliens Divisions of the District Courts decided in a large
number of appeals against decisions in asylum applications. The number of
court decisions with regard to asylum applications exceeds the number of court
decisions with regard to applications for unemployment benefits, or the deci-
sions of the DTA relating to personal and corporate income tax. However,  the
percentages of appeals that were upheld by the court do not significantly differ
between the three government agencies.
Table  3:  Number of court decisions iii first instance and percentage of appeals  that
were upheld, 2()02-2004.498
Organization 2002 2003 2004
IND
Decisions taken in the AC 6,642 4,689
procedure 18.9% 19.8%
Decisions taken in the normal 13,089 22,898
asylum procedure 25.3% 19.0%
EIA
Decisions concerning (par- 3,433 3,519 4,751
tially) disabled persons 26.3% 26.5% 27.1%
Decisions concerning people 1,492 1,472 2,229
who have been dismissed 33.1% 29.2% 34.9%
DTA
Decisions relating to personal 2,328 2,228 1,542
income tax 16.0;0 14.()% 23.0%
Decisions relating to corporate 217 158 152
incOIlle tax 28.1% 24.1% 36.2%
Contrary to what was expected, the differences in percentages of appeals that
were upheld by the court are rather small. Apparently, the three government
agencies have similar chances of winning or losing their case in court. How-
ever, since IND decisions result in judicial appeal more often than do decisions
by the ElA and the DTA, a relatively larger number of IND decisions is dis-
missed by the court.
498 The appeals that were declared inadmissible are not included.
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Conclusion
Data distilled from the annual reports of the three government agencies show
that, in comparison with the DTA and the EIA, the IND is confronted with a
large number ofjudicial appeals. This has to do with its allocation of tasks and
its working practices. The IND decides in matters in which stronger interests
are at stake and the organization is supposed to execute a restrictive asylum
policy. Furthermore,  the  IND  has to decide on the basis of qualitative informa-
tion that is frequently subject to changes, while the asylum procedure does not
provide an administrative appeal procedure. A remarkable similarity between
the three government agencies is that the percentages ofjudicial appeals that
were upheld by the court do not significantly differ. However, since IND
decisions resulted in judicial appeal more often than did decisions by the EIA
and the DTA, the court has disnzissed a relatively larger number of IND deci-




1)it onderzoek beschrijft en verklaart de wijze waarop beleidsinedewerkers van
de Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (INI)) reageren op rechterlijke uitspra-
ken. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat uitspraken waarin door een hogere rechterlij-
ke instantie kritiek is geuit op de matiier waarop de asielprocedure wordt
uitgevoerd, wel degelijk doorwerking vinden. Deze zogenoemde 'baanbre-
kende' rechterlijke uitspraken worden over het algemeen binnen enkele weken
vertaald in praktische consequenties voor de uitvoeringspraktijk en resukeren
vervolgens in een aanpassing van ambtelijke regelgeving en procedures. De
IND toont daarmee een juridisch competente organisatie te zijn die in staat is
van rechterlijke uitspraken te leren. De reactie van de beleidsmedewerkers op
rechterlijke uitspraken bleek evenwel vooral instrumenteel van aard. De be-
leidsmedewerkers concentreerden zich op 'de letter' van de rechterlijke uit-
spraak; de constatering dat een wetsartikel of verdragsbepaling was geschonden.
Aan 'de geest' van de rechterlijke uitspraken werd veel minder aandacht ge-
schonketi.
1)e resultaten van dit onderzoek moeten uiteraard worden bezien binnen de
context van de onderzoeksopzet. In deze studie is de doorwerking van rechter-
lijke uitspraken onderzocht voorzover de rechterlijke uitspraken consequenties
hadden voor de uitvoering van de asielprocedure. Het onderzoek gaat niet in
op de beteketiis van rechterlijke uitspraken voor de afhandeling van individuele
zaken. Daarover zijn andere rapporten verschenen.499 Het onderzoek beperkte
zich verder tot de procedurele effecten van rechterlijke uitspraken.  Of een wij-
zigitig van regels eii procedures bij beslismedewerkers en ketenpartners tot een
gedragsveratidering heeft geleid, is tiiet onderzoclit.
Vier ambtelijke responsstijlen
In dit onderzoek worden vier ambtelijke responsstijlen onderscheiden. De
respotisstijlen verschillen in de mate waarin beleidsiiiedewerkers van een uit-
voeringsorganisatie aandaclit schenken aan 'de letter' en 'de geest' van rechter-
lijke uitspraken (Hoofdstuk  1). De letter  van een rechterlijke uitspraak betreft
het oordeel van de rechter over de vraag of in het concrete geval een wets-
artikel of verdragsbepaling geschonden is. De geest van een rechterlijke uit-
spraak refereert naar de meer algemene overwegingen die de rechter in zijn
uitspraak verwoordt ten aanzien vall de belangen of waarden die in de beleids-
uitvoering gewaarborgd moeten zun. Athankelijk van de tilate waarin de be-
leidstnedewerkers aandacht schenken aan respectievelijk 'de letter' en 'de geest'
van rechterlijke uitspraken, kan de respons weloverwogen, instrumenteel of
principieel zijn, of afwezig blijven.
499 Zie bijvoorbeeld rapport van de Nationale Ombudsman tir. 2()03/385.
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Figuur 1: Vier ambteliike responsstiilen.
Nadruk op geest van de uitspraak
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Bij een weloverwogen responsstijl schenken de beleidsmedewerkers van de
uitvoeringsorganisatie zowel aandacht aan de letter als aan de geest van een
rechterlijke uitspraak. In reactie op een rechterlijke uitspraak onderzoeken de
beleidsmedewerkers eerst op welke onderdelen de uitvoeringspraktijk in strijd
is met het wetsartikel dat volgens de rechter geschonden is, en gaan vervolgens
na of de geconstateerde schending van die rechtsregel mogelijk voortkomt uit
een disbalans in de belangenafweging die de organisatie gewoon is te maken. In
een weloverwogen reactie op rechterlijke uitspraken houden de beleids-
medewerkers er dus rekening mee dat naast een concrete aanpassing van de
uitvoeringspraktijk, ook de uitgangspunten die de organisatie in de uitvoering
hanteert, moeten worden herzien. Ze zijn zich ervan bewust dat de beleids-
uitvoering dient te voldoen aan meerdere, veelal tegenstrijdige, belangen en
houden daarom rekening met de mogelijkheid dat een eenzijdige nadruk op
bepaalde doelstellingen tot de door de rechter geconstateerde juridische on-
volkomenheid in de uitvoering van beleid heefi geleid. Hun motto is: "Hoe
kunnen we het beter doen? Hoe kunnen we eenler gemaakte fouten voor-
komen?" Een weloverwogen respons resulteert in zowel korte- als lange-
termijn maatregelen, die bedoeld zijn oni de uitvoeringspraktijk in overeen-
stemming te brengen met de rechterlijke uitspraak en te voorkomen dat een
soortgelijke fout noginaals wordt gemaakt.
In het geval van een instrumentele responsstijl concentreren de beleidsme-
dewerkers zich vooral op de letter van een recliterlijke uitspraak. De beleids-
medewerkers weten uit de uitspraak af te leiden waarom de uitvoeringspraktijk
niet aan een bepaalde rechtsregel voldoet en gaan na op welke wijze de kloof
tussen het rechterlijk oordeel en de uitvoeringspraktijk is te dichten. Hun mot-
to is: "Itegels zijn regels, en regels dienen te worden uitgevoerd." In een in-
strumentele responsstijl wordt minder aandacht geschonken aan de waarden die
de rechter in zijn uitspraak heeft verwoord. Deze worden bijvoorbeeld niet
gebruikt voor een nadere analyse van de wijze waarop het beleid door de or-
ganisatie wordt uitgevoerd. Met een instrumentele responsstijl blijft de reactie
op rechterlijke uitspraken beperkt tot ad hoc maatregelen, die bedoeld zijn om
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ambtelijke procedures en de uitvoeringspraktijk in overeenstemming te bren-
gen met het wetsartikel dat volgens de rechter geschonden is.
In een principiBle responsstijl leggen de beleidsmedewerkers juist nadruk op de
geest van de rechterlijke uitspraak. Evenals bij een weloverwogen en instru-
mentele responsstijl zijn de beleidsmedewerkers goed in staat rechterlijke uit-
spraken te interpreteren. Echter, op basis van de overwegingen die de rechter
in zijn uitspraak heeft verwoord, komen zij tot een andere interpretatie van het
recht in het concrete geval. De beleidsmedewerkers zijn daarom minder bereid
de letter van de uitspraak te volgen. In reactie op een rechterlijke uitspraak re-
fereren de beleidsmedewerkers daarom naar de meer algemene doelstellingen
van de wet, of de waarden die de rechter in zijn uitspraak heeft verwoord,
maar de uitvoeringspraktijk wordt niet conform de letter van de uitspraak aan-
gepast. De beleidsmedewerkers nemen in hun reactie op rechterlijke uitspraken
dus "De intentie van de wet" of "De geest van de rechterlijke uitspraak" als
uitgangspunt. Een principiele responsstijl biedt zodoende ruimte om flexibel (of
creatief) met complexe situaties om te gaan. Een gevolg van een principiele
responsstijl is evenwel dat de legaliteit van de uitvoeringspraktijk onder druk
komt te staan. Omdat de beleidsniedewerkers niet geheel tegemoet komen aan
de letter van de rechterlijke uitspraak, kan een discrepantie ontstaan tussen de
ambtelijke uitvoeringspraktijk en het recht, zoals verwoord in de letter van uit-
spraak. Het uiteindelijke effect van de rechterlijke uitspraak is daarom pas na
verloop van tijd te beoordelen. Wanneer na enige tijd de ambtelijke uitvoe-
ringspraktijk alsnog in overeenstemming is gebracht met de letter van de uit-
spraak, of wanneer wet- en regelgeving is aangepast om de uitvoeringspraktijk
te rechtvaardigen, heeft de rechterlijke uitspraak wel degelijk enig effect gehad.
Wanneer na verloop van tijd de kloof tussen ambtelijke uitvoeringspraktijk en
rechterlijke uitspraak niet is gedicht, is het effect van de rechterlijke uitspraak
miniem te noemen.
In het geval van een non-response wordt in feite niet op rechterlijke uitspraken
gereageerd. De organisatie handhaaft haar uitvoeringspraktijk zonder te (willen)
beseffen dat de rechtmatigheid van haar handelen door de rechter is be-
kritiseerd. Deze responsstijl kan het gevolg zijn van een gebrek aan juridische
kennis en informatie, of ingegeven zijn door weerstand om aan een rechterlijke
uitspraak te voldoen. In het laatste geval reageren de beleidsmedewerkers op
rechterlijke uitspraken met de standaard reactie: "Deze uitspraak heeft geen
werking buiten het concrete geval." Een non-respons op rechterlijke uitspra-
ken betekent ook dat vanuit de omgeving van de organisatie, door bijvoor-
beeld de media of het parlement, onvoldoende aandacht wordt geschonken  aan
de naleving van rechterlijke uitspraken. Het gevolg is dat de organisatie niet
van rechterlijke uitspraken leert.
De responsstijl bepaalt dus op welke wijze en in welke mate een ambtelijke
organisatie leert van rechterlijke uitspraken. De door de beleidsmedewerkers
gehanteerde responsstijl kan evenwel per geval verschillen: Afhankelijk van de
situatie kan een verschillende responsstijl worden gehanteerd. Echter, in een
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bepaalde institutionele context kunnen de beleidsmedewerkers een bepaalde
responsstijl prefereren.
Doorwerking van rechterlijke uitspraken in de asielprocedure
Aan de hand van vijf zogoemde 'baanbrekende' rechterlijke uitspraken is in
deze studie onderzocht hoe de beleidsmedewerkers van de IND op rechterlijke
uitspraken reageren (Hoofdstuk 5).
De eerste casus betrof een uitspraak van het Europese Hof voor de Rechten
van de Mens van 7 maart 2000. Ondanks het feit dat het Europese Hof zich in
deze uitspraak primair richtte tot het Verenigd Koninkrijk, zag ook de IND
zich genoodzaakt op deze uitspraak te reageren. Bij de vreemdelingenrecht-
bank werden namelijk, met verwijzing naar de uitspraak van het Europese Hof,
meerdere beroepsprocedures tegen een voorgenomen Dublinoverdracht aange-
spannen. In haar uitspraak had het Europese Hof de claim van de asielzoeker
ongegrond verklaard, doch tevens aangegeven dat EU-lidstaten er niet zomaar
vanuit mogen gaan dat de overdracht van een asielzoeker naar een ander Du-
blinland geen schending van artikel 3 EVRM zou kunnen opleveren. Ook bij
de overdracht van asielzoekers op basis van de Overeenkomst van Dublin die-
nen er volgens het Europese Hof voldoende procedurele waarborgen te be-
staan om indirecte schending van artikel 3 EVRM te voorkomen.Scm De dis-
cussie die vervolgens tijdens beroepsprocedures in de rechtzaal werd gevoerd,
had betrekking op de vraag of de asielzoeker, of de Staatssecretaris van justitie,
aannemelijk zou moeten maken dat het Dublinland, waaraan de asielzoeker
zou worden overgedragen, zijn verplichtingen aangaande artikel 3 EVRM niet
nakomt. Volgens de beleidsmedewerkers van de IND voldeed de Nederlandse
asielprocedure reeds aan de uitspraak van het Europese Hof In het verweer in
de beroepsprocedures is door de procesvertegenwoordigers van de IND aange-
geven dat Nederland in Dublinzaken uitgaat van het interstatelijke vertrou-
wensbeginsel. Dit houdt in dat ervan uit wordt gegaan dat de landen die aan-
gesloten zijn bij internationale verdragen de daaruit voortvloeiende verplich-
tingen nakomen. Omciat echter de uitspraak van het Europese Hof door de
vreemdelingenkamers verschillend werd geinterpreteerd, is begin 2001 besloten
de officiEle interpretatie van de rechterlijke uitspraak op te nemen in de
Vreemdelingencirculaire. Deze interpretatie is later door de Afdeling Bestuurs-
rechtspraak bevestigd. Desondanks bleef de kwestie nog enige tijd onder-501
werp van rechterlijke procedures.
De tweede casus betrof een uitspraak  van het Gerechtshof Den  Haag van 31
oktober 2002. Deze uitspraak volgde op een langlopend con lict tussen belan-
genvertegenwoordigers van asieladvocaten en de vroegere Staatssecretaris van
Justitie (thans de Minister voor V&1) over de verlenging van de AC-procedure
van 24 naar 48 uur. In de uitspraak oordeelde het Gerechtshof dat gezien de
verblijfomstandigheden van asielzoekers in de aanmeldcentra (AC's) er sprake
500 EHRM 7 maart 2000, T.I. vs. Verenigd Koninkrijk (RV 1974-2003 nr. 4).
501   ABRVS 25 oktober 20(It  (RV 2001  nr.  15; JV 20(jl/328).
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was van onrechtitiatige vrijheidsontneming. Iii reactie op deze rechterlijke
uitspraak hebben de beleidsmedewerkers van de IND de Minister voor Vreem-
delitige,izaken eii Integratie (V&1) geadviseerd de aanwezigheidsverplichting
voor asielzoekers aan te passen. Sinds 5 december 2002 geldt dat asielzoekers in
de zogenoemde land-AC's tussen 22:00 tot 07:30 uur elders mogen verblijven.
In de derde casus stond eveneens de AC-procedure centraal. I)itmaal betrof het
een uitspraak van de Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak in een zaak die was aange-
spanneti door een asielzoeker. Deze stelde dat de AC-procedure was aangevan-
gen op het moment dat de Vreemdelingenpolitie zijn vingerafdrukken had ver-
zonden naar Eurodac. Eurodac is een Europees datasysteem waarin de vinger-
afdrukken worden bewaard van vreemdelingen die op illegale wijze het EU
grondgebied zijii ingereisd of in 66n van de EU-lidstaten asiel hebben aange-
vraagd. Gezien het tijdstip waarop de vingerafdrukken van de asielzoeker naar
Eurodac waren verzonden, was volgens de asielzoeker, op het moment dat de
IND over zijn asielverzoek had beslist, de 48-uursterniijn reeds verstreken en
daarom had de IND het asielverzoek niet in de AC-procedure mogen afwijzen.
De Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak stelde de asielzoeker in het gelijk.502 Volgens
de Afdeling behoorden de handelingen die de Vreemdelingelipolitie had ver-
richt tot het onderzoek naar de inwilligbaarheid van de asielaanvraag, en over
asielverzoeken die in de AC-procedure worden afgedaan, dient binnen 48
procesuren te worden beslist. Deze uitspraak noodzaakte de beleidsniede-
werkers van de IND de tot dan toe gebruikelijke werkwijze aan te passen. Om
de uitvoeringspraktijk in overeenstemming te brengen met het oordeel van de
rechter is door de beleidsmedewerkers de Eurodac Verordening zodanig gein-
terpreteerd dat het moment van verzenden van de vingerafdrukken samenvalt
met het moment waarop de asielaanvraag feitelijk door de IND in behandeling
wordt genomen. In een werkinstructie is aan medewerkers van de Vreemdelin-
genpolitie uitgelegd, dat pas op het moment waarop het eerste gehoor met de
asielzoeker daadwerkelijk begint, de vingerafdrukken van de asielzoeker naar
Eurodac verzonden mogen worden.
De vierde casus betrof een uitspraak van de Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak over
de wijze waarop het leeftijdsonderzoek bij alleenstaande minderjarige vreemde-
lingen wordt uitgevoerd.503 De beroepsprocedure was aangespannen door een
asielzoeker wiens asielverzoek, mede op basis van het leeftijdsonderzoek, iii de
AC-procedure was afgewezen. In haar uitspraak oordeelde de Afdeling dat de
Minister voor V&1 niet aan haar vergewisplicht had voldaan. Op grond van
artikel 3:2 van de Algemene wet bestuursrecht dient de Minister zich ervan te
vergewissen dat ieder onderzoek, dat aan een besluit ten grondslag ligt, op een
deugdelijke en zorgvuldige wijze is vericht. Uit deze uitspraak maakten de be-
leidsmedewerkers van de IND op dat de radiologen, die de rontgenfoto's van
asielzoekers beoordelen, hun bevindingen over de uitrijping van de sleutel-
beenderen in het vervolg anders (niet een paraaf en lettercode) dienden te
502 ABRvS 28 oktober 2()03 (IV 2<)113/559).
501  ABRvS 23 oktober 2()03 (IV 2()03/512; JB 2()03/321).
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ondertekenen. De nieuwe werkwijze is vervolgens in de procedure voor het
leeftijdsonderzoek vastgelegd en de IND-beslismedewerkers zijn via een werk-
instructie van de wijziging op de hoogte gebracht. Bovendien besloot de Mi-
nister voor V&1, mede naar aanleiding van deze rechterlijke uitspraak, in te
stemmen met de instelling van een medisch-ethische commissie, die thans toe-
zicht houdt op de uitvoering van het leeftijdsonderzoek. Enkele maanden nadat
de Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak uitspraak had gedaan, bleek ecliter dat niet de
aanpassing van de wijze waarop de radiologen hun bevindingen ondertekenen,
nog niet volledig aan de rechterlijke uitspraak was voldaan. In twee nieuwe be-
roepsprocedures, waarin het leeftijdsonderzoek volgens de nieuwe procedure
was uitgevoerd, oordeelde de Afdeling dat nog niet aan artikel 3:2 Awb was
voldaan, omdat de Minister voor V&[ (i.c. de IND) niet bekend was met de
504namen van de radiologen die het leeftijdsonderzoek hadden uitgevoerd.
De vijfde casus ten slotte had betrekking op de uitzetting van uitgeprocedeerde
Somalische asielzoekers. Op 25 mei 2004 oordeelde de Afdeling Bestuursrecht-
spraak, dat vanwege een interim measure  van het Europese  Ho f voor de R.ech-
ten van de Mens, een bepaalde groep Somalische asielzoekers niet langer naar
noord-SomaliB kon worden uitgezet.505 In reactie op deze rechterlijke uitspraak
hebben de beleidsniedewerkers van de IND de Minister voor V&I geadviseerd
een vertrekmoratorium in te stellen voor Somalische asielzoekers die ill noord-
Somalie geen familie- of clan-banden hebben, of daar tot een minderheids-
groep behoren. Op grond van deze maatregel kreeg deze groep asielzoekers
weer recht op opvang. Op 31 augustus 2004 volgde echter een nieuwe interim
nieasure van het Europese Hof. Met deze interim measure werd de Neder-
landse Staat verzocht een afgewezen Somalische asielzoeker, die in het land van
herkomst tot een meerderheidsgroep behoorde, niet naar noord-Sonialie uit te
zetten, totdat het Europese Hof in de zaak uitspraak had gedaan. Een officiale
reactie van de Minister voor V&1 betreffende de consequenties van deze in-
terim measure voor vergelijkbare asielzaken liet enkele maanden op zich wach-
ten en volgde pas nadat de Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak daarover uitspraak had
gedaan.  Op 17 december 2004 oordeelde de Afdeling  dat de nieuwe interim
measure van het Europese Hof betekende dat ook andere asielzoekers niet naar
noord-Somalif konden worden uitgezet.506 Naar aanleiding van deze uitspraak
is in februari 2()05 voor een breder gedefinieerde groep Somalische asielzoekers
een vertrekmoratorium ingesteld. Enkele maanden later volgde een categoriaal
beschermingbeleid voor asielzoekers afkomstig uit Somalia.
Factoren die de doorwerking van rechterlijke uitspraken beinvloeden
In het onderzoek naar de ambtelijke reactie op bovenstaande rechterlijke uit-
spraken zijn negen hypotheses onderzocht met betrekking tot factoren die de
doorwerking van rechterlijke uitspraken zouden kunnen beTnvloeden (Hoofd-
stuk 3). De hypotheses hadden betrekking op:
504  ABRvS 31  maart 2004 (}V 2(M 14/210 en JV 2004/211).
5(15  ABRvS 25 mei 2(}()4 (jV 2()(14/277)
*  ABR.vS 17 december 2004 (IV 2()(15/7(1).
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-    de kenmerken van de organisatie;
-    het recht; en,
-    de politieke omgeving van de organisatie.
Uiteindelijk bleek een zestal factoren ertoe te hebben bijgedragen dat de be-
leidsmedewerkers van de INI) veelal een instrunientele responsstijl hanteerden
(Hoofilstuk  7).
Ke„„ierketi van de orgattisatie
Met betrekking tot de kenmerken van de organisatie zijn drie factoreii otider-
scheiden die alle de doorwerking van rechterlijke uitspraken bleken te beYn-
vloeden. Ten eerste was de juridische conipetentie van de beleidsmede-werkers
groot te noemen. I)e beleidsmedewerkers bleken goed bekend met het be-
stuursrecht en het vreemdelitigenrecht. Hun juridische competentie en vak-
inhoudelijke expertise stelde lien in staat rechterlijke uitspraken zo te inter-
preteren dat de uitvoeringspraktijk in overeensteniming werd gebracht met het
wetsartikel waaraan volgens de rechter niet werd voldaan. Ten tweede was de
verspreiding van juridische kennis en informatie naar belatighebbenden bitinen
en buiten de eigen organisatie goed georganiseerd. I)it droeg bij aan eeii snelle
opvolging van rechterlijke uitspraken die de uitvoering van de asielprocedure
dreigden te verstoren. De professionele houding van de beleidsmedewerkers
ten aanzien van recliterlijke uitspraken is welhaast een logisch gevolg van de
ontwikkelingen die zich sinds de oprichting van de IND (in 1994) op het ter-
rein van het vreemdelingenrecht hebben voorgedaan (Hoofdstuk 4). De grote
toestrooni van asielzoekers in het midden van de jaren negentig noodzaakte de
organisatie tot een efficiEnte uitvoering van haar taken.
Het derde kenmerk van de organisatie, het juridisch noniibewustzijn van de
beleidsmedewerkers, bleek echter de doorwerking van rechterlijke uitspraken
negatief te beinvloeden. Met juridisch normbewustzijn wordt bedoeld dat de
beleidsmedewerkers zich bewust tonen van de waarden die in de uitvoering
van het beleid een rol behoren te spelen en deze in de ambtelijke uitvoerings-
praktijk trachten te waarborgen. Uit het otiderzoek komt naar voren dat het
juridisch norinbewustzijn van de IND beleidsmedewerkers het anegt tegen
politieke druk vanuit de externe omgeving van de organisatie. In reactie op de
rechterlijke uitspraken werd door de beleidsmedewerkers meer belang gehecht
aaii het streven om binneti een zo kort mogelijke tijd over asielverzoeken Ie
bestissen, dan aan andere waarden die in rechterlijke uitspraken werden ver-
woord.
Het reclit
Met betrekking tot het recht zun twee factoren onderscheiden: de kenmerken
van het rechtsgebied en de duidelukheid van rechterlijke uitspraken. Uit het
onderzoek blukt dat de kenmerken van het vreemdelingenrecht er mede toe
hebben bijgedragen dat de beleidsmedewerkers van de IND voornameluk een
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instrumentele responsstijl hanteerden. Het vreemdelingenrecht wijkt namelijk
op onderdelen sterk af van andere bestuursrechtssgebieden. In vergelijking met
bijvoorbeeld het sociale verzekeringsrecht of het belastingrecht is het vreemde-
lingenrecht een sterk gejuridiseerd rechtsgebied. In de Vreemdelingenwet zijn
niet betrekking tot bijvoorbeeld de indiening en afhandeling van bezwaar- en
beroepsschriften nadere procedures en terinijnen vastgelegd die afwijken van de
Awb. Daarmee biedt de Vreemdelingenwet een juridische context waarin het
belang van de uitvoeringsorganisatie (een snelle en efficiante afhandeling van
asielverzoeken) prevaleert boven het belang van de asielzoeker (om zijn aan-
vraag zorgvuldig onder woorden te brengen). Bovendien wordt de IND, in
vergelijking met andere uitvoeringsorganisaties, niet een groot aantal beroeps-
procedures geconfronteerd en wordt een relatief groot percentage van de be-
slissingen in asielzaken door de rechter (in eerste instantie) vernietigd.
De voorkeur van de IND beleidsmedewerkers voor een instrumentele respons-
stijl lijkt daarnaast te worden versterkt door de wijze waarop de Afdeling Be-
stuursrechtspraak, als hoger beroepsinstantie in vreemdelingenzaken, invulling
geeft aan haar controlerende taak. Door de Afdeling wordt niet alleet i strikt
vastgehouden aan het principe dat in het bestuursrecht besluiten van een uit-
voeringsorganisatie door de recliter (slechts) marginaal worden getoetst, ook
hanteert de Afdeling bij de beoordeling van beroepsprocedures een legistische
interpretatie van de wet. Dus terwijl de Afdeling aan de IND een grote mate
van beleidsvrijheid toestaat, legt ze in haar uitspraken juist nadruk op de letter
van de wet.
De duidelijkheid van rechterlijke uitspraken bleek van nunder groot belang
voor de doonverking van rechterlijke uitsprakell dan over het algemeen in
rechtssociologische literatuur wordt verondersteld. De beleidsmedewerkers van
de IND bleken voldoende juridisch competent om rechterlijke uitspraken te
interpreteren. lin het geval een rechterlijke uitspraak onduidelijk werd gevon-
den, duurde het wat langer voordat de uitspraak van de rechter resulteerde in
een gepaste aanpassing van de uitvoeringspraktijk.
De politicke onigevi,W vati de organisatie
Met betrekking tot de politieke omgeving van de organisatie zijn vier factoren
onderscheiden. Twee daarvan bleken te hebben bijgedragen aan het feit dat de
beleidsmedewerkers van de IND een instrumentele responsstijl hanteerden.
Ten eerste toonden de beleidsmedewerkers zich sterk geconimitteerd aan de
politieke doelstellingen van het asielbeleid: achterstanden in de afhandeling van
asielverzoeken moesten voorkomen worden en de kosten voor de opvang van
asielzoekers dienden zo beperkt mogelijk te blijven. De beleidsmedewerkers
stelden zich ten dienste van het 'politiek primaat'. Zij zagen het als hun taak de
Minister voor V&1 te adviseren in hoeverre het door 'de politiek' gewenste
beleid juridisch mogelijk zou zijn.
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Het commitment van de beleidsmedewerkers aan de politieke doelstellingen
van het asielbeleid heeft er enerzijds toe bijgedragen dat rechterlijke uitspraken
doorwerking vonden. Rechterlijke uitspraken die de versnelde afhandeling van
asielverzoeken (de AC-procedure) dreigden te verstoren, resulteerden over het
algerneen binnen enkele weken in een aanpassing van ambtelijke procedures
en/of uitvoeringspraktijk. Anderzijds werd als gevolg van dit commitment
weinig aandacht geschonken aan de waarden die in een rechterlijke uitspraak
besloten lagen en bleef het effect van de rechterlijke uitspraken beperkt. Van-
wege hun loyaliteit aan het politieke primaat achtten de beleidsniede-werkers
zich niet iii de positie om in het licht van de geest van een rechterlijke uit-
spraak de (operationele) doelstellingen van de organisatie te evalueren. Zij
concentreerden zich vooral op de letter van een rechterlijke uitspraak.
Daarnaast werd de reactie van de bcleidsmedewerkers op rechterlijke uitspra-
ken beinvloed door politieke druk vanuit de Tweede Kanier. Ten eerste heeft
het parletiient, met de invoering Vreemdelingenwet 200(), een specifieke juri-
dische context gecreeerd die de beleidsmedewerkers van de IND tot een iii-
strumentele responsstijl heeft stimuleerd. Daarmee kan uiteraard het par-lement
niet worden verweten dat in de uitvoering van de asielprocedure de grenzen
van de wet worden opgezocht,  of soms zelfs worden overschreden,  maar aan-
houdende kritiek vanuit de Tweede Kamer (over onder meer de acliterstanden
in de afhandeling van asielverzoeken) heeft er wel toe bijgedra-gen dat de
IND-beleidsmedewerkers beducht bleken voor problemen in de beleidsuitvoe-
ring en zich djarom vooral concentreerden op een letterlijke interpretatie van
rechterlijke uitspraken. Daarnaast bleek dat, wanneer Tweede Kamerleden aan
de Minister voor V&1 vragen hadden gesteld over de conse-quenties van een
rechterlijke uitspraak, juist de letter van die uitspraak secuur werd geinterpre-
teerd.
De invloed van de media op de doorwerking van rechterluke uitspraken bleek
minder groot dan vooraC bij aanvang van het onderzoek, was verondersteld.
Hoewel de media veelvuldig over problemen in de uitvoering van de asiel-
procedure heeft bericht, wordt in de media slechts in beperkte mate aandacht
geschonken aan de inhoud of uitkonist van beroepsprocedures. Van de vijf
onderzochte cases is bijvoorbeeld alleen de kwestie rond het leeftijdsonderzoek
uitgebreid in kranten beschreven. Als gevolg van de negatieve publiciteit over
de IND-organisatie en de aandacht voor zogetioemde 'schrijnende gevallen'
zijn de medewerkers van de IND evenwel beducht om fouten te maken. Be-
leidsmedewerkers gaven aan zich daaroni vooral te concentreren op 'regels en
procedures'. Belangengroepen, ten slotte, bleken nauwelijks betrokken te wor-
den bij de ambtelijke reactie op rechterlijke uitspraken. Hun bijdrage aan de
doonverking van rechterlijke uitspraken lag veeleer in de fase die vooraf gaat
aan een rechterlijke uitspraak. Vanwege hun kennis en expertise bleken zij in
staat beroepsprocedures aan te spannen die leidden tot een baanbrekende rech-
terlijke uitspraak. Zij zijn als het ware 'de aanjagers' van het proces, en bie-den
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